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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                         FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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                               NORTHERN DIVISION
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       R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA,
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       Secretary of Labor,
                Plaintiff
                                       Civil Docket No. RDB-15-3315
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       CHIMES DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
 6
       et al.,
                Defendants
 7
                                                Baltimore, Maryland
                                                December 17, 2018
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                                                 4:10 PM to 6:31 PM
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                     THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR
                          TELEPHONIC MOTIONS HEARING
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                    BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD D. BENNETT
11
                             APPEARANCES
12
       On behalf of the Plaintiff:
              Patrick M. Dalin, Esquire
13
              Katrina Liu, Esquire
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       On behalf of the Defendants:
              Richard I. Scharlat, Esquire
15
              Mark D. Meredith, Esquire
              Brian Cousin, Esquire
16
              Christina S. Dumitrescu, Esquire
17
              Marc A. Koonin, Esquire
              Joseph S. Ferretti, Esquire
              Robert D. Eassa, Esquire
18
              Scott Weatherford, Esquire
              Rebecca Newman Strandberg, Esquire
19
              Donald J. Kravet, Esquire
20
21
            Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography,
       transcript produced by computer.
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                      MARTIN J. GIORDANO, RMR, CRR, FOCR
                         U.S. Courthouse, Fourth Floor
2.4
                            101 West Lombard Street
                           Baltimore, Maryland 21201
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                                  410-962-4504
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PROCEEDINGS OF DECEMBER 17, 2018

THE COURT: Good afternoon. I'll be with you in one second.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Good afternoon to everyone. I'm sorry to keep you all waiting for a few minutes. This is a telephone conference on the record --

MR. KOONIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This is a telephone conference on the record here on Acosta versus Chimes, et al., Civil

Number RDB-15-3315. Based upon my conference call with counsel on Friday and my letter order, which is Paper 522 that was filed today, at the request of counsel for FCE, I have delayed this trial for about a week, so the bench trial will start

Monday, January the 14th, with a pretrial conference Friday,

January the 11th, and, with that, we have a series of motions in limine which have been filed, pretty exhaustive amount of material here, and I've gone through a lot of it and spent a lot of time with this, but we're just going to go step by step with respect to these motions.

If counsel will just identify themselves for the record, please.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Counsel, just identify themselves for the record, please. First of all, on the line for the Plaintiff,

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for the Government, Secretary of Labor?
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                 MR. DALIN: Your Honor, this is Patrick Dalin for the
       Secretary of Labor.
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                 THE COURT: All right.
                 MS. LIU: And Katrina Liu for the Secretary.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to the both of
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       you. And then for the Defendant --
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                 MS. LIU: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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                 MR. DALIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: And then for the Defendant Chimes,
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       District of Columbia, Inc.?
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                 MR. SCHARLAT: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
                 Richard Scharlat and Mark Meredith are here.
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                 Brian Cousin and Christina Dumitrescu should be on
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       the phone from the car.
                 MR. COUSIN: Hello, Your Honor. We're here.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Then, for the Defendant
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       Chimes International, same set of lawyers, correct?
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                 MR. SCHARLAT: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. And then --
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                 MR. COUSIN: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: -- FCE Benefit Administrators, who is on
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       the line?
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                 MR. KOONIN: Yes, Your Honor. This is Marc Koonin.
       I'm present, as is our local counsel, Joe Ferretti.
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THE COURT:
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                             Okay.
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                 MR. EASSA: And also Rob Eassa, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to all of you.
       And then, Mr. Eassa, I hope you're feeling better.
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                 MR. EASSA:
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT:
                             Then we have, for the -- I think we have
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       the same group of lawyers there, and then we have, going
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       through here -- just hold on one second here.
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           (Pause.)
                 THE COURT: For the Defendant, Marilyn Ward?
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                 MR. WEATHERFORD: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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                 Scott Weatherford for Marilyn Ward, and I think
       Rebecca Strandberg, local counsel, is also present.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon.
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                 MS. STRANDBERG: Yes, Your Honor, I am.
                 THE COURT: All right. Have I missed anybody?
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           (No response.)
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Good.
                                           Thank you all very much.
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                 MR. COUSIN: Your Honor?
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                 THE COURT: Yes.
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                 MR. COUSIN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Cousin. I
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       believe that Kravet & Vogel, Don Kravet, is also on the line.
       He's another counsel for Chimes. These are special counsel on
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       the experts.
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                 THE COURT: All right. That's fine.
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Have I missed anybody else? One, two, three. Hearing none, okay, we're ready to proceed.

First of all, we have four motions filed by the Secretary, and I'll use the phrase Secretary and the Government interchangeably. The first is the Secretary of Labor's motion in limine and memorandum in support of his motion to exclude the testimony of the Employee Benefit Security Administration's investigator, Siamack Gharanfoli, and to exclude evidence of the Employee Benefit Security Administration.

I'm going to give each side about a minute to summarize their positions. I have read all this material exhaustively. I've gone through it. I don't need to have you just restate everything you've written, because there has been quite a bit of written material, but I'll give each side an opportunity. This is the Secretary's motion, and then you all can decide who is going to speak for the Defendants. The Defendants have filed a joint opposition.

This is Paper Number 477 that was filed on December the 5th with quite a few -- let's say we've had an exhaustive amount of material filed in the last -- just literally within the last two weeks.

So, with that, I'll be glad to hear from counsel for the Secretary for about a minute or two, and then I'd be glad to hear from whoever wants to take the lead for the Defense response on that, and I believe that, at least initially -- I'm

not sure who is taking the lead on it. It would appear that the response on that -- well, I can't tell. It was filed by everyone. I can't tell if it was Mr. Cousin from Denton's or whoever is going to take the lead, or Michael Schrier for Duane Morris, but I'd be glad to hear from the Secretary --

MR. KOONIN: Your Honor?

THE COURT: I'll be glad to hear from the Secretary on this, first of all.

MS. LIU: Sure, Your Honor. Katrina Liu here.

So Siamack Gharanfoli is an investigator for us, so his only role in this was to gather information during the administrative investigation, so he has no personal knowledge to which he'd be able to testify in court to. He'd only be reporting what others have told him, which, in this case, would be inadmissible hearsay.

And then any other testimony that may be solicited as to his opinions, his impressions, or conclusions during that administrative investigation would be protected by the deliberative process privilege.

At one point, I do want to sort of respond a little bit to at least the written response from Defendants. It sounds like they're challenging essentially the sufficiency of the investigation. That is not relevant here. We are now litigating, and so the evidence is being presented anew to the Court, and what happened at the administrative stage is not

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really something that the Court is to review.
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                                                      It's really to
       review the evidence itself to determine whether the violations
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       have occurred.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much.
       Thank you very much on that, and I'll be glad to hear from
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       Defense side on this now.
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                 What one lawyer is going to speak for the Defendants
       on this?
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                 MR. SCHARLAT: Your Honor, this is Richard Scharlat.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
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                 MR. SCHARLAT: Unless somebody stops me, I'll speak
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       for the Defendant.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
                 MR. SCHARLAT: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 First of all, the Secretary himself, in his brief,
       said -- lists -- and in the Draft Pretrial Order, lists
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       Mr. Gharanfoli as a witness and indicates the need arises.
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       There is no way to anticipate exactly what's going to happen at
       trial, and to categorically bar him is very premature.
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                 We've given the Court a couple of examples in our
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       papers about where his testimony or evidence that he created
       would be relevant. We've also got -- I'm sorry?
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                 THE COURT: I didn't say anything.
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                 MR. SCHARLAT: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
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                 THE COURT: No. I didn't say anything.
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MR. SCHARLAT: Okay. I thought somebody said something.

THE COURT: No.

MR. SCHARLAT: We gave a couple of examples with regard to Mr. Huber where Mr. Huber's testimony contradicts the report created by Mr. Gharanfoli. The late-submitted declaration from Diane Lapin, certainly we should be able to talk to Mr. Gharanfoli and question him about that report. We didn't have an opportunity to depose him about it.

Obviously, also relevant to attorneys' fees, Your Honor, this record is replete with misconduct here, and the bottom line is that there are inconsistencies between what the Secretary is relying on and what he's offering as a fact and what's true.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much.

MR. SCHARLAT: And, to that extent, we should --

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much.

I'm on top of this one, and I'm aware of the implications here,

and the Secretary's motion in limine in support of this motion to exclude Siamack Gharanfoli, Paper Number 477, will be denied. Both the Secretary and the Defendants have listed the investigator as a trial witness if the need arises, and essentially it's premature at this point in time for me to determine if that testimony is relevant.

I will note that essentially the matter of this

motion in limine to exclude Gharanfoli's testimony and the evidence of essentially the Employee Benefit Security

Administration's investigation per se would be premature at this point in time, and I do note the interview notes and testimony that have been raised by Mr. Huber with respect to the summaries that have been made and specifically Gharanfoli's notes of his witness interviews and the contradiction that exists apparently between Mr. Huber's view and that as to what Mr. Gharanfoli's notes reflect.

And, in light of that, the trial testimony may be relevant to also the matter of attorneys' fees, and, indeed, it is the position that's been taken by the Defense, as I understand it, that there is a pattern of selective notes and reports, and, indeed, some allegation of misrepresenting certain statements made.

So this clearly is a question of fact that I will have to address during the bench trial of this case, and, for those reasons, the Secretary's motion in limine, Paper Number 477, to exclude that testimony will be denied for the reasons set forth on the record.

Hold on one second here, please. Wait a minute. (Pause.)

THE COURT: 477 will be denied for the reasons set forth on the record.

The next of the four motions filed by the Secretary

is the motion in support of his motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants' putative expert, Aaron Raddock, and I'll be glad to hear from the Secretary on this next. And this is Paper Number 478.

MR. DALIN: Yes, Your Honor. This is Patrick Dalin addressing this motion.

So the Secretary alleges that the Plan paid excessive fees and submits an expert report to establish that claim.

Defendants submit the expert report of Aaron Raddock, and he said the Plan's fees aren't excessive on the basis that the Plan had additional costs arising from the Service Contract Act compliance. The Service Contract Act compliance, however, is a requirement imposed on the employer, and regulations specifically state that the employer's carrying out of those administrative obligations cannot be charged to the fringe benefit rate or the assets of the trust.

Raddock testified as to a number of activities that he says should be considered when assessing the costs to the Plan. Among them are completing certified payrolls, which is a payroll activity pursuant to the Service Contract Act; response to DOL inquiries regarding Service Contract Act compliance; calculating the fringe benefit dollars to be contributed to the Plan, which is a requirement under the Service Contract Act.

THE COURT: What I understand, by the way, is that -I understand that the Secretary's argument essentially on this

is that these are settlor expenses, which the Secretary contends may not be paid by the Chimes Plan, correct? That's basically the thrust of the Secretary's position, correct?

MR. DALIN: That's part of it. Some of them are settlor functions, and some of them are purely payroll functions that have nothing to do with the trust. Yes, eventually the funds paid get put into the trust, but what the employer has to do to make sure that he's paying -- that the employer is paying the correct fringe rate, to make sure that they're keeping certified payrolls, that's wage and hour stuff. That is the employer's obligation.

Now, the employer is free to hire someone to do that work. They can hire FCE to do the work if they want, but the employer has to pay for that work themselves. They can't have it paid out of the trust.

THE COURT: Well, are these or are these not expenses relating to legal compliance and eligibility determinations?

(Pause.)

THE COURT: I guess my -- I'm asking the Secretary.

Are they not expenses relating to legal compliance?

MR. DALIN: Well, keeping certified payrolls are legal compliance for the Service Contract Act, which is a wage and hour requirement for the employer, for instance. So it's legal compliance, but it's legal compliance that has nothing to do with ERISA or the trust, and that's what we're saying here.

There are numerous examples of what Raddock says --

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, I understand.

It's my understanding that essentially, if I'm not mistaken here -- hold on one second.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Then what would be the basis of the Government's expert, Andrew Naugle, with respect to his testimony based upon your position as to Raddock's testimony?

MR. DALIN: So we asked Mr. Naugle to give the Plan as much credit as possible, to be as conservative as possible in his analysis, so he gave credit for numerous things. That doesn't mean, as a matter of law, they can take credit for a number of the specific charges that Aaron Raddock gives them credit for.

And, if you look at even the supporting documents that Defendants attach to their motion, they refer to their Exhibit 3, the EBSA's Guidance on Settlor versus Claim Expenses, includes the example where a Plan paid \$60,000 for consulting fees for USERRA and SBGA compliance, and said that the Plan cannot pay those expenses. Even if it's connected to benefits concerning the Plan, it's only -- you know, the other side of the 50 yard line, so to speak, before the money comes into the Plan, those are compliance obligations of the employer, which are settlor functions, which the Plan cannot pay.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I understand what your 1 2 argument is on this, and I must tell you I'm hard pressed to 3 understand that, if your argument is correct, then there would be the basis of Mr. Naugle's testimony, but I understand what 4 5 your position is. All right. On behalf of the Defendants, who is going 6 7 to respond on this? 8 MR. KOONIN: This is Marc Koonin, Your Honor. I will 9 respond on behalf of the Defendants. First of all, this is yet another example of the 10 11 Secretary trying to introduce a new theory at the eleventh hour 12 that's never been raised in the Complaint or in any discovery 13 responses prior to this point. So that's a problem right 14 there. 15 But --16 THE COURT: You're saying that that's because --MR. KOONIN: Your Honor --17 18 THE COURT: You're saying -- wait a minute. Just 19 give me a minute here. 20 You're saying that because your contention is the 21 Secretary is now arguing for the first time that these expenses 22 are settlor expenses? 23 MR. KOONIN: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 MR. KOONIN: They've never raised that theory in this

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case at all about settlor expenses or that being excluded, which, as a general principle of law, is correct, or that these are settlor expenses which they are not as a matter of law, but neither of those issues were raised in the Complaint, and neither were raised in the discovery. And, now that we're going into trial in a couple weeks, they're raised for the first time. That's not proper. THE COURT: All right. MR. KOONIN: But --THE COURT: I understand. MR. KOONIN: Based upon the --THE COURT: I understand. I'm on this one. understand. The simple fact of the matter is --MR. KOONIN: Okay. Both --THE COURT: I think you're ahead, so, when you're ahead, let me cut you off, because I've got a lot of territory to cover here. (Laughter.) MR. DALIN: Your Honor, may I address that? THE COURT: No, you may not. We're not having rebuttal on each one. I've read these. I mean, I've spent hours and hours reading this stuff, so I hope you realize I'm 23 on top of it. No, you're not. Each side goes one time, and that's it, okay? And this motion --MR. DALIN: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: This motion -- so don't even try. No one is going to get two bites at the apple on all these motions.

We'll be here until 8 o'clock at night.

The Secretary's motion on this is denied for the simple fact of the matter that essentially there is an issue that the Secretary is raising as to settlor expenses. I understand what it is. I'm not necessarily precluding that.

But, in terms of trying to determine the costs and computing benefits with respect to these expenses, the expenses may or may not relate to legal compliance and eligibility determinations in terms of that being a proper Plan expense, and I would furthermore note that, to the extent that we have the testimony of the Government's expert, the Secretary's expert, as to Andrew Naugle, from what I can see, I don't know that he's actually addressed the matter of settlor function expenses, but that's okay in terms of what will be presented at trial, but we're not going to grant a motion in limine as to Raddock's report and, at the same time, have Andrew Naugle opine as well.

To put it bluntly, if the Secretary's argument was correct, then Naugle would be precluded as well. So I'm going to permit both sides to testify on that, and that's fine, but, for those reasons set forth on the record, the Secretary's motion in limine in support of his motion to exclude the testimony of Aaron Raddock will be denied. Paper Number 478

will be denied for the reasons set forth on the record here. 1 2 MR. KOONIN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. There you go. There you are. 3 4 Now, hold on just one second. 5 (Pause.) THE COURT: Okay. The next motion, the third of the 6 7 Secretary's motions in limine, this filed on December the 5th, 8 essentially the Secretary is moving, motion in limine, to 9 exclude the declaration of Grace Dong, who was employed by FCE as a financial reporting analyst since May of 2016, and I'd be 10 11 glad to hear from the Secretary on this. 12 MR. DALIN: Yes, Your Honor. It's Patrick Dalin 13 again. 14 So FCE is trying to admit two analyses performed by 15 Ms. Grace Dong. They call the analysis pertaining to the charges resulting from the 2% compliance fee a Rule 1006 16 17 summary, and they're trying to admit the summary with the 18 declaration without live testimony. A Rule 1006 summary, 19 however, is not a record of regularly-conducted business 20 activity; it's a document prepared specifically for trial, and 21 it cannot be admitted simply with a declaration. Under the

THE COURT: Well, under Rule 1006, that's not quite a correct summary of Rule 1006. Rule 1006 is a summary of evidence that may be based upon admissible evidence. That is

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rule --

the principle of Rule 1006. It doesn't mean that it 1 2 automatically dovetails --MR. DALIN: Right. 3 4 THE COURT: It doesn't necessarily dovetail with business record under Rule 803(6) with respect to business 5 records. It doesn't mean that all the documents --6 7 MR. DALIN: Correct. 8 THE COURT: -- themselves have to have been admitted. It means it has to be a reasonable summary --9 10 MR. DALIN: Yes. 11 THE COURT: -- of evidence which would be admissible. 12 So that's a more precise definition of that --13 MR. DALIN: Yes. THE COURT: -- but go ahead. 14 15 MR. DALIN: And the foundation for the summary is laden with live testimony. An example of that is a Fifth 16 17 Circuit case, U.S. v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436. The underlying 18 documents, as you mentioned, Your Honor, have to be admissible. 19 In this case, FCE, Grace Dong hasn't provided the 20 underlying documents. The day after the Secretary filed this 21 motion, FCE e-mailed us a second spreadsheet which it contends 22 is the underlying documents, but it's just another summary. 23 They're saying one summary is the underlying evidence for 24 another summary. It's not the actual invoices that were used 25 to calculate the fees at the time. We've been trying to get a

hold of the contemporaneous records calculating these monies for two years and haven't received any.

In this case, Your Honor, you're very familiar with the facts, but a quick summary. David Crutcher, one of FCE's attorneys, submitted a declaration in summary judgment stating that he could calculate the fees that FCE charged. He purported to show that they undercharged \$1.5 million. He then filed a second declaration completely walking back that calculation.

Gary Beckman testified that FCE didn't add a 2% compliance, or -- I'm sorry -- he testified that they did add a 2% compliance fee charge. Then he submitted a declaration saying that they didn't.

Now we have Grace Dong submitting a declaration saying that they did, and she can calculate with specificity the amount charged under that fee when we have an earlier letter from David Crutcher stating that FCE doesn't have the records necessary to recalculate fees, and he tried to pin it on Ward and say that Ward has the records, and Ward denies that she has the records. So FCE can't keep its story straight about whether it added a 2% compliance fee or not, about whether it can calculate the fees or not.

THE COURT: Doesn't that go to the weight, not the admissibility? In other words, I have already -- as I recall --

MR. DALIN: Yeah, but we have to be able to cross-examine someone, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, you certainly are free to crossexamine on it. As I think I've already addressed this in my
Order about a month ago, where I granted FCE's motion to
correct the record due to a mathematical calculation error, and
I don't see anything that you've submitted that seems to
indicate that there is some error in the arithmetic calculation
here --

MR. DALIN: Well, we point out, Your Honor -- we point out, Your Honor, that there is missing variables. You can't do the math. You can't follow the math at all. You can have an accountant, a mathematician, and a rocket scientist try to do the math based on Ms. Dong's analysis. They can't do it. It's missing necessary variables.

THE COURT: All right. Well, that may be a problem for the Government as well, but this goes to the weight, not the admissibility. They may have a problem with it, and the Secretary may have a problem with it, and, if it's too speculative, neither side is going to prevail on it --

MR. DALIN: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- because I'm going to be the one that's going to judge. That is a bench trial, and I'll make that determination. I'll make that determination as to the Defendant, and I'll make that determination as to the

Government, on either side.

MR. DALIN: One additional very important point, Your Honor, is the David Crutcher declaration was submitted in connection with the summary judgment motion. The Court can accept testimony by declaration in summary judgment, but not at trial. This is substantive testimony.

THE COURT: Well, I'll judge what I can take in terms of testimony. This is exactly an example -- this is a bench trial. I can hear the evidence, and you're free to cross-examine on this.

Who is speaking --

MR. DALIN: We can't cross-examine Ms. Dong if she doesn't come to court. She's the person who did the analysis, Your Honor, and how are we to cross-examine her if she doesn't come to trial?

THE COURT: Well, quite frankly, I'm not going to waste time with you trying to do a math class for a day, so that's -- you're probably right on that.

MR. DALIN: We need Ms. Dong to do the math class, because we don't understand the calculation.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it's very simple. It's very simple. Your motion is going to be denied on this as well. Three of these four motions by the Secretary, I would note, had very little merit at all, and I've taken a lot of time going through this.

I don't need to hear from the Defendants on this with respect to this motion. This is nothing more than nitpicking over arithmetic calculations, and, so the Government understands, it may not have any weight with me. The key distinction on these things in a courtroom is the matter of weight as opposed to admissibility, and when one finds one's self arguing a great deal over the weight, they should realize that they're talking about weight, not admissibility.

Without question, under Rule 1006, the Dong declaration is an appropriate summary under Rule 1006 with respect to the underlying documents upon which it is based. It doesn't mean it's going to be binding upon me, but it certainly is admissible as far as I'm concerned, and it clearly would be covered under a residual exception under Rule 807 with respect to having indicia of reliability even if there would be a hearsay problem. I don't consider this to be a major problem on this, and, again --

MR. DALIN: Can I ask for a clarification of the ruling? So, under Rule 1006, the proponent needs to provide the underlying records, so that hasn't happened in this case. What's the Court's holding with regard to the underlying records?

MR. KOONIN: May I address that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure. Sure. Go right ahead.

MR. KOONIN: Okay. We -- this is Marc Koonin. We

did attach the underlying records to our opposition. The Secretary keeps pulling a sleight of hand. The Secretary keeps saying, "Well, you haven't given a specific --" what the Secretary likes to call an invoice.

Well, for most of these bills, they were based on contributions, and they were run as a computer program through the TAS software, and so what we've produced and what we attached to the opposition were records of the contributions that were produced out of TAS. If you multiply those by 11.62 and by 13.62, you get the differential. So the fact that we don't have a report that says, "Here is the differential report," is not the important issue. We've shown the contributions. You can run the 11.62 and the 13.62, and you can calculate the difference. It's absolutely untrue that we did not provide the supporting documents.

THE COURT: I'm satisfied that this qualifies as a summary document, Rule 1006. I'm satisfied there is sufficient documentation of it. And I'm also satisfied that it would fall under 807 in terms of residual exception. And there is actually no merit -- no merit whatsoever to the Secretary's motion in limine on the matter of the summary by Grace Dong. It will be denied for the reasons set forth here on the record, and that is Paper Number 479 will be denied for the reasons set forth on the record.

So I think we're at the fourth now. We're on number

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four of the four motions of the Secretary. The fourth motion of the Secretary is one that definitely has had more merit in my eyes, and that is the motion in limine to exclude the deposition testimony of Kathy -- actually, it's T-H-A-M-E-S, Thames, but, consistent with how we pronounce the river, I'll pronounce her Thames unless someone tells me otherwise, because it must be after the river in England, so --MR. SCHARLAT: You're correct, Your Honor. We understand it Thames, yes. THE COURT: Well, the true English pronunciation would be Thames, so I'll allow it to be Americanized. Thames. And the matter of the opinion of Mark Abernathy. As I understand it, the Secretary is moving to exclude deposition designations of Kathy Thames with respect to an arbitration as to which the Government, the Secretary, was not a party, and no notice was provided, and there was no ability to examine. So I'll be glad to hear from the Government on that, and then I'll hear from the Defense. MR. DALIN: That's correct, Your Honor, and we're also moving to exclude the supplemental expert report --THE COURT: Yes, I understand. MR. DALIN: -- of Mark Abernathy, which was produced last month. THE COURT: Yes. I understand.

MR. DALIN: So these Trilogy audit reports have been at issue for the entire time of litigation. We've subpoenaed Trilogy in this case in discovery. We served their responses and these audit reports to all Defendants in March and April of 2017.

The Secretary identified Trilogy Consulting as an entity with knowledge of FCE's administrative issues in discovery responses that we've provided in February 2017.

Fact discovery closed in January of this year,

January 2018. FCE had almost a full year to take a deposition
of someone from Trilogy Consulting with regards to these audit
reports. They didn't do so.

Instead, they waited until discovery closed in this case, and then took the deposition of the auditor who did these audits in another case to which we're not a party. The entire deposition pertained to these audit reports that are at issue in this case. And they also brought along to that deposition Mark Abernathy, their expert in this case. Under Rule 804(b)(1), prior testimony of an unavailable witness isn't admissible if the party who they're using it against didn't have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

With regards to Abernathy's supplemental report, FCE argues that, you know, experts can rely on hearsay if it's the type that the expert would typically rely upon in correcting a report, but, first, you know, the hearsay that experts usually

rely upon, for instance, in this case, would be Mark Abernathy going and interviewing people in the Claims Processing

Department of FCE and relying upon that, and everyone would agree you don't have to drag all those people into court to have them testifying for the underlying statements.

But experts don't typically go take a deposition in a case while cutting out one of the parties in the case and then putting that deposition testimony into an expert report. It's an unfair ambush. The Secretary is deprived of the opportunity of cross-examining this witness, and it's completely unfair to -- it's a complete end run around the rules and the spirit of the rules in discovery. FCE shouldn't be rewarded at all for engaging in such conduct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much,
Mr. Dalin.

With that, Michael Schrier, are you responding on that on behalf of the Defendants?

MR. KOONIN: No. Mr. Koonin will respond, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

MR. KOONIN: All right. So, Your Honor, there is two parts to this. There is the deposition, and then there is the expert report, but I would like to address these in two parts.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOONIN: I mean, on the first part, nobody cut

the Secretary out. FCE has multiple litigation going on, and, in fact, the Secretary is well aware of the other litigation, because the Secretary has been -- interviewed people at the corporate entities for M&L and SSL, who are opponents in this other arbitration, and, in fact, one of the issues in dispute in the arbitration is having to recompense them for the fees of complying with the Secretary's investigation and audits.

So there is no intent to cut the Secretary out. We didn't know what we didn't know. There were over 30 depositions taken in the Chimes litigation, and then, when we were in this other litigation, there were other depositions taken. Some overlapped, and some didn't.

We had no idea that -- you know, we assumed that -- even though we didn't agree with the Trilogy report, we assumed that their auditor had a background in statistical analysis and training in auditing. That would be a normal assumption. We found out that wasn't the case.

It's not like we decided to surprise the Secretary with this, because we were surprised with this, okay? We had no idea, and, when we found out, we disclosed it to the Secretary.

Now, as to point two, I think it is pretty uncontested that Mr. Abernathy, as the Secretary concedes, could have interviewed employees who conducted audits and relied on that. Why can't he rely on the sworn testimony of

the person who did the audits? So he could rely on an interview of somebody at the company with regard to the audit according to the Secretary. The one person that he cannot rely on, apparently, is the sworn testimony given by the person who actually conducted the audit about what her language in the audit reports mean.

So, you know, there is two parts to this, but, particularly with regard to the report itself, I don't think it's contested that experts can and regularly do rely on deposition testimony and on interviews. He was present for this. There is no reason to exclude that report.

As to the testimony itself, there were parties who were acting to defend Ms. Thames or Ms. Thames, as the case may -- as we've decided on in this hearing, because she was defended by counsel at hearing who was seeking to bolster her and her reports.

So the Secretary wasn't there, but certainly there was somebody present who was working to bolster her and to defend her work on the reports. And Your Honor has read the paper.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, and I have read the papers, and there is merit to this motion in limine filed by the Secretary. It's very simple.

In terms of the principles, clearly as has been noted

as to 804(b)(1), in terms of prior testimony, it's pretty axiomatic that, unless a party is given an opportunity to cross-examine, this type of former testimony of a witness is not admissible, and the Supreme Court -- I think it's the Salerno case, if I recall -- I've dealt with this before -- so rules. It's very abundantly clear.

This deposition designation of Kathy Thames was taken in connection with an arbitration to which the Secretary of Labor was not a party, was not directly noticed, and did not attend, and you could argue all you want of whether they should have known about it or whatever. That's not the test under Rule 801 or under Rule 804 with respect to this out-of-court statement clearly being offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein. And it does not meet the exceptions under 804(b)(1), because the party against whom it's being offered did not have the exact same motive to cross-examine Thames, and it's inadmissible.

And, accordingly, because it's inadmissible, any supplemental opinion by Mr. Abernathy shall be excluded with respect to his supplemental report that's dated just four weeks ago, which is some nine months, as I recall, looking at the deadlines here -- he's not going to be permitted to take that deposition and then amend his report.

So, for those reasons as set forth on the record, the Secretary of Labor's motion in limine to exclude the deposition

testimony of Kathy Thames and the supplemental expert report and opinion of Mark Abernathy, Paper Number 480, will be granted for the reasons indicated on the record.

Now, I believe that that deals with all of the motions in limine filed by the Secretary of Labor. Am I correct, Mr. Dalin?

MR. DALIN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So then we have now -
I'm trying to get through some of these as we go, and we may

have to take a break here in a minute, a brief break, but let

me just keep moving here for a minute here.

The next motion that I have in terms of joint Defense motions is -- and I want to address the joint Defense motions, and then we may have to take a brief break for something I also have to tend to in a minute with respect to the FCE Defendants' motions, but we'll continue on.

With respect to the joint Defendants motions, the first one here that I have reviewed essentially is the Defendants' joint motion, 471, the joint Defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence of claims processing errors on plans other than the Chimes Plan, and essentially the Defendants are moving to exclude all testimony and evidence relating to the quality of FCE's claims processing for plans other than the Chimes Plan, and the Defendants argue that it's not relevant.

The Secretary has argued that it is relevant under

Rule 401 because it essentially makes the fact of a negligent operation more probable.

So, with that, I'd be glad to hear from counsel for the Defendants, and just, again, so we're clear for the court reporter, if you'll just identify who is speaking, whoever next starts for the Defendants.

MR. KOONIN: Yes, Your Honor. This is Marc Koonin again. I'll be taking this one.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOONIN: The bottom line, Your Honor, is that this evidence is not supportive of whether or not it's more probable that there were problems with Chimes. It's uncontested that Chimes had a dedicated team, that that team was the best team, and that that team was separate. Also, there is evidence in the record, separate and apart from the now-excluded Kathy Thames testimony, that some of the measurements that were made with regard to other clients were targeted as opposed to general audits. In other words, they can't be extrapolated.

So, when you put those two things together, it's not relevant. If there were problems with a different plan that were being supported by a different team on a targeted audit that can't be extrapolated, then it shouldn't be attributed to Chimes.

THE COURT: Well, as I understand it, if I can

interrupt you for a minute, don't I understand that FCE -- from what I reviewed of the documents and the facts here, it's contended that FCE used the same trust accounting system and the same technology and even the same procedures for all of its clients; did it not? Isn't that what's in the record here so far?

MR. KOONIN: Well, hold on, Your Honor. The trust administrative system is not used at the claims processing level. There are claims for releasing the -- there are portions of that software that are used to release payments or to process the payments of the claim, but the actual initial processing, that's not done with TAS, and it's handled by a team, and Chimes had a dedicated team. So it is correct to say that, once the team processes a claim, that that claim is then later -- the payment is processed, in part, through TAS, or was at that time. That is correct.

But the actual issue of how long it takes to process the claims and what the application is of the exclusion rules to the claim, whether there are mistakes made in the paperwork or the input that goes into TAS, all that's different because they have their own dedicated team doing that work.

THE COURT: Well, what is the distinction between the team and the matter specifically with respect to, as I understand it, the same trust accounting system and the same technology and the same procedures? I know you emphasized the

difference in terms of the team that was involved, the actual people on it, but what is the difference here in terms of the matter of the computerization and the processing errors that are alleged here?

MR. KOONIN: Okay. That's a good question, Your Honor. One of the Secretary's complaints, if you will, in this case is that FCE did not use what's called auto adjudication, so Your Honor might be working under the misimpression that TAS is an auto-adjudication program. It's not.

So the team members put the data -- they pull out maybe paper, and they put data into the computer. So, when you have a different team that has different people doing the work with different levels of quality perhaps, then, with the computer, it's garbage in, garbage out.

We're not conceding that there was garbage, but the point is, if there were entry errors on the paperwork or the computer with a totally different team, that doesn't affect the quality of this particular dedicated team.

THE COURT: All right. I understand what your argument is. I understand what your argument is. I'm not sure if you satisfactorily answered my question, but I understand what the argument is.

I'd be glad to hear from the Government -- from the Secretary on this.

MR. DALIN: Yes, Your Honor. It's Mr. Dalin.

So it is contested that the Chimes claims were processed by a dedicated team. Some people mentioned that in deposition testimony, but you can see, in FCE's own claims auditing records, that there are other persons besides those mentioned who processed claims on team -- who processed claims on the Chimes Plan.

The fact of the matter is FCE had one claims processing department. They all received the same training. They worked according to the same protocols.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand.

MR. DALIN: They had two outside auditors --

THE COURT: I understand. Quit while you're ahead.

I understand. I understand. I understand.

The joint Defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence of claims processing errors on plans other than the Chimes is going to be denied. This is Paper Number 471. And essentially, while the Defendants have argued that reports relating to FCE's work for other plans is not relevant, the simple fact of the matter is that it's relevant under Rule 401. It goes to the weight, not admissibility, because the matter of it addressing the alleged -- FCE's alleged negligent operations. And, to the extent that there is evidence of third-party audits showing FCE had any systematic claims processing errors or problems in terms of the same trust accounting system and the same technology is relevant for this

Court's review.

I'm not making a finding one way or the other in terms of the weight that's accorded to it, but it certainly is relevant, and, for those reasons, Paper Number 471 filed by the Defendants — the Defendants' joint motion to exclude evidence of claim processing errors, Paper Number 471, will be denied for the reasons set forth on the record.

The next joint Defense motion that was filed on December the 5th as well is the joint Defendants' motion to preclude the Secretary from offering evidence relating to subsequent remedial procedures, Paper Number 4 -- I'm sorry. Hold one second here. Wait a minute.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Paper Number 473 is the next one I want to address here. And I'll be glad to hear -- essentially, I don't need to hear from the Defendants on it. I'm very clear on what their view is, and essentially it's seeking to have the Secretary be precluded from subsequent remedial measures that Chimes took after the lawsuit was filed, and the Defendants have argued that should be excluded under Rule 407 if it's being used to show negligence or culpable conduct. The Secretary has responded that it does not intend to introduce that evidence for showing negligence, but to impeach Defendants' putative expert and to rebut the lack of feasibility defense.

This is very simple. This motion will be granted, and it's granted, quite simply, for the fact that, when it comes to Rule 407 and remedial procedures, I do not entertain any dance around it, what could have been done, whatever.

Rule 407 is very clear to me. It comes up in a lot of cases, and I don't allow a lot of wiggle room around Rule 407 when it comes to remedial measures, and I'm not going to entertain any argument with respect to trying to rebut a lack of feasibility defense with respect to trying to show that there were feasible replacements, and, as far as I'm concerned, those kind of efforts to get around Rule 407 don't go well with me in any context in terms of any cases I have.

So it's very simple. I've read the papers on it.

The joint Defendants' motion in limine to preclude the

Secretary from offering evidence relating to subsequent

remedial measures, Paper Number 473, will be granted for the

reasons clearly stated in the joint Defendants' motion, and it

will not be permitted. So that will be granted for the reasons

set forth.

All right. The next motion I have here to address is the Defendants' joint motion in limine to preclude evidence of extraneous lawsuits or investigations. Give me one second.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Yes. The next one I have here is the Defendants' joint motion to preclude evidence of extraneous

lawsuits or investigations, which is Paper Number 475, and essentially the Defendants have moved to preclude the Secretary from presenting any evidence with respect to other investigations or lawsuits relating to any other plan apart from Chimes.

The Government, as far as I understand it, has agreed that it will not admit evidence as to Ward, but it contends that he may have evidence admitted for impeachment purposes or statements by a party opponent.

What is the Secretary's position on this? I'm not sure if I understand what the Secretary's position is on this.

MR. DALIN: So, Your Honor, they're asking for a very broad order excluding any evidence of other lawsuits or investigations. The Secretary agrees that this one example that they provide with regards to Ward accepting an injunction in another case is not something that's part of our affirmative case.

You know, potentially, it could be relevant on rebuttal, but it's not something that we're -- you know, we stipulate we'll not be putting it into our affirmative case, but there can be evidence that's, you know, connected to another case; for instance, Raddock's testimony in another case could be used for impeachment.

The Secretary subpoenaed documents in this case from service providers. FCE services a lot of plans, and they use a

lot of the same service providers for those plans, so we get documents that may pertain to other plans besides Chimes just because that's how those service providers keep those documents.

Whether they're relevant or not is a case-by-case decision. As a blunderbuss order saying that no documents that are related to any other investigation or lawsuit would preclude such things as the Raddock transcript or financial statements from service providers that mention the Chimes Plan --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that that's the breadth -- I don't interpret that to be the breadth of the Defendants' joint motion. The motion is to preclude evidence of extraneous lawsuits or investigations.

I really don't care about other lawsuits or investigations. To the extent that there is a document that somehow was in another case and you wanted to challenge the testimony of a witness, I don't care what context the testimony is. If it's the testimony of a person, you're free to present that if that testimony was under oath. I don't care if it's a deposition in a divorce case. The person is under oath and answers certain questions, you're free to challenge someone in that regard, but, in terms of evidence of extraneous lawsuits or investigations, I'm not really interested in challenging and trying to attack Ward or anyone else as a fiduciary with

respect to those other investigations or lawsuits.

So essentially the motion will be granted, but it doesn't mean that, if you have deposition testimony of someone in another case and you want to challenge their testimony, if it's impeaching, you're free to use it, but you're not free to use it in the context of, well, there is another lawsuit or another investigation. Quite frankly, I'm not going to be tainted by that in terms of acting, you know, as the finder of fact in this case and making findings of fact and rulings of law. So, to that extent, Paper Number 475, the joint motion to in limine to preclude evidence of extraneous lawsuits or investigations, will be granted with that explanation for the reasons set forth on the record.

Any questions about that from the point of view of the Secretary?

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Hearing none, okay.

Any questions from the point of view of the Defense on that? Hearing none, that motion --

MR. KOONIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That motion will be granted.

And so the next motion is the joint motion in limine,

Paper Number 476. This is the motion -- at least the way I've

analyzed these with my notes and what have you, this is the

joint motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning

reasonableness of BCG's fees and contributions, and essentially the Defendants have moved for exclusion of evidence regarding the reasonableness of BCG's fees and charitable contributions because it is not relevant after the dismissal of the BCG Defendants from this case based upon my previous ruling.

And, as I understand it, the Secretary has responded that the reasonableness of BCG's fees is still an open question and is relevant with respect to the case against Chimes D.C., essentially arguing that my opinion was focused on BCG's knowledge, not on the reasonableness of the fees. I think that's really the thrust of what all these motions are about.

So, with that, I'd be glad to hear from Defense counsel on this, and then I'll give the Secretary an opportunity to respond.

Who wants to argue this for the Defense?

MR. SCHARLAT: This is Richard Scharlat.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHARLAT: If nobody stops me, I'll do it.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. SCHARLAT: And Your Honor basically summed it up that any evidence about the reasonableness of BCG's fees is out. It's not relevant to any remaining issue in this case.

And I don't have much to add to what you already --

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. That's fine. I understand what your argument is.

1 All right. Go ahead. Let me hear from the Secretary 2 on this. 3 MS. LIU: Your Honor, I believe the Court already 4 understands our argument. Just because BCG is no longer a party here doesn't mean that its payments are irrelevant to the 5 claims that are still live. 6 7 THE COURT: Yes. That's enough from the Government, 8 because I think the Government is absolutely correct on that. 9 My ruling on BCG has to do with the BCG's knowledge, and did 10 not in any way relate to the reasonableness of the fees, and so 11 I think the Secretary is correct on this point. BCG's fees and contributions are still relevant to the case to be presented 12 13 against the Chimes Defendants. So, for that reason, the Defendants' joint motion in 14 15 limine to exclude evidence concerning reasonableness of BCG's fees and contributions, Paper Number 476, will be denied for 16 17 the reasons set forth on the record. 18 So that the next motion here we have is, I think -we have two more here, joint motions, and this would be Paper 19 20 Number 483 -- hold on one second here. Wait a minute. 21 (Pause.) 22 THE COURT: Wait one second here. 23 (Pause.) 24 THE COURT: Hold on one second here. Wait a minute. 25 I think we missed one here. Let's do 472. No.

Haven't done 472 yet. I had my notes here on that.

We have two motions left here on joint Defense motions, and there is the joint Defendants' motion to preclude the Secretary from offering expert opinion testimony in support of claimed damages for the years 2010, 2016, and 2017. And that is Paper Number 472.

And I'll be glad to hear from the Defendants on that, and then I'll hear from the Secretary on his response.

MR. MEREDITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is

Mark Meredith on behalf of the joint Defendants for this motion

in limine.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MEREDITH: As the papers set forth, the motion is really a very limited motion to exclude the expert testimony for years 2010, '16, and '17 based on the theory that the Secretary had those 5500s well before the time the expert's opinion was served.

The Secretary appears to concede this argument in their paper. They say that, to the extent that the Defendants seek to exclude the Secretary's expert opinion to demonstrate damages in 2010, '16, and '17, that no such exclusion is necessary because the expert report only analyzes 2011 through '15, which we take to be an admission and a concession that, in fact, they do not dispute the relief we request.

However, I did want to just briefly address the

Secretary's additional arguments, which appear to be that, in fact, even if there is not expert testimony regarding 2010, '16, and '17, that they should not be excluded from introducing evidence of damages of those years, and, to that, we would only say we don't know how they'll get that evidence in if they're not relying upon expert testimony. The cases they cite in their motion in limine -- Pender, for example -- relies on an expert opinion regarding profit. So our position would be that their distinction between profit and damages seems to be dancing on the head of a pin.

And then, secondarily, we would just point out that, to the extent they're seeking an accounting or equitable relief under 502(a)(5) with respect to BCG, that relief requires knowingly participating in that violation, and the Court has already ruled that BCG, based on your previous opinion, did not knowingly participate in that violation. And so, to that extent, the DOL's relief regarding evidence should be precluded.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Meredith.

And, with that, I'd be glad to hear from you, Mr. Dalin, on the Government's response on that.

MS. LIU: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Oh. I'm sorry, Ms. Liu.

MS. LIU: Katrina Liu. I'm going to take that one.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Ms. Liu. I'm sorry.

MS. LIU: Sure. So, to the extent of -- Defense counsel is correct. The expert -- our expert -- excuse me -- does not submit an opinion for 2010, 2016, 2017, but the way I understood the motion was that they seek to preclude all evidence of damages entirely if it is not in the form of an expert opinion for which they cite no authority.

And so the Secretary seeks to admit what evidence he has regarding damages for those years, and I think, to the Court's earlier point, that is a question of weight, not admissibility. And, to respond also to what I understand to be the argument that, because BCG was able to defeat the Secretary's claim of knowing participation, that somehow that means that damages that the Plan incurred in relation of payment of fees to BCG cannot -- that we cannot pursue those damages. I don't quite understand the foundation for that.

THE COURT: Well, I think I understand what the basis is on that, Ms. Liu, is that essentially the Defendants are moving to preclude expert testimony on damages for any years other than 2011 through 2015. And the Amended Complaint -- the operative Amended Complaint as to which we're proceeding next month at trial -- hold on one second. I'm about to sneeze. Excuse me.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Excuse me. I'm sorry. I had to sneeze.

I didn't want to have the court reporter have to put that on the record. He's good, but he's not that good.

(Laughter.)

THE COURT: The Amended Complaint that was filed in 2015 alleges that 2008 through the present -- and I've already made a decision on limitations precluding evidence from 2008 to 2009, and the Secretary's own expert report only includes damages for 2011 and 2015, so that there was no basis for the Secretary offering expert testimony in support of any damages for any other years -- specifically, 2010, 2016, and 2017 -- because it's not considered by Mr. Naugle in his report, if I'm pronouncing his name correctly.

The response that the Secretary is not required to use an expert to present damages evidence, I'm afraid, without getting in too deep into the legal analysis here, that's what I'm going to expect with respect to supporting damages and a demonstration of loss to the Plan, and that's really the essential matter I have to address.

So this motion filed by the Defendants will be granted. There is no basis for me to consider anything other than the damages for the years 2011, '12, '13, '14, and '15, and there will be no basis for offering expert testimony in support of any claimed damages for the years 2010, 2016, and 2017. So, for those reasons, Paper Number 472, the joint Defendants' motion, will be granted.

So, with that, we have one more joint motion, I believe, joint Defense motion here, and that is the Defendants' joint motion to preclude the Secretary from offering evidence relating -- I'm sorry. Wait a minute.

It's Defendants' joint motion to preclude the Secretary from offering evidence, including expert testimony, in support of any claim that alleged excessive fees paid to FCE by the Chimes Health & Welfare Plan exceeds \$2,931,000, et cetera, and that, I think, is the last joint motion here if I'm not mistaken. And, as to that, I think that that would appear -- and you all can correct me if I'm wrong on this, and I'll certainly give the Defendants the opportunity on this to distinguish it, but I think this relates in many ways to my previous denial of the joint motion to exclude evidence concerning reasonableness of BCG's fees and contributions.

That was Paper Number 476, in which I denied that motion, noting that the fees and contributions may be still relevant as to the case against Chimes and the matter of precluding evidence, including expert testimony, in support of any claim of alleged excess fees because essentially the Defendants have argued that the claims against BCG are now out of the case, but I think the position of the Government is that those claims include failing to prudently and loyally monitor the Plan expenses.

So it seems to me that the same analysis would be

attendant to this particular motion, but I'll be glad to hear from Defense counsel on this, and then I'll give Government counsel an opportunity to respond, but it would certainly appear that it relates to the same issue, that, even though BCG is out of the case, it doesn't mean that expenses and/or fees and contributions, et cetera, and claims and fees paid still is not relevant as to the claims against Chimes, but I'll be glad to hear from Defense counsel on this.

MR. SCHARLAT: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Richard Scharlat.

I think this is actually a little different, and I think, at the end of the analysis, the Secretary and Defendants don't really fundamentally disagree. What we've presented -- what we've presented -- hello? What we've presented to the Court -- and maybe somebody should mute the phone.

What we've presented to the Court on Page 2 of our motion, in the chart, is a calculation which is taken directly from Table 12 of Mr. Naugle's report. That is a very targeted number. That number is the direct excessive fees that the Secretary claims were paid to FCE. We calculate that number based on Mr. Naugle at 2.931 million.

THE COURT: Yes. I've got that in front of me right here. It's right here, and it's for the years I've mentioned, 2011, '12, '13, '14, and '15.

MR. SCHARLAT: Correct.

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. SCHARLAT: And I actually think it's more akin to the last motion Your Honor ruled on, you'll see in a minute --3 4 THE COURT: All right. MR. SCHARLAT: -- and that's why we've stuck to those 5 numbers, because that's what Mr. Naugle said. 6 7 The Secretary, however, provides a chart in its 8 opposition, which puts apples and oranges together, which is 9 fine, except that it's sort of -- it confuses the issue. 10 If Your Honor looks at that chart that the Secretary 11 did, in the first little box next to the one that says "Year," 12 you see the Secretary combined direct and indirect fees. 13 That's how their number got higher. They included the 2.204 indirect fees to get to the 5.8. 14 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. SCHARLAT: I have not been able to figure out, 17 Your Honor, why there is a difference between 3.6, which the 18 Secretary admits is the excessive direct compensation actually paid to FCE, and our 2.9, which we say is that same number. 19 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. SCHARLAT: The point of this, Your Honor, is that 22 this is the only -- besides BCG -- and I understand Your Honor 23 saying that's still in the case. Besides BCG, this is the only

To get up to the 8.3 -- putting aside the indirect,

number for which Mr. Naugle does an expert analysis.

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to get up to the 8.3 number that Mr. Naugle mentions on Page 24 of his report, in a little line under his chart, the Secretary wants this Court to add up all -- and the parties to add up all the vendor charges and fees in Attachment I to Mr. Naugle's report without presenting any reasonableness analysis at all with regard to those fees.

The Secretary wants this Court to hear and consider evidence that a lump sum of unanalyzed payments should be held against us and should be considered to potentially be unreasonable. There is nothing in Mr. Naugle's report or otherwise in the record to show any payments to Wachovia, to Trucker & Huss, to The Arc of San Diego, whatever the amounts, were unreasonable.

That's why we focused on FCE, Judge, because that's the only -- besides BCG, that's the only analysis Mr. Naugle does with regard to excessive direct fees, and our point is the Secretary should be limited to that 2.9 number. We can figure out the difference between the 2.9 and 3.6, but that should be limited, and that's all he does analysis on.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

And I'll be glad to hear from the Government.

MR. DALIN: Yes, Your Honor. Chimes Defendants are misrepresenting Naugle's report. So, first of all, the 8.3 number is Mr. Naugle's analysis of excess fees in aggregate, so he looked at all Plan expenses, benchmarked it against a sample

of plans that he developed, and determined that the Plan paid, in total, to all service providers, which includes FCE and BCG, but also many other service providers, 8.3 million in excess fees in the years at issue.

We've pleaded in Count 1 of the Complaint that the Plan paid excess expenses for all service providers. That's where that number comes from. His methodology for coming to that number is set forth in the report. He does not need to do a vendor-by-vendor analysis.

One of the cases that Defendants cite in their own motion, the *Baltimore Aircoil Company*, *Inc.* case says that, where an expert is providing a broad lost profits analysis, the expert doesn't need to do a vendor-by-vendor analysis under --

THE COURT: That was Judge Blake's -- that was Judge Blake's opinion about two years ago. Go ahead.

MR. DALIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm familiar with it.

MR. DALIN: It stands for the opposite of what Chimes is arguing now.

The FCE number that they cite is -- they rely on

Table 12, which is the wrong table. We asked Naugle to just

provide an opinion of whether the stated rate in the adoption

agreements are reasonable based on the stated rate. That's

Table 12.

He calculated his damages, though, off of actual

expenses paid, which is Table 17. So the problem is we keep coming back to this problem. There is stated expense rates in the agreement, but we don't have any contemporaneous invoices or records showing how they actually calculated the fees that they actually charged. But we know the actual aggregate amounts charged from the bank records that we subpoenaed and records that we subpoenaed from third-party providers.

So Naugle used those numbers, the actual amounts paid, to calculate his damages. That's Table 17. That's how the Secretary gets to his number of 3.6 million of direct compensation paid to FCE. That's the amount based on the actual expense paid. That's the right table.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think that this is the kind of thing that will have to await the trial of the case in terms of this analysis, but I'm going to essentially deny the Defendants' motion at this point in time for the following reason: That, with respect to the overall calculation of 8.3 million and the gap between that figure and the amount of compensation paid to FCE specifically, I think that it appropriately lists any excessive expenses paid by all service providers, but not limited to FCE.

And I think that, as I recall, there is another case that I had -- I'm drawing a blank on the name of it -- that I think you all cited somewhere as well, where I was consistent, a year later from Judge Blake's opinion. I think it was

Mathias -- the Mathias case, if I recall. 1 2 And so, for those reasons, essentially the 3 Defendants' joint motion to preclude the Secretary from offering evidence of any claim in excess of 2.9 will be denied. 4 Paper Number 483 will be denied. 5 All right. Now, where we are now is that we still 6 7 have FCE Defendants' motions, and there are three or four of 8 those, as I recall, and then we have -- actually, it's more 9 than four, I think. Then we have the Chimes Defendants' motions. 10 11 I don't want anyone to get off the line here, but I 12 would like, just out of courtesy for the court reporter for a 13 minute, we can just take a little bit of a break. We're going to take about five minutes. You'll have a live mic open over 14 15 there, and we'll just take no more than a five-minute break here, so we'll get started. I'll be back on the line here in 16 17 about five minutes. Everybody stand by. Don't hang up the 18 telephone. Everybody stay on the line, and no more than five minutes. We'll take a five-minute break. 19 20 Everybody good with that? 21 MR. KOONIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a five-minute break,

MR. KOONIN: Yes, Your Honor.

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but --

THE COURT: -- everyone keep the lines hooked up

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Okay. Thank you.
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       here.
 2
           (Recess taken, 5:23 p.m. - 5:29 p.m.)
                 THE COURT: Okay. We're back on the line here where
 3
 4
       the court reporter is back. Mr. Giordano needed to take a
       break, and we're ready to roll here.
 5
                 I did hear on the phone that one of the counsel for
 6
 7
       Ms. Ward had left the call. Rebecca Strandberg is no longer on
 8
       the line. Is there somebody still on the line for
 9
       Marilyn Ward, because I know I have a motion to deal with for
       her in a few minutes here. Who is still on the line for --
10
11
                MR. WEATHERFORD: Yes, Your Honor. Scott Weatherford
12
       is still on the line. I'm not sure why Rebecca dropped. Maybe
13
       she had another meeting, but I'll be on the line.
                 THE COURT: That's fine. You're still on Texas time,
14
15
       so you're still --
16
           (Whereupon, Ms. Strandberg entered the call.)
                 THE COURT: All right. Now she's back again.
17
18
       Ms. Strandberg, I wasn't sure if you were still here or not.
19
                MS. STRANDBERG: I'm sorry.
20
                 THE COURT: That's all right.
21
                MS. STRANDBERG: I'm sorry. I accidentally hit the
22
       button, so I had to call back in.
23
                 THE COURT: That's quite all right. That's quite all
24
       right. Better to hit the button and go off than hit a live
25
       button and not know you're on it, so that's fine.
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(Laughter.)

THE COURT: It's been fatal to many people on more than one occasion.

Okay. Here we go. Let me just go over, if we can, in terms of the FCE Defendants' motion, plowing through these, the few others that I've got to get to, just give me a second here, but the FCE Defendants' motion in limine number one, which is Paper Number 464, essentially the motion is to exclude evidence and argument in support of what the Defendants consider to be a new fiduciary theory that the Defendants contend was not in the operative Complaint.

The Secretary has responded that it's within the ambit of Rule 8 and was appropriately pled.

I'd be glad to hear from the Defense counsel on this first.

MR. KOONIN: Yes, Your Honor. This is Marc Koonin.

So, first of all, this theory was not pleaded in the

Complaint or the Amended Complaint, and it was introduced for

the first time at oral argument on the motion for summary

judgment, and Your Honor may recall that I objected to it at

that time.

Now, Rule 8, the liberal pleading rule under Rule 8, assuming it applies, which we don't think it does here, but let's assume that it did.

THE COURT: Why would it not -- excuse me. Why would

it not apply?

MR. KOONIN: Well, Rule 8 applies, but, when you specifically plead theories on specific fiduciary theory and you leave out the one theory that you tried to introduce a month and a half before trial, and you say, oh, it was hidden in the Complaint all the time, I don't think that that is what the case law supports. But, even more to the point, the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8 is predicated on getting information in discovery.

The Secretary never disclosed this theory in discovery. We served discovery asking for a description of the facts and the theories behind alleged fiduciary breaches, and alleged prohibited transactions, and I went back and I looked at the responses. The words "investment" and "investment advisor" are not in those responses, Your Honor. This is pure sandbagging, and it's unfair to do this now at this point in the litigation.

It's a gotcha moment. It was expressly left out of the theory of fiduciary responsibility by its absence in the allegations about why FCE is allegedly a fiduciary, and it was not identified in discovery.

And, in all fairness, Your Honor, Your Honor has ruled that Ms. Thames' deposition can't come in and the expert can't rely on it because that would be unfair to the Secretary because of the timing. How is this fair? How is it right that

something that's not identified in the pleadings, not identified in the motions, and not identified in discovery can now be introduced now? That's not fair.

THE COURT: All right. I'd be glad to hear from the Secretary on this.

MR. DALIN: Yes, Your Honor.

The Secretary pleaded in the Complaint and also stated in discovery responses that FCE was a fiduciary by way of recommending, negotiating, and executing the Plan's agreements with service providers. Under the definition of "fiduciary," that satisfies all three subparagraphs. The Secretary doesn't need to say the word "investment advisor" in its discovery responses. We provided the facts by which our theory rests that FCE is a fiduciary.

We raised this argument in summary judgment in connection with the prohibited transaction exemption contained in the regulation 29 CFR § 2550.408, which cites an illustrated example wherein an investment advisor recommends purchase of an insurance policy, and it's a prohibited transaction because the investment advisor collects a commission in connection with that transaction.

That's directly applicable to what FCE did here. The important part of that example isn't that the party is necessarily an investment advisor; it's that they're a fiduciary. In that example, they're a fiduciary by way of

being an investment advisor. FCE is a fiduciary with regards to these transactions under all three subparagraphs of the definition of a "fiduciary." They exercised discretionary control of Plan assets. They recommended to the Plan what contracts to enter into, which is recommending to the Plan how to spend its money. And they also had discretionary control over administration of the Plan.

Those facts were set forth in the Complaint, had been set forth throughout discovery. The Secretary isn't required under the notice pleading standard to say magic words or reference every subparagraph of every provision that may be implicated in connection with the facts pleaded in the Complaint.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the simple fact of the matter is I'm going to deny this motion at this point in time, and the Secretary may present evidence which it feels relates essentially to the matter of investment advice, but I will tell you that, while I'm denying the motion, I don't intend to give that a whole lot of weight, and, at the trial of this case, this is really not what the trial of this case is about in terms of investment advice.

So I'll permit the Secretary to introduce it, and I will deny the motion, but, at the bench trial, I don't view this case -- in terms of the breach of fiduciary duties and my knowledge of the facts of this case, I don't see this as being

an investment advice case, just to let you know that that's my view of the evidence, and it remains to be seen, but that's my view of it.

But I'll deny the motion, and I'll permit the Secretary to introduce evidence with respect to a fiduciary theory. I think that it is sufficiently within the ambit of Rule 8 and Twombly and Iqbal and all the other cases, but I don't anticipate it being granted -- I mean, I don't anticipate there being a great deal of weight accorded to that, quite frankly, as long as the Secretary understands that.

So, with that, the next motion of the Defendants', motion in limine of the FCE Defendants, is to exclude testimony of Diane Lapin and what it contends is an inadmissible e-mail chain, and this has to do with essentially Ms. Lapin being an informant whose name was initially withheld by the Government under the Government informants privilege, and the FCE contends it has been prejudiced and deprived of deposing her to provide a defense.

And, with that, I'll be glad to hear from Defense counsel, and then I'll hear from the Secretary.

MR. KOONIN: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Marc Koonin again.

There is two parts to this, and I'd like to address them separately. So one part has to do with the e-mails that contains an e-mail chain from a third party that alleges that

FCE says something that -- that FCE allegedly did, is allegedly unethical, and we objected to this when the Secretary produced its declaration for the first time. I flagged for the Secretary that Ms. Lapin cannot authenticate a communication from somebody else and that a version of that e-mail has been produced three times in the record that did not have that surplusage, and we gave them an opportunity to switch it out, and they didn't do that, okay?

Whatever else Your Honor rules about Ms. Lapin and whatever else she can authenticate, she cannot authenticate an e-mail chain on which she was not copied, okay? And it's clear that that chain is in there solely to cast aspersion on our client, particularly when we've already pointed out to the Secretary that versions in the communication that Ms. Lapin alone was copied on exists and that they could switch that out, but they declined to do that. So that's the first issue.

The second issue is: One of the Secretary's key arguments for why it was okay not to disclose Ms. Lapin previously and not to give us an opportunity to explore issues related to Ms. Lapin is that she was supposedly -- there was a concern that she could be retaliated against because FCE sent letters to its employees reminding them that they had to honor their nondisclosure agreements with regard to HIPAA and trade secrets.

Your Honor may recall -- it's been some time, but

this argument was already rejected by this Court back when the Secretary sought to have a protective order regarding the Donna Zapata issue. They specifically cited this as a theory that employees were being intimidated in their motion, which was ECF 165, and Your Honor allowed me to participate by phone, and I very much remember that Your Honor told them that that letter was a standard business letter, there was nothing out of the ordinary about it, and Your Honor denied their motion at ECF 187.

So the whole basis of this supposedly keeping

Diane Lapin as a secret witness is the theory that she got a

vanilla, bland business letter telling her not to disclose

HIPAA information and trade secrets that Your Honor has already

told the Secretary was okay back -- I want to say -- I think

that was in early 2017.

So they had Your Honor's ruling on that for over a year, but they apparently nevertheless use that as an excuse to hide her until now.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you very much.

I'd be glad to hear from the Secretary on this.

MR. DALIN: Yes, Your Honor.

Former employees get retaliated against. We enforce 20-something retaliation statutes here at the Department of Labor. We get these cases all the time where former employees get blackballed in the industry or in the local market by the

former employer because they spoke or the employer believed that they spoke to the Government, so we take that very seriously. We assert the privilege.

Here, it doesn't matter. We produced these e-mails to Defendants in February of 2017. The e-mails aren't redacted. Diane Lapin's name is on them. We didn't withhold her name from the evidence itself. We stated in our initial discovery responses in, I believe, February of 2017 that there is an informant who can testify that FCE solicited donations from other service providers on behalf of the Chimes Plan.

The only thing that wasn't disclosed to FCE pursuant to the Government's now informants privilege is that it was Diane Lapin who could tell us that, and we have the right to assert that privilege out of, you know, fear of retaliation, and, you know, FCE's argument here is really a motion to compel argument. They had that motion to compel. You know, they didn't pursue it any further.

She can't be excluded when the Secretary has properly raised the privilege, having the Secretary signing a declaration asserting the privilege, and we disclosed all the underlying information to Defendants two years ago.

THE COURT: As I understand it, the discovery in this case did close in January of 2018, and the identity of Ms. Lapin was not disclosed specifically until October 30th of this year, 2018. Is that correct?

1 MR. DALIN: We asserted the informants privilege as 2 to her identity. We produced the e-mails, though, that have 3 her name on them. 4 THE COURT: That have --MR. KOONIN: Your Honor? 5 THE COURT: My question to the Government: Is it 6 7 correct that the discovery closed at the end of January of this 8 year, say ten months ago, almost eleven months ago, and that 9 the identity of Ms. Lapin in terms of being the informant was withheld until October 30th, 2018, when a declaration from her 10 11 was produced authenticating the e-mails which had been 12 previously referenced? Is that correct, or not? 13 MR. DALIN: Yes. We disclosed her as a trial witness 14 in October. We disclosed, in response to discovery, persons 15 who have knowledge of the facts except to the extent that we had asserted the informants privilege over certain employees or 16 former employees. 17 18 THE COURT: All right. Well, with respect to that, 19 the basic principle of fairness has to apply here, and there is 20 absolutely no public interest in holding that until six weeks 21 This is December the 17th. ago. 22 MR. DALIN: Your Honor, there is ample case law that 23 says we can withhold names until ordered by the Court. 24 THE COURT: I've read the case law. Mr. Dalin --25 Mr. Dalin, I'm well aware of your expertise in this area, and,

believe me, I've tried more than a few cases, and, with all due respect to you, this is not just a narrow area of labor law, okay? So you don't need to cite the cases to me with respect to -- there is literally -- there is a Fourth Circuit case in 2018 that absolutely rejects your argument, so I don't want to hear a lecture from you on labor law. This has nothing to do with labor law. This has to do with trial lawyers trying cases, and it's way too cute to come up on October 30th and say on December 17th, "We notified them." You notified them six weeks ago.

That does not cut it with this trial judge, period.

And there is loads of authority in that regard. So this motion is granted. And, if I had any idea you were going to -- you do that at your own peril, sir. You do it at your own peril.

And it has nothing to do -- this is basic trial law in the federal court of the United States, and it's true in criminal cases. It's true in civil cases. It's across the board. It's well stated in a case that you may or may not be familiar with under criminal law known as *Roviaro*. It's true across the board, and so we're not going to get caught in the weeds over what you think how it's defined under labor law.

I don't mean to be quip with you, but I don't think that's fair, okay, and I've spent enough time in a courtroom.

When I see something that's fundamentally unfair on either side, I'm going to call either side out on it, and that is way

too cute. So whoever made the decision for the Secretary to disclose them on October 30, 2018, and then placed you in a position of trying to defend it six weeks later, you cut it way too close. So this motion is granted, and the testimony of Diane Lapin will be excluded, and the e-mail chain will be excluded for the reasons indicated on the record. So Paper Number 465 is granted for the reasons set forth on the record.

All right. And we'll move along. I don't of any grudge against the Secretary on this, Mr. Dalin. I'll keep my mind open on each motion, but that one was way too cute, and the Secretary's position is untenable as to that, and that motion will be granted for those reasons.

All right. The third motion to address now is the FCE Defendants' motion in limine number three to exclude evidence relating to benefit plans other than the Chimes, and that is Paper Number 3, and I'll be glad to hear from Defense counsel on that.

MR. KOONIN: Yes, Your Honor. Marc Koonin again, and I'm going to be addressing all of these for FCE.

I know that Your Honor has ruled that general evidence of claims processing may be permitted, and so I'm not going to reargue that motion, but that is not the only kind of evidence relating to other plans that the Secretary has indicated he may offer.

In particular, the Secretary has referenced several

documents having to do with a former FCE client, TRDI. That's the initials of Training Rehabilitation Disability, Inc., I believe, or, in any event, as the Secretary well knows, there was a lot of very, very contested litigation in both state and federal court simultaneously involving TRDI, and I was involved in that litigation, and, in discovery, the Secretary attempted to help our opponents by providing them with documents, and it also came out in discovery that they had obtained documents from the TRDI counsel.

And so they've listed, for example, a Plan document for TRDI as one of their trial exhibits, and I know we haven't gotten to it yet, but they list this privileged communication relating to TRDI's in the trial exhibits -- as a trial exhibit, and I don't know what else they have out there that's not related to claims, but the bottom line is FCE administers at any given time over a hundred plans, and, over the years, there is turnover. So, for all I know, going back eight years, you know, it could be 150, it could be 200.

But bringing in -- Your Honor has already ruled that evidence related to other litigation is excluded. Evidence that relates to totally different plans that have this different benefits packages, different sizes, some are private sector, some are public sector, or non-profit, I should say -- not public sector, but non-profit -- that's not relevant. It will require a lot of time if we have to dig up what the

dispute was and address that at trial.

And the only reason that the Secretary says that this is relevant is they say: Well, see, the documents here are different. You've produced more express language about whether FCE is a fiduciary. Well, unsurprisingly, FCE, like most businesses, updates its records and forms from time to time. The fact that it makes something more express or more clear as it develops forms over time doesn't really have anything to do with whether the prior form is sufficient to set forth its status as a non-fiduciary.

THE COURT: I understand. I understand your argument. I understand. I understand. And the documents you're relating to, I think, is another motion. Is that the Trial Exhibit 164, the attorney-client and work product privilege e-mail chain? Is that to which you're referring to as well?

MR. KOONIN: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Then I understand. I got it.

I understand. I understand. All right. That's fine.

I'd be glad to hear from the Government.

MR. KOONIN: Wait. I don't want to beat a dead horse, but it's not relevant. It's going to require a mini trial, and I think the Secretary is, frankly, being a little cute, because the Secretary has already gotten all of this, you know, evidentiary discovery in other litigation from other

1 counsel. 2 THE COURT: I understand. I understand. We're 3 trying to -- it's getting late here. I'm trying -- I 4 understand. I'm trying to let you all --MR. KOONIN: Okay. I'm sorry, Your Honor. I'm done. 5 THE COURT: We're not going to argue at length every 6 7 one, as I told you all before almost two hours ago. We're 8 trying to get through these. 9 All right. I'd be glad to hear from the Government on this. 10 11 MR. KOONIN: All right. I'm finished, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: It seems to me that this relates also to 13 the matter of, as I understand it, the work product issue with respect to the e-mail chain and Mr. Crutcher with respect to a 14 15 dispute between FCE and Training and Rehabilitation, as I 16 recall as well, and this is woven together. The two of them 17 are woven together; is that not correct, Mr. Koonin? 18 MR. KOONIN: It's correct to a point, but there is a couple of minor additional points with that one. 19 20 THE COURT: Don't worry about it. I don't need the 21 additional points. I've read it. I've read it. 22 MR. SCHARLAT: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Go ahead. The Government will respond 24 now on, first of all, the matter to exclude evidence relating 25

to benefit plans other than the Chimes Plan, and I think that

what is tied in with that is also this matter with respect to a discovery issue with respect to disclosure of what the Defense contends is attorney-client and work product privilege as to another matter, but just go ahead, Mr. Dalin -- I'd be glad to hear from you -- or Ms. Liu, whoever is going to address this.

MR. DALIN: It's Mr. Dalin, Your Honor. Just to be clear, do you want me to address the e-mail issue in this argument, or --

THE COURT: No, no. Just quickly address this in terms of the matter of essentially the Defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to benefit plans other than the Chimes Plan. I've essentially already addressed this issue; have I not? We're not going to have mini trials here.

MR. KOONIN: I think you have, Your Honor.

MR. DALIN: There is a little bit of difference from the earlier motion, but, first, we need to address FCE's allegations that the Secretary was sharing information with TRDI in their case. That didn't happen. There is a provision of the Act where a plan can request records from the Department of Labor with regards to its plan -- the plan's representative can request. So they may have filed a request for information that the Government is required by law to respond to, so maybe that's how they got some documents.

The document that Mr. Koonin references, which is the adoption agreement for the TRDI plan, is in the public record

in that lawsuit, and I believe FCE even filed it. We just got it from public records. And we're not going to be putting into evidence any allegations from that case, any results of that case.

THE COURT: Well, let's go to the parent one. Let's go to the big picture. Before we get to the document issue, which may be moot dependent on how I rule on this issue, address the matter of evidence being presented with respect to benefit plans other than the Chimes Plan.

MR. DALIN: So, to interpret a contract, a party can put in evidence of another contract that the party has in order to glean the meaning of the terms when comparing the two, so the adoption agreement in the TRDI case is an FCE adoption agreement. It looks very much the same as the Chimes adoption agreement, but some terms are different.

So FCE is arguing in this case that certain provisions remove discretion from it in this case; it wasn't acting with discretion per the terms of the Plan. But you can see in the TRDI adoption agreement, which they drafted, that they use different language when trying to remove itself from having discretionary authority, more direct language in TRDI, which Courts can look at in reaching a conclusion about the meaning of the terms --

THE COURT: I understand. I understand your argument. The bottom line on this is -- the bottom line on

this is in terms of a presiding judge in a bench trial here,
Mr. Dalin, it may or may not have any relevance under Rules 401
or 402, but, as far as I'm concerned, it goes afield of
Rule 403 with respect to essentially, one, if it's prejudicial;
two, if it's confusing. I don't intend to have mini trials on
other plans in this case. So Defendants' motion in limine to
exclude evidence relating to benefit plans other than the
Chimes Plan will be granted for the reasons set forth on the
record here. Paper Number 466 will be granted.

So, with that, it seems to me that the matter of the Trial Exhibit 164 and the matter of the Training,

Rehabilitation & Development Institute contract is moot in that there is no basis to introduce that exhibit in the first place based upon my other ruling, it would seem to me, and, if you want to take one more bite at the apple on this one, Mr. Dalin, you go right ahead.

MR. DALIN: Yeah.

THE COURT: What would be the purpose of my having this exhibit coming in?

MR. DALIN: So David Crutcher, one of the attorneys for FCE, has put into the record two declarations purporting to recalculate the fees that FCE charged to the Chimes Plan. TRDI is another plan serviced by FCE. They have the same trustee. They both -- TMS is the trustee for both. The e-mail discusses that TMS couldn't recalculate the fees for the Plan. This

works in conjunction with the earlier letter from Crutcher, where he says: We can't recalculate the fees charged to the Plan.

This is rebuttal evidence for Crutcher's latest declarations where he says he can calculate the charges, and Grace Dong's declaration, which we discussed earlier, where she says she can calculate the charges, when, earlier on, the same trustee, under the same system with FCE, said that they couldn't recalculate the charges.

THE COURT: I understand your argument, and it's going to be denied for the same reason. I'll be capable of interpreting that, and I'll make rulings in terms of credibility, in terms of your cross-examination of Mr. Crutcher, but we're not going to go afield. I'm not going to have mini trials here in terms of other disputes in other matters with the Secretary. It's going to be tough enough to try to get this case tried in a reasonable period of time without going afield and having mini trials.

So this is probably the third time now I've ruled in the same fashion on the same essential issue. We're not going to go far afield on this case. So that will be granted as well for the reasons set forth on the record.

So I think the next motion that we have here -- the next motion that we have is essentially -- I think we've got a total of -- according to my notes, I've got a total of five

more motions to get through here according to my notes, and this is the motion in limine of the FCE Defendants to exclude testimony of David Levin for lack of personal knowledge, and essentially the FCE Defendants have moved to exclude his deposition designations because they're not based on personal knowledge. He's a former FCE employee, and the Secretary has responded that the designations from his deposition are related to matters that he participated in and observed.

And, from that, I'll be glad to hear from the FCE
Defendants briefly, because, to put it bluntly, I'm hard
pressed to understand how a former employee of the FCE would
not have certain knowledge about certain matters; that he's
certainly free, as far as I'm concerned, to testify as to those
matters in which he participated or as to which he observed in
terms of just basic evidentiary principles. It doesn't mean
he's binding FCE in any way in terms of areas outside of his
prior employment, but whether he's employed for a year and a
half or three months, it's relevant in terms of what he
observed as far as I'm concerned.

So I'd be glad to hear from FCE Defense counsel on this.

MR. KOONIN: Yeah. Your Honor is correct that what Mr. Levin actually observed would be relevant to the extent that he had a foundation. The problem is, if you look at the cited testimony, he testifies as to the meaning of things. So,

for instance, he sees an e-mail, and the e-mail says, "Adjust the employee count," and then he goes ahead and testifies that he thinks that that's improper and someone made it up, but he also testified he doesn't work with the sales team and interact with the clients, so he doesn't know whether the client told them to do that or not.

He testifies that he thinks that the, quote/unquote, make commissions high button means certain things, but when he's asked about who designed it, no. Do you know how it was used? No.

You know, so that's the problem. He observes certain things, but he's not testifying strictly that I observed this spreadsheet, or I got this e-mail. He is moving it out on speculation two levels beyond saying here is what it means and here is what this other person was thinking, even though he has no foundation on any of that.

THE COURT: Well, that's going to go to the weight, not the admissibility. As I understand it, he worked in the actuary department; is that right?

MR. KOONIN: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And he was an underwriter; is that correct?

MR. KOONIN: That's not quite correct. He was in training in that department, but he wasn't -- I don't think you could say that he was a fully-qualified --

THE COURT: Well, that depends -- you can challenge his credibility on that. Mr. Koonin, you can challenge his credibility on that, but, to the extent that he's an underwriter and those duties include budgeting and plans and what have you, and plan designs, he's certainly free to testify as to that. He worked there for a period of time.

You can attack him in terms of exactly what he did or did not work on and what his expertise was or his area. I'm not going to qualify him as an expert, but there is no merit to this motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Daniel Levin for lack of personal knowledge. So the secretary doesn't even need to respond on this. This motion, Paper Number 468, will be denied for the reasons indicated here on the record.

So where we are now is we are at the motion in limine -- FCE's motion in limine number six, I believe, of the seven motions in limine by the FCE Defendants, and this motion number six essentially is that the FCE Defendants have moved to exclude any admissions by Co-Defendants against them because Co-Defendants are obviously not bound by another Defendant's admission.

The Secretary contends that this blanket exclusion is somewhat overbroad and that it may or may not be admissible.

With respect to that, I'll hear from the Secretary first. What is the theory here? Is there a conspiracy count in this case?

I don't believe there is, is there?

MS. LIU: Katrina Liu here.

No, Your Honor. We are not seeking to -- well, we don't expect to use evidence of Chimes D.C.'s out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted under the conspiracy non-hearsay definition. Our only argument is that we understand we cannot use it as party opponent statements against FCE, but we can use it for impeachment for -- I'm sorry -- excuse me -- for impeachment purposes, not as to the truth of the matter asserted.

And so, in that sense, we just want to ensure that -we can still admit this evidence, the statements by Chimes
D.C., at least against Chimes D.C.

THE COURT: All right. I understand, Ms. Liu.

Ms. Liu, that is a noble effort worthy of a great law school performance in a classroom. Trying to get around a clear rule of evidence is not permitted, and I'm teasing you here a little bit, but the skill with which you tried to dance around it is illustrative of the point that the Defendants' motion number six shall be granted, so any evidence of Co-Defendants' admissions shall not be admissible in any way, in any context against the FCE Defendants, and so that will be granted.

Okay. So I think that we have one more motion of the FCE Defendants, and that is number seven here, and Paper

Number 7 of the FCE Defendants' motion in limine is to exclude evidence and argument relating to Significa Benefit Services,

Inc. Essentially, there is a great deal of information provided about Significa, which became essentially a relationship later, as I understand it, with Chimes D.C.

Essentially, as I understand it, the FCE Defendants argue that this kind of information was revealed late and not until the Pretrial Order, that it will be prejudice -- the Secretary's essentially said that Significa did not replace FCE until January of 2018, so that the Secretary was only aware of it then, and there is a question as to the admissibility of evidence relating to Significa Benefit Services.

Let me save you all some time here from billable time against your clients. I'm really not interested in Significa Benefit Services, Inc. I'm trying to keep my focus upon the allegations in this case, consistent with my other rulings, and, in terms of solicitation for RFPs or what have you and another third-party administrator, it's of limited utility to me on either side, quite frankly, but it is the FCE Defendants' motion in limine to exclude that evidence. I'll be glad to hear from you, but I really think you can be very brief. I need to hear from the Secretary on this, because I'm not anxious to go afield on this. It's very important.

MR. KOONIN: Well, Your Honor, I'll --

THE COURT: This case is detailed enough. This case is detailed enough. You don't need to be going afield on this. Go ahead.

MR. KOONIN: No, Your Honor. Your Honor has already granted ECF 473, which overlaps for different purposes, because the alleged remedial measures --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KOONIN: -- were to bring in Significa, and so
granting this motion is consistent.

I will say one other thing and only one other thing on this motion. Part of the Secretary's newly-disclosed theory is that Significa should have been considered as some sort of a comparator back in 2009.

We asked an interrogatory that was specifically and expressly exactly on point, and the Secretary did not identify Significa -- never did. And they raised this theory. They've submitted these Internet page printouts just within the last, I think, month and a half. I want to say it was in late October.

But the point is: For the same reason that Your Honor did not allow remedial measures after 2017, Your Honor should also not allow them to say: Oh, and they can come in back in 2009. We asked the specific interrogatory on that. They didn't provide it, and now, after the fact, they want to bring in evidence, and Your Honor has already excluded the evidence of the replacement process.

So I think Your Honor should grant this motion as well.

THE COURT: All right. Government counsel, do you

want to respond on this?

MR. DALIN: Yes. This isn't a subsequent remedial measure issue, nor does the Government want to put in evidence from the request for proposal process. FCE's and Defendants' expert, Aaron Raddock, argues -- and the parties argues this as well -- that there are only two competitors to FCE in the market to whom they could have looked for -- to replace FCE's services. Well, here is another service provider who can come into court and tell you that they could provide the services as well to rebut the arguments from these -- from Defendants and from the expert.

As to the discovery issue, at the time that FCE issued the interrogatory asking us to identify other providers, I mean, first, it should be noted that it's not our duty to identify the providers; it's the fiduciary's duty. But, at that time, we didn't know about Significa.

When we learned about Significa, we sent them a subpoena. We noticed FCE of the subpoena. They got a copy of the subpoena. And, when we got the documents, we turned them over to FCE and other Defendants, so, once we learned about it, we supplemented our discovery with the subpoena and provided all documents that we received.

We're not looking to get into subsequent remedial measures here. It's rebuttal of Defendants' contention that there were no other players in the market who they could have

looked to besides the two that they identified, Boon and Fringe Benefit Group.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KOONIN: Your Honor, that's a switch of bait.

That's a switch of bait. The question here is: Who was available in 2009? And there is no -- if Your Honor does not grant this motion in limine, then we will have to put on evidence of what Significa could or could not have done in 2009, which is not something we were allowed to do discovery on before, and it's unfair to do it now, and they never amended their interrogatory. It's true they've made a subpoena, but that's different saying, well, Significa could do something in 2018. It's different than saying it could have done it nine years before. That is a total switch of bait.

THE COURT: Well, the bottom line on it is this:

This scenario, somewhere in your materials here, if I recall,
there is a citation to a case that I had called First Data,
which was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit on many, many issues,
and this came up, I think, in discovery before the trial of the
First Data case, et cetera, et cetera, and I forget what -- you
could just try to find the First Data case somewhere. And I
was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in that case.

First of all, there is a delay here in providing this information, and it's prejudice to the other side. And, to the extent that they could have found out about Significa and also

in terms of the time reference, I'm going to grant this motion. I think it is akin to the remedial motion matter, but, furthermore, apart from that, that there is improper delay with respect to the length of time before this was necessarily disclosed in a Pretrial Order.

So I've dealt with this before. I've been affirmed by it before by the Fourth Circuit, and the Defendants' motion is granted, excluding that evidence and argument related to Significa Benefit Services. Paper Number 470 is granted for the reasons set forth on the record.

So I think I just have two motions left.

Essentially, I have the motion of the Chimes Defendants. A motion in limine to prevent the Secretary from offering evidence of payments made by the Plan to reimburse Chimes D.C., Inc., for work performed by Chimes D.C., Inc. employee

Karen Holcomb is before me. And then I have the Defendant

Marilyn Ward's motion in limine to preclude certain evidence, and so the Chimes Defendants counsel is up on deck here finally, so I'd be glad to hear from you.

MR. SCHARLAT: Thank you, Your Honor. Richard Scharlat.

Our point is very simple. The Secretary chose to seek certain relief with regard to these payments, and that was disgorgement under 502(a)(5). These payments are -- this transfer of money was not of profit. It was a reimbursement

for services rendered. There was no overage. There was no profit. There was simply a return of money from the Plan for benefits it received to Chimes D.C.

The case that the Secretary cites, the Leckey case, not comparable at all. That's where a trustee took \$500,000, cleared out a trust, and put it in a different trust, and that money was gone. That is not what happened here. It's not a semantic argument. It's a very real argument under ERISA, because there is no way for this to be a profit. It can't be disgorged.

THE COURT: Does it not also weave into my matter of a limitations issue, as I recall, on Holcomb as well?

MR. SCHARLAT: This is -- yes, Your Honor. This has been reduced. It's been almost cut in half -- actually, I think cut in half.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHARLAT: It's down to about \$233,000. That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. I'd be glad to hear from the Secretary on this.

MS. LIU: Yes, Your Honor. Katrina Liu.

How to characterize whether it's a reimbursement or profit or a payment, it is a transaction that Chimes D.C. caused the Plan to make that the Secretary alleges is self dealing. And so, whether it was for direct expenses, that's

something for the Defendants to carry the burden on, and so the characterization of simply reimbursement doesn't negate the substance of the transaction, which is a prohibited transaction under ERISA 406.

And so, for that reason, we oppose the motion to exclude.

THE COURT: All right. This motion will be granted.

I've looked at this at some length before, but I'm reviewing it here now in terms of the matter of reimbursement -- the issue here as to the employee Karen Holcomb. Essentially, the Secretary of Labor has limited its remedy to disgorgement and essentially is seeking to compel a payment of a sum of money here, which should be barred, because the matter of trying to include this as reimbursement, I think, is not consistent with the other rulings I've already made.

First of all, I know that I cut this thing in half in terms of the matter of anything having to do with payments before January 1 of 2010, as I recall, and this, I think, relates to the matter of Holcomb payments.

The Order that I issued back in November, just a few weeks ago, granting the Defendants' joint motion for summary judgment, I noted, as I recall there, that the Secretary had actual knowledge of these facts well before the Chimes signed the tolling agreement here. And so, as a result of that, essentially the defense here essentially were reimbursements

and not just unjust profits, consistent with my earlier ruling, so, to sort of dance around and trying to say that that characterization is not important, there is not going to be an issue before me that it was a prohibited transaction resulting in losses to the Plan, and, quite frankly, in light of the amount of money involved compared to what's being sought in this case, it's of very little moment to me.

So, with that, the Defendants' motion in limine,

Paper Number 482, shall be granted for the reasons indicated on
the record. So that will be granted.

So then I think we have one more motion here, to my knowledge, and that is coming on past a little two hours now. We're getting a lot of work done. I certainly appreciate the people who are on the East Coast time here, particularly the court reporter.

The last remaining motion that I have here is the motion of the Defendant Marilyn Ward, motion in limine to preclude evidence relating to Ward's recordkeeping after her retirement, and, essentially, as I understand it, looking at these arguments and the submissions of the parties of the Paper Number 474 and the response of the Secretary, which is Paper Number 509, essentially Ms. Ward has requested that this Court exclude all documents and testimony and other evidence relating to her recordkeeping after her retirement, and contends that it is not relevant in that I've already ruled that she is not

liable for anything after December 13, 2013, her effective retirement date, and it is essentially not relevant whether she currently possesses any records related to the Plan, and she essentially has argued that it's inappropriate for the Secretary to argue that her failure to keep records should result in a presumption against her that she failed to maintain records.

The Secretary's response has been that anything that happened to the records after she retired is relevant, and apparently there is some contention that she felt the records were in FCE's possession, and essentially the Secretary wants to elicit testimony about whether the documents existed and who retained them.

I guess the real question here is the matter of her recordkeeping after her retirement. I've already ruled that she is not liable for anything after December 13, 2013, and to the extent that there is some suggestion that she had an obligation to review records is really what's at issue here.

So I'll be glad to hear from counsel for Ms. Ward, and then I'll hear from the Secretary, counsel.

MR. WEATHERFORD: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Scott Weatherford, and I'll be short. I think you summarized it pretty well.

The only thing I'll add is that that's exactly the point of this *limine*, is the fact that, in light of Your

Honor's ruling limiting her fiduciary responsibility post

December 13, 2013, any intent by the Secretary to use

Ms. Ward's recordkeeping practices after that date to somehow imply that she didn't keep proper or adequate records during the time that she did serve as trustee is simply not probative of any fact that's at issue in the remaining claims against Ms. Ward.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel for the Secretary,
Ms. Liu or Mr. Dalin?

MS. LIU: Yes.

THE COURT: Ms. Liu?

MS. LIU: Yes. Katrina Liu here.

The Secretary's concern is Ms. Ward's recordkeeping during the time -- before she retired, the period of time during which she could be held liable. What the Secretary is seeking, though, is what happened to those documents in order to, I guess, see or to present evidence on what Ms. Ward's recordkeeping practices were during her trusteeship.

The Secretary hasn't been able to get those records, and there has been some back and forth between FCE and Ward about what happened to those records or whether those records even exist. And so, to the extent that the documents still exist beyond Ms. Ward's retirement, the Secretary would like to be able to at least question witnesses about what happened to those documents in order to flesh out the Secretary's

allegation that Ms. Ward wasn't keeping track of FCE's fees while she was trustee.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think that what -- in terms of trying to hold her responsible, Ms. Liu, for records, wherever the records are now in terms of her level of conduct, I in no way would make a finding of fact that would in any way advance the Secretary's position with respect to, if someone doesn't know where records are now some five years after the fact, that that would in any way reflect upon how she kept records up to December 13, 2013.

You are certainly free to pursue from FCE in terms of what records they do and don't have. I don't know that there is a spoliation issue here or not. I don't know. But I see nothing that requires, you know, inquiry of Ms. Ward with respect to what she did after her retirement.

I mean, if someone from FCE says, "We gave all the records to Ms. Ward," and, Ms. Ward can say, "No, you didn't.

I don't have the records." That may or may not be the evidence and how it breaks at trial, but the matter of her recordkeeping after her retirement is simply not in the case, and nor can it be judged in terms of what she did or didn't do prior to December 13th of 2013.

It doesn't mean you can't pursue or argue that FCE did not keep appropriate records. In any kind of case like this, you're free to do so. But it doesn't relate to trying to

present evidence against Ms. Ward with respect to that.

So, with respect to this motion, Paper Number 474, the Defendant Marilyn Ward's motion in limine to preclude evidence relating to her recordkeeping, that motion will be granted for the reasons set forth on the record.

motions in limine. I have the schedule. The Order that I issued last Friday has noted -- it was filed as a Letter Order, but it was deemed to be a direct Order of Court, and the Clerk has docketed it as such. We granted the request -- in light of Mr. Eassa's health issue, we've delayed the case for about a week so that the bench trial in this case will begin on Monday, January the 14th. The pretrial conference will be Friday, January the 11th. Parties are to exchange electronic copies of trial exhibits by Friday, January the 4th. And the Pretrial Order shall be to me by Thursday, January the 3rd. And we, consistent with that Order, have held a on-the-record telephone conference to address the current pending motions in limine, so I think we're ready to roll here on this.

It will remain to be seen. We'll go over how starting the case a week later will impact the overall schedule. I know that, for religious reasons, we've previously noted -- hold on just one second.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: We have previously noted that we'll make

sure we stop at the appropriate time on a Friday during the 1 2 trial, and we haven't really had time to go through the days 3 that we're sitting in light of the fact that the case is starting a week later. Obviously the case is not going to end 4 on the date we anticipated. I thought we were going to finish 5 by January 28th. We may not. We'll have to wait and see on 6 7 this. Is there anything else from the point of view of the 8 9 attorneys for the Secretary of Labor, from the Government 10 counsel? 11 MS. LIU: No. 12 MR. DALIN: No, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything --14 MS. LIU: No, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Is there anything else from the point of view of the Chimes Defendants here? 16 17 MR. SCHARLAT: No, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else from the FCE Defendants here? 19 20 MR. KOONIN: One minor point, Your Honor. Your 21 Honor --22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. KOONIN: -- since you granted motion in limine 24 number four about the privileged exhibit --25 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KOONIN: -- we'd like the Secretary to destroy 1 2 it. THE COURT: That's fine. That was going to be Trial 3 Exhibit Number 164; is that correct? 4 MR. KOONIN: Yes. That's what it -- the numbers are 5 changing since we're meeting and conferring, but, regardless, 6 7 it's a privileged document, and Your Honor has excluded it. 8 They should destroy the document. 9 THE COURT: I agree. Any problem with that? Government counsel, any problem? 10 11 MR. DALIN: Well, I think you ruled that it's 12 excluded for relevance reasons, but not that it was privileged. 13 THE COURT: Well, it is privileged. Destroy it. That make it easier for you? 14 15 MR. DALIN: Sure, Your Honor. Thank you. 16 THE COURT: All right. Just destroy it. And, as an 17 Officer of the Court, I'll assume you've done that, and it will 18 be destroyed. 19 Anything else from the point of view of the FCE Defendants? 20 21 MR. EASSA: Your Honor, this is Rob Eassa. I am 22 going to make an attempt to participate in the trial, and I 23 would like to take the Court up on its offer of accommodations 24 with respect to possible parking and use of a back-door 25 elevator to get in and out.

THE COURT: That's fine. We'll do whatever you want to do in that regard. Just remind me. We'll make sure that we -- I think the best way on this, there is handicapped parking right at the front door of the courthouse, right on the horseshoe driveway, and there is a ramp, disability accessible, for court staff off to the right of the main door, and you can roll in there, and you can roll right around to the elevator and come right up to the fifth floor, my courtroom. And we'll make sure that we can accommodate you with respect to bathroom facilities.

I'm just thinking that, as to that, Mr. Eassa, the men's room on the fifth floor is disabled accessible with a larger toilet facility, for example, and a rail, but you still could just roll out of the courtroom and go around the bend to the bathroom, and that's all on one floor, and there are large handrails there that would assist you. So I think that all that can be done, and, as far as I'm concerned, yes, we'll make sure you get a parking spot, and we'll have it for you there. I'd be glad to do it.

MR. EASSA: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. KOONIN: Your Honor, one last --

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

MR. KOONIN: Your Honor, one last thing. This is

Marc Koonin. We have understood that Your Honor was going to

use the ceremonial courtroom on Floor 1.

THE COURT: No. We're not.

MR. KOONIN: I think Your Honor mentioned the fifth.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KOONIN: Okay. I just wanted to clarify that.

THE COURT: We're going to order -- yes. In light of some of the parties who are no longer in the case, as far as I'm concerned, you all have been in my courtroom, I think. You all have been there. And I have a large Defense table with six chairs, and then I have chairs behind it. And the Plaintiffs' counsel's table has three chairs, so that we have space for Government counsel, and we have space for Defense counsel for essentially the three parties that we have here, so we have room for two lawyers for each party, and we have chairs behind that where people can sit.

We have a witness room where we can store exhibits, so you all can keep exhibits in a certain room right there and just keep lugging things back and forth. And the fifth floor is much more accommodating than the ceremonial courtroom, and, despite the grandeur of the ceremonial courtroom, most lawyers agree that the acoustics in there are terrible, and so we're not going to be -- we don't have any need now to use the ceremonial courtroom, and my staff will follow up on that to verify that we'll be trying this case in Courtroom 5D, my courtroom. And, as I say, it's very easily accessible for you, Mr. Eassa. It will be fine. It will be fine. Okay.

MR. EASSA: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate that. On security, getting into the building, Your Honor, security, I have a problem. I have an inability to take my shoes off or really do that. I can't bend down.

THE COURT: I know. I understand.

MR. EASSA: Is that an issue?

THE COURT: We have started a security check on you already, Mr. Eassa, and your colleagues of yours were not quite as raucous as your high school years, and so I've made sure that they delete some of those things, you know --

MR. EASSA: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate that.

THE COURT: And certainly, consistent with everyone, once people get to law school, they really start to behave, so I have no bad reports from the FBI or the CIA on any of you all in terms of your law school years, and some of you were a little raucous in your college years, but that's another matter.

MR. EASSA: Great. Great.

THE COURT: We don't need to worry about that. We'll square that away. I'll talk to the security -- court security personnel and the court security officers and the Marshals, and that will be fine. We'll be able to roll you in and out pretty easily, and it will be okay. It will be fine. Okay?

MR. EASSA: Great. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Good enough. 1 MS. STRANDBERG: Your Honor? 2 THE COURT: Yes? Yes? 3 4 MS. STRANDBERG: Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes? 5 MS. STRANDBERG: I would like to thank you. This was 6 7 a massive amount of material. You've worked very hard, and, on 8 behalf of all of us, I'd like to say that we appreciate it. 9 THE COURT: Well, that's quite all right. That's my job, and I'm glad to do it. And, if I was quip with any of the 10 11 lawyers, I apologize, and I'm very sorry I couldn't accommodate 12 Mr. Eassa. I actually have enjoyed it. I like cases, and I 13 like being in the courtroom, and these are very interesting 14 issues. And I'm sorry. Who was just speaking? Who was the 15 very intelligent person who just spoke? 16 MS. STRANDBERG: Rebecca Strandberg. 17 THE COURT: All right. Rebecca Strandberg. 18 MS. STRANDBERG: Rebecca Strandberg. 19 THE COURT: Rebecca Strandberg. Obviously that's the 20 most intelligent thing that's been said thus far by all the 21 lawyers in the case. 22 (Laughter.) 23 THE COURT: We're all laughing here. That's the most 24 cogent, and I appreciate your great perception, Ms. Strandberg, 25 on that.

No. That's fine. I'm looking forward to the case, and we're going to get this case tried, and it's been at issue a long time, and the Government's entitled to get this case tried, and so are the Defendants, so that's my goal, and we'll work through this.

And I will tell you that I have -- I guess because of the fact that I was fortunate enough to be able to try a lot of cases, both civil and criminal, when I was at the bar before I went on the bench, I really -- I can't guarantee it's going to be two weeks, but it will definitely be three. I have never, ever had a bench trial -- and I've had some complicated bench trials over the years. I have never had a bench trial where I didn't get an opinion out within 15 days.

So what I do is that I'm going to ask for proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from everyone at the conclusion of the case. I'll warn you ahead of time that, as we try the case, you start betting those ready. So, when we complete the case, within a -- along with your closing arguments, within a matter of two or three days, I will want proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. I take those into account along with closing argument, and then I get to work on it right away, and you'll notice that the law clerk working on the case will be with me in the courtroom the entire time.

So we keep our nose to the grindstone on a bench

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We don't let it drift. So I can promise you that.
 1
 2
       you'll have an opinion in this case and resolution from which
 3
       the parties can take -- either side can take an appeal
 4
       certainly by the second week in February. So that's where we
       are. So good enough.
 5
                 Well, anyway, you all have a wonderful holiday, and
 6
 7
       try to enjoy the holiday in light of this pace we have here.
 8
                 And, Mr. Eassa, I certainly hope that you continue to
 9
       heal, and I'm very sorry that you have to be going through this
       right now, particularly during this time of year, so all the
10
11
       best to all of you.
12
                 MR. EASSA: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
                 THE COURT: If anyone needs me for any reason, just
14
       let me know. I'll be around next week as well, but just sort
15
       of in and out a little bit, so I'll see you all in January.
16
       Thank you very much. Take care. Bye-bye.
17
                 MR. KOONIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
18
                 MR. SCHARLAT:
                               Thank you, Your Honor.
19
                 MS. LIU: Thank you, Your Honor.
20
                 THE COURT: Bye-bye.
21
           (Proceedings adjourned.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER I, Martin J. Giordano, Registered Merit Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, do hereby certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically-reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dated this 27th day of December 2018. MARTIN J. GIORDANO, RMR, CRR FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

\$	44:23	509 [1] - 82:22
т	2017 [10] - 24:5, 24:8, 41:5, 43:4, 44:10,	522 [1] - 2:12
	44:24, 59:15, 60:5, 60:8, 76:17	5500s [1] - 41:16
\$2,931,000 [1] - 45:8	2018 [11] - 1:8, 2:1, 24:10, 60:23, 60:25,	5:23 [1] - 52:2
\$233,000 [1] - 80:17	61:10, 62:5, 63:2, 75:8, 78:13, 95:14	5:29 [1] - 52:2
\$500,000 [1] - 80:5	21201 [1] - 1:24	5D [1] - 90:23
\$60,000 [1] - 12:18	24 [1] - 48:1	5th [3] - 5:19, 16:7, 34:9
, ,	2550.408 [1] - 55:17	3th [5] - 3.19, 10.1, 34.9
•	27th [1] - 95:14	•
		6
	28 [1] - 95:8	
'12 [2] - 44:21, 46:24	28th [1] - 87:6	6:31 [1] - 1:8
'13 [2] - 44:21, 46:24	29 [1] - 55:17	110 (1)
'14 [2] - 44:21, 46:24		7
'15 [3] - 41:23, 44:21, 46:24	3	
'16 [3] - 41:15, 41:21, 42:3		
'17 [3] - 41:15, 41:21, 42:3	3 [2] - 12:17, 63:16	7 _[1] - 74:24
[6]6,		724 [1] - 17:17
1	3.6 [3] - 47:17, 48:18, 50:10	753 [1] - 95:8
I	30 [2] - 26:9, 63:2	
	30th [3] - 60:24, 61:10, 62:8	8
1 [3] - 49:5, 81:18, 89:25	3rd [1] - 86:16	· · ·
1.5 [1] - 18:7		4
1006 [10] - 16:16, 16:18, 16:23, 16:24,	4	8 [7] - 15:3, 53:13, 53:22, 54:2, 54:8,
17:1, 21:9, 21:10, 21:19, 22:17		57:7
101 [1] - 1:24	4 04:44	8.3 [5] - 47:25, 48:1, 48:23, 49:3, 50:17
11.62 [2] - 22:9, 22:13	4 [1] - 34:11	801 [1] - 28:12
	401 [3] - 30:1, 33:19, 69:2	803(6 [1] - 17:5
11th [2] - 2:16, 86:14	402 [1] - 69:3	804 [1] - 28:12
12 [3] - 46:18, 49:21, 49:24	403 [1] - 69:4	804(b)(1 [3] - 24:19, 28:1, 28:15
13 [4] - 83:1, 83:16, 84:2, 85:10	406 [1] - 81:4	• • •
13.62 [2] - 22:10, 22:13	407 [5] - 34:20, 35:3, 35:5, 35:7, 35:11	807 [2] - 21:14, 22:19
13th [1] - 85:22	410-962-4504 [1] - 1:25	A
14th [2] - 2:15, 86:13	436 [1] - 17:17	Α Α
15 [1] - 93:13	464 [1] - 53:8	
150 [1] - 64:18	465 [1] - 63:7	Aaron [5] - 10:2, 10:9, 12:13, 15:25,
164 [3] - 65:14, 69:11, 88:4	466 [1] - 69:9	77:5
165 [1] - 59:5	468 [1] - 73:12	Abernathy [7] - 23:12, 23:23, 24:18,
17 [4] - 1:8, 2:1, 50:1, 50:9	470 [1] - 79:9	25:1, 26:23, 28:19, 29:2
17th [2] - 61:21, 62:9	471 [4] - 29:19, 33:16, 34:4, 34:6	
187 [1] - 59:9	472 [4] - 40:25, 41:1, 41:6, 44:24	Abernathy's [1] - 24:22
- •		ability [1] - 23:17
2	473 [3] - 34:14, 35:16, 76:2	able [9] - 6:13, 8:7, 19:1, 43:12, 47:16,
<u></u>	474 [2] - 82:21, 86:2	84:19, 84:24, 91:23, 93:7
	475 [2] - 36:1, 38:10	ABOVE [1] - 1:9
2 [1] - 46:16	476 [3] - 38:23, 40:16, 45:16	above-entitled [1] - 95:10
2% [4] - 16:16, 18:10, 18:12, 18:21	477 [4] - 5:18, 8:20, 9:19, 9:23	ABOVE-ENTITLED [1] - 1:9
2.204 [1] - 47:13	478 [2] - 10:4, 15:25	absence [1] - 54:19
2.9 [4] - 47:19, 48:17, 48:18, 51:4	479 [1] - 22:23	absolutely [4] - 22:14, 40:8, 61:20, 62:5
2.931 [1] - 46:21	480 [1] - 29:2	abundantly [1] - 28:6
20-something [1] - 59:23	482 [1] - 82:9	accept [1] - 20:5
200 [1] - 64:18	483 [2] - 40:20, 51:5	accepting [1] - 36:15
	4:10 [1] - 1:8	accessible [3] - 89:5, 89:12, 90:24
2008 [2] - 44:5, 44:6	4th [1] - 86:15	accidentally [1] - 52:21
2009 [5] - 44:7, 76:10, 76:19, 78:6, 78:9		accommodate [2] - 89:9, 92:11
2010 [8] - 41:5, 41:15, 41:21, 42:2, 43:4,	5	accommodating [1] - 90:18
44:10, 44:23, 81:18		accommodating [1] - 90.16
2011 [5] - 41:22, 43:20, 44:8, 44:21,		
46:24	5.8 [1] - 47:14	accorded [2] - 34:3, 57:9
2013 [5] - 83:1, 83:16, 84:2, 85:10,	50 [1] - 12:22	according [4] - 27:3, 33:9, 70:25, 71:1
05:00	502(a)(5 [1] - 42:13	accordingly [1] - 28:18
85:22		
2015 [3] - 43:20, 44:5, 44:8		account [1] - 93:21
	502(a)(5) [1] - 79:24	account [1] - 93:21 accountant [1] - 19:13

accounting [4] - 31:3, 31:24, 33:25, aggregate [2] - 48:24, 50:5 apples [1] - 47:8 42:12 ago [10] - 19:5, 28:21, 49:15, 60:21, applicable [1] - 55:22 Acosta [1] - 2:10 61:8, 61:21, 62:10, 66:7, 81:21 application [1] - 31:18 ACOSTA[1] - 1:3 agree [4] - 25:4, 26:14, 88:9, 90:20 applies [2] - 53:23, 54:2 acoustics [1] - 90:20 agreed [1] - 36:6 apply [2] - 54:1, 61:19 Act [7] - 10:11, 10:12, 10:20, 10:21, agreement [7] - 50:3, 67:25, 68:13, appreciate [5] - 82:13, 91:1, 91:11, 10:23, 11:22, 67:19 68:14, 68:15, 68:19, 81:24 92:8, 92:24 acting [3] - 27:13, 38:8, 68:18 agreements [3] - 49:23, 55:10, 58:23 appropriate [3] - 21:10, 85:24, 87:1 activities [1] - 10:17 agrees [1] - 36:14 appropriately [2] - 50:20, 53:13 activity [2] - 10:20, 16:20 ahead [17] - 7:13, 14:15, 14:16, 17:14, April [1] - 24:4 actual [9] - 17:24, 31:11, 31:17, 32:1, 21:24, 33:12, 39:19, 40:1, 43:1, 49:15, arbitration [4] - 23:15, 26:5, 26:6, 28:8 49:25, 50:5, 50:8, 50:12, 81:23 66:23, 67:4, 69:16, 72:2, 75:25, 89:22, Arc[1] - 48:12 actuary [1] - 72:19 area [3] - 61:25, 62:2, 73:8 add [6] - 18:10, 18:11, 39:23, 48:3, Aircoil [1] - 49:11 areas [1] - 71:16 83:24 akin [2] - 47:2, 79:2 argue [7] - 28:10, 29:24, 39:15, 66:6, added [1] - 18:21 al [2] - 1:6, 2:10 75:5, 83:5, 85:23 additional [5] - 10:11, 20:2, 42:1, 66:19, ALEXANDER [1] - 1:3 argued [5] - 29:25, 33:17, 34:20, 45:21, 66:21 allegation [2] - 9:14, 85:1 83:4 address [18] - 9:17, 14:19, 21:23, 25:23, allegations [4] - 54:20, 67:17, 68:3, arques [3] - 24:23, 77:5, 77:6 29:13, 34:15, 35:20, 41:25, 44:18, 75:14 arguing [5] - 13:21, 21:7, 39:9, 49:19, 57:23, 63:13, 65:1, 67:5, 67:7, 67:9, alleged [8] - 32:4, 33:21, 45:7, 45:20, 68:16 67:16, 68:8, 86:18 54:12, 54:13, 76:3 argument [29] - 10:25, 13:2, 13:3, addressed [3] - 15:15, 19:4, 67:12 allegedly [3] - 54:20, 58:1 15:20, 32:20, 32:22, 35:8, 39:25, 40:4, addressing [3] - 10:6, 33:21, 63:19 alleges [4] - 10:7, 44:5, 57:25, 80:24 41:18, 43:12, 53:9, 53:19, 55:15, 59:1, adequate [1] - 84:4 allow [4] - 23:11, 35:6, 76:17, 76:18 60:15, 60:16, 62:5, 65:12, 67:8, 68:25, adjourned [1] - 94:21 70:10, 74:5, 74:25, 79:8, 80:8, 93:21 allowed [2] - 59:5, 78:9 adjudication [2] - 32:7, 32:9 almost [4] - 24:10, 61:8, 66:7, 80:14 arguments [5] - 42:1, 58:18, 77:10, 82:20, 93:19 Adjust [1] - 72:1 alone [1] - 58:15 administers [1] - 64:15 arises [2] - 7:17, 8:22 ambit [2] - 53:13, 57:6 administration [1] - 56:7 ambush [1] - 25:9 arising [1] - 10:11 Administration [1] - 5:9 arithmetic [2] - 19:8, 21:3 amend [1] - 28:23 Administration's [2] - 5:7, 9:3 Amended [4] - 43:20, 43:21, 44:4, 53:18 aside [1] - 47:25 administrative [6] - 6:12, 6:18, 6:25, amended [1] - 78:10 aspersion [1] - 58:12 10:15, 24:7, 31:8 Americanized [1] - 23:11 assert [2] - 60:3, 60:14 administrator [1] - 75:16 amount [7] - 2:17, 5:20, 18:16, 50:11, asserted [5] - 28:14, 61:1, 61:16, 74:4, Administrators [1] - 3:22 74.9 50:18, 82:6, 92:7 admissibility [8] - 18:24, 19:18, 21:6, asserting [1] - 60:20 amounts [3] - 48:12, 50:6, 50:8 21:8, 33:20, 43:11, 72:18, 75:9 ample [1] - 61:22 assessing [1] - 10:18 admissible [8] - 16:25, 17:11, 17:18, analyses [1] - 16:14 assets [2] - 10:16, 56:4 21:13, 24:20, 28:4, 73:22, 74:20 analysis [17] - 12:11, 16:15, 19:14, assist [1] - 89:16 admission [2] - 41:23, 73:20 20:13, 26:15, 44:15, 45:25, 46:12, assume [2] - 53:24, 88:17 admissions [2] - 73:18, 74:20 47:24, 48:5, 48:15, 48:19, 48:24, 49:9, assumed [2] - 26:13, 26:14 admit [5] - 16:14, 16:17, 36:7, 43:8, 49:12, 49:13, 50:15 assuming [1] - 53:23 74:11 analyst [1] - 16:10 assumption [1] - 26:16 analyzed [1] - 38:24 admits [1] - 47:18 attach [2] - 12:16, 22:1 admitted [3] - 16:21, 17:8, 36:8 analyzes [1] - 41:22 attached [1] - 22:8 adoption [6] - 49:22, 67:25, 68:13, Andrew [3] - 12:7, 15:14, 15:18 Attachment [1] - 48:4 68:14, 68:19 anew [1] - 6:24 attack [2] - 37:25, 73:7 advance [1] - 85:7 answered [1] - 32:21 attempt [1] - 88:22 advice [3] - 56:17, 56:21, 57:1 attempted [1] - 64:6 answers [1] - 37:22 advisor [6] - 54:15, 55:12, 55:18, 55:20, anticipate [3] - 7:18, 57:8 attend [1] - 28:10 55:24, 56:1 anticipated [1] - 87:5 attendant [1] - 46:1 affect [1] - 32:17 anxious [1] - 75:21 attorney [2] - 65:14, 67:3 affirmed [3] - 78:18, 78:22, 79:6 anyway [1] - 94:6 attorney-client [2] - 65:14, 67:3 afield [6] - 69:3, 70:14, 70:18, 70:21, apart [3] - 30:15, 36:4, 79:3 attorneys [3] - 18:5, 69:20, 87:9 75:21, 75:24 apologize [1] - 92:11 attorneys' [2] - 8:10, 9:11 afraid [1] - 44:14 appeal [1] - 94:3 attributed [1] - 30:23 afternoon [11] - 2:2, 2:5, 2:8, 3:6, 3:8, appear [4] - 6:1, 42:1, 45:11, 46:4 audit [8] - 24:1, 24:4, 24:11, 24:16, 27:2, 3:9, 3:12, 4:3, 4:11, 4:14, 41:9 apple [2] - 15:2, 69:15 27:5, 27:6, 30:22

auditing [2] - 26:16, 33:4 better [2] - 4:4, 52:24 auditor [2] - 24:14, 26:15 betting [1] - 93:17 auditors [1] - 33:11 between [9] - 8:12, 9:8, 31:22, 42:9, 47:17, 48:18, 50:18, 66:15, 84:20 audits [6] - 24:15, 26:7, 26:24, 27:1, 30:18, 33:23 beyond [2] - 72:14, 84:23 authenticate [3] - 58:4, 58:10 big [1] - 68:6 authenticating [1] - 61:11 billable [1] - 75:11 authority [3] - 43:7, 62:12, 68:21 bills [1] - 22:5 auto [2] - 32:7, 32:9 binding [2] - 21:12, 71:16 auto-adjudication [1] - 32:9 bit [6] - 5:14, 6:21, 51:13, 67:15, 74:17, automatically [1] - 17:2 94:15 available [1] - 78:6 bite [1] - 69:15 bites [1] - 15:2 await [1] - 50:14 blackballed [1] - 59:25 aware [4] - 8:18, 26:2, 61:25, 75:8 axiomatic [1] - 28:2 Blake's [3] - 49:14, 49:15, 50:25 **bland** [1] - 59:12 blank [1] - 50:23 В blanket [1] - 73:21 **blunderbuss** [1] - 37:6 back-door [1] - 88:24 bluntly [2] - 15:20, 71:10 background [1] - 26:15 board [2] - 62:18, 62:20 bad [1] - 91:15 bolster [2] - 27:15, 27:18 bait [3] - 78:4, 78:5, 78:14 Boon [1] - 78:1 Baltimore [3] - 1:7, 1:24, 49:11 bottom [6] - 8:12, 30:10, 64:15, 68:25, bank [1] - 50:6 78:15 bar [2] - 7:19, 93:8 bound [1] - 73:19 barred [1] - 81:13 box [1] - 47:11 based [15] - 2:11, 12:8, 14:11, 16:25, breach [1] - 56:24 19:14, 21:11, 22:5, 39:5, 41:15, 42:15, breaches [1] - 54:12 46:21, 49:23, 50:11, 69:14, 71:5 breadth [2] - 37:12 basic [3] - 61:19, 62:15, 71:15 break [8] - 29:10, 29:14, 51:13, 51:15, basis [9] - 10:10, 12:6, 13:4, 43:17, 51:19, 51:22, 52:5 44:8, 44:20, 44:22, 59:10, 69:13 breaks [1] - 85:19 bathroom [2] - 89:9, 89:15 Brian [2] - 1:16, 3:14 BCG [13] - 39:4, 40:4, 40:9, 42:13, brief [4] - 7:15, 29:10, 29:14, 75:19 42:15, 43:12, 43:15, 45:21, 46:4, briefly [2] - 41:25, 71:10 47:22, 47:23, 48:15, 49:2 bring [2] - 76:5, 76:21 BCG's [9] - 39:1, 39:3, 39:7, 39:9. bringing [1] - 64:19 39:21, 40:9, 40:11, 40:15, 45:15 broad [2] - 36:13, 49:12 beat [1] - 65:21 brought [1] - 24:17 became [1] - 75:2 budgeting [1] - 73:4 Beckman [1] - 18:10 building [1] - 91:2 **BEFORE** [1] - 1:10 burden [1] - 81:1 begin [1] - 86:12 business [5] - 16:19, 17:5, 59:7, 59:12

behalf [8] - 1:12, 1:14, 13:6, 13:9, 25:17,

41:10, 60:10, 92:8

behind [3] - 54:12, 90:9, 90:13

benchmarked [1] - 48:25

75:10. 75:13. 78:2. 79:9

best [3] - 30:14, 89:3, 94:11

bend [2] - 89:14, 91:4

67:11, 68:9, 69:7

BENNETT[1] - 1:10

bench [12] - 2:14, 9:17, 19:23, 20:8, 56:23, 69:1, 86:12, 93:9, 93:11, 93:12,

benefit [7] - 10:16, 10:22, 63:15, 66:25,

Benefit [9] - 3:22, 5:7, 5:9, 9:2, 74:25,

benefits [4] - 12:21, 15:9, 64:22, 80:3

behave [1] - 91:14

93:25

C

button [4] - 52:22, 52:24, 52:25, 72:8

businesses [1] - 65:6

bye [4] - 94:16, 94:20

bye-bye [2] - 94:16, 94:20

calculate [9] - 17:25, 18:6, 18:15, 18:22, 22:14, 46:20, 50:9, 70:5, 70:7 calculated [2] - 49:25, 50:4 calculating [2] - 10:22, 18:1 calculation [6] - 18:9, 19:6, 19:8, 20:20, 46:17, 50:17 calculations [1] - 21:3 CAME [1] - 1:9

cannot [10] - 10:15, 12:20, 12:24, 16:21, 27:3, 43:15, 58:4, 58:10, 74:6 capable [1] - 70:11 car [1] - 3:15 care [4] - 37:15, 37:18, 37:20, 94:16 carry [1] - 81:1 carrying [1] - 10:14 case [92] - 6:14, 9:17, 14:1, 17:17, 17:19, 18:3, 21:20, 24:3, 24:14, 24:15, 24:17, 24:18, 25:1, 25:7, 26:17, 27:13, 28:5, 32:7, 36:16, 36:17, 36:20, 36:22, 36:24, 37:5, 37:17, 37:21, 38:4, 38:9, 39:5, 39:8, 39:22, 40:12, 45:18, 45:22, 46:5, 47:23, 49:11, 50:14, 50:22, 51:1, 54:7, 56:19, 56:20, 56:24, 56:25, 57:1, 60:23, 61:22, 61:24, 62:4, 62:18, 67:18, 68:3, 68:4, 68:13, 68:16, 68:17, 69:6, 70:17, 70:21, 73:24, 75:14, 75:23, 78:17, 78:20, 78:21, 78:22, 80:4, 82:7, 85:20, 85:24, 86:11, 86:12, 86:21, 87:3, 87:4, 90:6, 90:23, 92:21, 93:1, 93:2, 93:3, 93:16, 93:17, 93:18, 93:23, 94:2 case-by-case [1] - 37:5 cases [13] - 35:6, 35:12, 42:6, 49:10, 57:7, 59:24, 62:1, 62:3, 62:8, 62:17, 92:12, 93:8 cast [1] - 58:12 categorically [1] - 7:19 caught [1] - 62:20 caused [1] - 80:24 ceremonial [4] - 89:25, 90:18, 90:19, certain [11] - 9:15, 37:22, 61:16, 68:16, 71:12, 72:8, 72:11, 79:17, 79:23, 90:16 certainly [14] - 8:7, 19:3, 21:12, 27:17, 34:3, 45:12, 46:3, 71:13, 73:5, 82:13, 85:11, 91:13, 94:4, 94:8 CERTIFICATE[1] - 95:1 certified [3] - 10:19, 11:10, 11:21 Certified [1] - 95:6 certify [1] - 95:7 cetera [4] - 45:9, 46:6, 78:20

,

challenging [2] - 6:22, 37:24 changing [1] - 88:6 characterization [2] - 81:2, 82:3 characterize [1] - 80:22 charge [7] - 18:12 charged [7] - 10:15, 18:6, 18:16, 50:5, 50:6, 69:22, 70:2

chairs [4] - 90:9, 90:10, 90:13

charges [6] - 12:13, 16:16, 48:4, 70:5, 70:7, 70:9

chain [7] - 57:14, 57:25, 58:11, 58:12,

challenge [5] - 37:17, 37:22, 38:4, 73:1,

charitable [1] - 39:3

CFR [1] - 55:17

73.2

63:5, 65:15, 66:14

COLUMBIA [1] - 1:5

combined [1] - 47:12

4:3, 4:6, 4:10, 4:14, 4:16, 4:18, 4:20,

4:25, 6:7, 7:4, 7:10, 7:13, 7:23, 7:25,

8:3, 8:15, 8:17, 9:23, 10:24, 11:16,

chart [4] - 46:17, 47:7, 47:10, 48:2 coming [4] - 49:7, 50:2, 69:19, 82:12 conspiracy [2] - 73:24, 74:5 check [1] - 91:7 commission [1] - 55:20 Consulting [2] - 24:6, 24:11 **CHIMES**[1] - 1:5 commissions [1] - 72:8 consulting [1] - 12:19 Chimes [47] - 2:10, 3:10, 3:18, 4:23, communication [3] - 58:4, 58:14, 64:12 contained [1] - 55:16 11:2, 26:10, 29:21, 29:24, 30:12, Company [1] - 49:11 contains [1] - 57:25 30:13, 30:24, 31:13, 33:1, 33:6, 33:16, company [1] - 27:2 contemporaneous [2] - 18:1, 50:3 34:19, 36:5, 37:2, 37:9, 39:8, 40:13, comparable [1] - 80:5 contend [1] - 53:11 45:8, 45:18, 46:7, 48:22, 49:18, 51:9, comparator [1] - 76:10 contended [1] - 31:3 60:10, 63:15, 66:25, 67:12, 68:9, contends [8] - 11:2, 17:21, 36:7, 57:13, compared [1] - 82:6 68:14, 69:8, 69:22, 74:3, 74:11, 74:12, comparing [1] - 68:12 57:16, 67:3, 73:21, 82:24 75:3, 79:12, 79:14, 79:15, 79:18, 80:3, compel [3] - 60:15, 60:16, 81:12 contention [3] - 13:20, 77:24, 83:10 80:23, 81:23, 87:16 compensation [3] - 47:18, 50:11, 50:19 contested [3] - 27:9, 33:1, 64:4 chose [1] - 79:22 context [4] - 35:12, 37:18, 38:6, 74:20 competitors [1] - 77:6 Christina [2] - 1:16, 3:14 Complaint [13] - 13:12, 14:4, 43:20, continue [2] - 29:16, 94:8 CIA [1] - 91:15 43:21, 44:4, 49:5, 53:11, 53:18, 54:6, Contract [6] - 10:11, 10:12, 10:20, Circuit [5] - 17:17, 62:4, 78:18, 78:22, 55:7, 56:8, 56:13 10:21, 10:23, 11:22 79:7 complaints [1] - 32:6 contract [3] - 68:10, 68:11, 69:12 citation [1] - 78:17 complete [2] - 25:11, 93:18 contracts [1] - 56:5 cite [5] - 42:6, 43:7, 49:10, 49:20, 62:3 completely [2] - 18:8, 25:10 contradiction [1] - 9:7 cited [3] - 50:24, 59:3, 71:25 completing [1] - 10:19 contradicts [1] - 8:5 cites [2] - 55:17, 80:4 compliance [15] - 10:12, 10:21, 11:17, **contributed** [1] - 10:22 Civil [2] - 1:5, 2:10 11:20, 11:22, 11:24, 12:19, 12:23, contributions [10] - 22:6, 22:8, 22:13, civil [2] - 62:17, 93:8 15:10, 16:16, 18:11, 18:12, 18:21 39:1, 39:3, 40:12, 40:16, 45:15, 45:17, claim [10] - 10:8, 31:11, 31:14, 31:19, complicated [1] - 93:11 46:6 34:6, 43:13, 45:7, 45:20, 51:4 complying [1] - 26:7 control [2] - 56:4, 56:6 Claim [1] - 12:17 computer [5] - 1:21, 22:6, 32:11, 32:14, copied [2] - 58:11, 58:15 claimed [2] - 41:5, 44:23 32:17 copies [1] - 86:14 Claims [1] - 25:2 computerization [1] - 32:3 copy [1] - 77:18 claims [21] - 29:20, 29:23, 31:8, 31:9, computing [1] - 15:9 corporate [1] - 26:4 31:18, 33:1, 33:3, 33:5, 33:7, 33:15, concede [1] - 41:18 correct [33] - 3:18, 11:2, 11:3, 11:9, 33:23, 40:6, 45:21, 45:23, 46:6, 46:7, concedes [1] - 26:23 13:3, 14:2, 15:21, 16:24, 17:7, 19:6, 46:20, 63:21, 64:15, 84:6 conceding [1] - 32:15 23:8, 23:20, 29:6, 29:7, 31:13, 31:16, clarification [1] - 21:18 40:8, 40:11, 43:3, 45:11, 46:25, 60:25, concern [2] - 58:21, 84:13 clarify [1] - 90:4 61:7, 61:12, 66:17, 66:18, 71:22, concerned [7] - 21:13, 35:10, 69:3, class [2] - 20:17, 20:19 72:20, 72:22, 72:23, 80:18, 88:4, 95:9 71:13, 71:19, 89:17, 90:7 **classroom** [1] - 74:15 correcting [1] - 24:24 concerning [4] - 12:21, 38:25, 40:15, clear [8] - 28:6, 30:4, 34:16, 35:5, 58:11, 45:15 correctly [1] - 44:12 65:7, 67:7, 74:15 costs [3] - 10:11, 10:18, 15:8 concession [1] - 41:23 cleared [1] - 80:6 counsel [32] - 2:11, 2:13, 2:21, 2:24, conclusion [2] - 68:22, 93:16 clearly [5] - 9:16, 21:13, 27:25, 28:13, conclusions [3] - 6:17, 93:15, 93:20 3:25, 4:13, 4:23, 5:22, 27:15, 30:3, 35:17 39:13, 43:3, 46:2, 46:3, 46:8, 52:6, conduct [3] - 25:13, 34:21, 85:5 Clerk [1] - 86:9 53:14, 57:20, 63:17, 64:9, 66:1, 71:20, conducted [3] - 16:19, 26:24, 27:5 clerk [1] - 93:22 76:25, 79:18, 83:19, 83:20, 84:8, conference [6] - 2:7, 2:9, 2:11, 2:15, client [5] - 58:13, 64:1, 65:14, 67:3, 72:5 87:10, 88:10, 90:11 86:13, 86:18 clients [4] - 30:17, 31:5, 72:5, 75:12 counsel's [1] - 90:10 Conference [1] - 95:12 close [2] - 60:23, 63:4 count [2] - 72:2, 73:24 conferring [1] - 88:6 closed [3] - 24:9, 24:13, 61:7 Count [1] - 49:5 conformance [1] - 95:11 closing [2] - 93:18, 93:21 couple [4] - 7:20, 8:4, 14:6, 66:19 confuses [1] - 47:9 Co [3] - 73:18, 73:19, 74:19 court [16] - 6:13, 20:13, 25:4, 28:12, confusing [1] - 69:5 Co-Defendants [2] - 73:18, 73:19 30:4, 44:1, 51:12, 52:4, 62:16, 64:5, conjunction [1] - 70:1 Co-Defendants' [1] - 74:19 74:3, 77:9, 82:15, 89:6, 91:21, 91:22 connected [2] - 12:20, 36:21 Coast [1] - 82:14 Court [18] - 6:25, 7:1, 7:20, 20:4, 28:4, connection [5] - 20:4, 28:8, 55:16, 40:3, 42:14, 46:15, 46:16, 48:3, 48:7, cogent [1] - 92:24 55:20, 56:12 59:1, 61:23, 82:22, 86:9, 88:17, 88:23, colleagues [1] - 91:8 conservative [1] - 12:10 95:7 collects [1] - 55:20 consider [4] - 21:16, 44:20, 48:7, 53:10 COURT [176] - 1:1, 2:2, 2:5, 2:9, 2:24, college [1] - 91:17 considered [4] - 10:18, 44:11, 48:9, 3:4, 3:6, 3:10, 3:17, 3:20, 3:22, 4:1, Columbia [1] - 3:11

consistent [8] - 23:5, 50:24, 75:14,

76:6, 81:14, 82:1, 86:17, 91:13

11:19, 12:2, 12:6, 13:1, 13:16, 13:18, Defendant's [1] - 73:19 D 13:24, 14:8, 14:10, 14:12, 14:15, Defendants [61] - 1:6, 1:14, 5:16, 5:17, 14:20, 15:1, 16:3, 16:6, 16:23, 17:4, 6:21, 7:7, 8:21, 10:9, 12:16, 13:6, **D.C** [8] - 39:8, 74:12, 75:3, 79:14, 79:15, 17:8, 17:11, 17:14, 18:23, 19:3, 19:16, 13:9, 21:1, 24:4, 25:17, 29:17, 29:21, 80:3, 80:23 19:22, 20:7, 20:16, 20:21, 21:24, 29:24, 30:4, 30:6, 33:17, 34:5, 34:16, D.C.'s [1] - 74:3 22:16, 23:10, 23:22, 23:25, 25:14, 34:19, 36:2, 39:2, 39:5, 40:13, 41:7, 25:20, 25:24, 27:21, 29:8, 30:9, 30:25, **DALIN** [45] - 3:2, 3:9, 10:5, 11:4, 11:21, 41:10, 41:19, 43:18, 44:19, 45:12, 12:9, 14:19, 14:25, 16:12, 17:3, 17:7, 31:22, 32:19, 33:10, 33:12, 34:14, 45:21, 46:12, 48:22, 49:10, 53:9, 17:10, 17:13, 17:15, 19:1, 19:10, 53:10, 57:12, 60:5, 60:21, 71:2, 71:4, 35:24, 37:11, 38:17, 38:21, 39:17, 39:19, 39:24, 40:7, 40:22, 40:24, 19:21, 20:2, 20:12, 20:19, 21:18, 71:10, 73:16, 73:17, 73:18, 73:19, 23:20, 23:23, 24:1, 29:7, 32:25, 33:11, 41:12, 42:19, 42:24, 43:1, 43:17, 74:21, 74:23, 75:4, 77:11, 77:20, 36:12, 48:22, 49:16, 49:18, 55:6, 43:25, 44:4, 46:22, 47:1, 47:4, 47:15, 79:12, 79:18, 81:1, 87:16, 87:19, 59:21, 61:1, 61:13, 61:22, 67:6, 67:15, 47:20, 48:20, 49:14, 49:17, 50:13, 88:20, 93:4 68:10, 69:17, 69:20, 77:2, 87:12, 51:22, 51:25, 52:3, 52:14, 52:17, Defendants' [37] - 10:2, 29:16, 29:19, 52:20, 52:23, 53:2, 53:25, 55:4, 56:14, 88:11, 88:15 33:14, 34:5, 34:9, 34:24, 35:14, 35:17, 59:19, 60:22, 61:4, 61:6, 61:18, 61:24, Dalin [16] - 1:13, 3:2, 10:5, 16:12, 25:15, 35:21, 35:25, 37:13, 40:14, 41:3, 65:11, 65:18, 66:2, 66:6, 66:12, 66:20, 29:6, 32:25, 42:22, 61:24, 61:25, 63:9, 44:25, 45:2, 45:5, 50:16, 51:3, 51:7, 66:23, 67:9, 68:5, 68:24, 69:18, 70:10, 67:4, 67:6, 69:2, 69:15, 84:9 51:10, 53:5, 53:7, 57:11, 63:14, 67:10, 72:17, 72:21, 73:1, 74:13, 75:23, 76:4. damages [17] - 41:5, 41:21, 42:4, 42:9, 69:6, 74:18, 74:19, 74:24, 75:17, 77:5, 76:25, 78:3, 78:15, 80:11, 80:16, 43:6. 43:9. 43:14. 43:16. 43:19. 44:8. 77:24, 79:7, 81:21, 82:8 44:9, 44:14, 44:16, 44:21, 44:23, 80:19, 81:7, 84:8, 84:11, 85:3, 86:25, defended [1] - 27:15 87:13, 87:15, 87:18, 87:22, 87:25, 49:25, 50:9 **defense** [4] - 34:25, 35:9, 57:18, 81:25 dance [3] - 35:4, 74:17, 82:2 88:3, 88:9, 88:13, 88:16, 89:1, 89:22, Defense [22] - 5:24, 7:6, 9:12, 23:19, 90:1, 90:3, 90:5, 91:5, 91:7, 91:13, dancing [1] - 42:10 29:12, 29:13, 34:8, 38:18, 39:12, Daniel [1] - 73:10 91:20, 92:1, 92:3, 92:5, 92:9, 92:17, 39:15, 41:2, 43:2, 45:2, 46:2, 46:8, 92:19, 92:23, 94:13, 94:20, 95:18 Data [3] - 78:17, 78:20, 78:21 53:14, 57:19, 63:16, 67:2, 71:20, 90:8, Court's [3] - 21:21, 34:1, 43:10 data [2] - 32:10, 32:11 90:11 courtesy [1] - 51:12 date [3] - 83:2, 84:3, 87:5 defined [1] - 62:21 Courthouse [1] - 1:23 definitely [2] - 23:2, 93:10 Dated [1] - 95:14 courthouse [1] - 89:4 dated [1] - 28:20 definition [4] - 17:12, 55:10, 56:3, 74:5 courtroom [12] - 21:5, 62:23, 89:8, David [5] - 18:4, 18:17, 20:3, 69:20, delay [2] - 78:23, 79:3 89:14, 89:25, 90:7, 90:18, 90:19, 71:3 delayed [2] - 2:13, 86:11 90:22, 90:24, 92:13, 93:23 days [3] - 87:2, 93:13, 93:19 delete [1] - 91:10 Courtroom [1] - 90:23 dead [1] - 65:21 deliberative[1] - 6:19 Courts [1] - 68:22 deadlines [1] - 28:22 demonstrate [1] - 41:20 Cousin [4] - 1:16, 3:14, 4:21, 6:3 deal [4] - 21:7, 52:9, 57:9, 75:1 demonstration [1] - 44:17 COUSIN [4] - 3:16, 3:21, 4:19, 4:21 dealing [1] - 80:25 denial [1] - 45:14 cover [1] - 14:17 deals [1] - 29:4 denied [18] - 8:21, 9:19, 9:23, 15:4, covered [1] - 21:14 dealt [3] - 28:5, 79:6, 86:6 15:25, 16:1, 20:22, 22:22, 22:23, created [2] - 7:21, 8:6 **DECEMBER** [1] - 2:1 33:16, 34:6, 40:16, 45:16, 51:4, 51:5, credibility [3] - 70:13, 73:2, 73:3 December [12] - 1:8, 5:18, 16:7, 34:9, 59:8, 70:11, 73:13 credit [4] - 12:10, 12:11, 12:12, 12:14 61:21, 62:9, 83:1, 83:16, 84:2, 85:10, denies [1] - 18:19 criminal [3] - 62:17, 62:19, 93:8 85:22, 95:14 Denton's [1] - 6:3 cross [10] - 19:1, 19:3, 20:9, 20:12, decide [1] - 5:16 deny [4] - 50:15, 56:15, 56:23, 57:4 20:14, 24:21, 25:10, 28:3, 28:16, decided [2] - 26:18, 27:14 denying [1] - 56:18 70:13 decision [3] - 37:6, 44:6, 63:1 department [3] - 33:8, 72:19, 72:24 cross-examination [1] - 70:13 deck [1] - 79:18 Department [3] - 25:3, 59:23, 67:19 cross-examine [5] - 20:12, 20:14, declaration [15] - 8:7, 16:9, 16:18, dependent [1] - 68:7 24:21, 28:3, 28:16 16:21, 18:5, 18:8, 18:12, 18:14, 20:3, depose [1] - 8:9 cross-examining [1] - 25:10 20:5, 21:10, 58:3, 60:20, 61:10, 70:6 deposing [1] - 57:17 CRR [2] - 1:23, 95:17 declarations [2] - 69:21, 70:5 deposition [19] - 23:4, 23:14, 24:10, Crutcher [7] - 18:4, 18:17, 20:3, 66:14, declined [1] - 58:16 24:14, 24:16, 24:17, 25:6, 25:8, 25:22, 69:20, 70:1, 70:14 dedicated [5] - 30:13, 31:13, 31:21, 27:10, 28:7, 28:23, 28:25, 33:3, 37:21, Crutcher's [1] - 70:4 32:18, 33:2 38:3, 54:23, 71:5, 71:7 culpable [1] - 34:21 deemed [1] - 86:9 depositions [2] - 26:10, 26:11 current [1] - 86:18 deep [1] - 44:15 deprived [2] - 25:9, 57:17 cut [8] - 14:16, 25:25, 26:8, 62:11, 63:3, description [1] - 54:11 defeat [1] - 43:12 80:14, 80:15, 81:16 defend [3] - 27:13, 27:19, 63:3 designation [1] - 28:7 cute [4] - 62:8, 63:1, 63:10, 65:24 Defendant [9] - 3:7, 3:10, 3:17, 4:10, designations [3] - 23:14, 71:5, 71:7 cutting [1] - 25:7

7:12, 19:25, 79:16, 82:17, 86:3

designed [1] - 72:9

Document 530

designs [1] - 73:5 documents [25] - 12:15, 17:6, 17:18, either [5] - 20:1, 62:24, 62:25, 75:17, 17:20, 17:22, 21:11, 22:15, 31:2, 94:3 despite [1] - 90:19 destroy [4] - 88:1, 88:8, 88:13, 88:16 36:24, 37:2, 37:4, 37:6, 64:1, 64:7, electronic [1] - 86:14 64:8, 65:3, 65:12, 67:23, 77:19, 77:22, elevator [2] - 88:25, 89:7 destroyed [1] - 88:18 82:23, 83:12, 84:16, 84:22, 84:25 eleven [1] - 61:8 detailed [2] - 75:23, 75:24 determination [3] - 19:24, 19:25 **DOL** [1] - 10:21 eleventh [1] - 13:11 DOL's [1] - 42:17 determinations [2] - 11:17, 15:11 elicit [1] - 83:12 dollars [1] - 10:22 determine [3] - 7:2, 8:24, 15:8 eligibility [2] - 11:17, 15:10 determined [1] - 49:1 Don [1] - 4:22 emphasized [1] - 31:25 Donald [1] - 1:19 developed [1] - 49:1 employed [2] - 16:9, 71:17 donations [1] - 60:9 Development [1] - 69:12 Employee [3] - 5:7, 5:9, 9:2 done [9] - 31:12, 35:4, 41:1, 66:5, 78:8, employee [5] - 71:6, 71:11, 72:2, 79:15, **develops** [1] - 65:8 78:13, 82:13, 88:17, 89:17 Diane [6] - 8:7, 57:13, 59:11, 60:6, 81:10 Dong [8] - 16:9, 16:15, 17:19, 18:14. employees [7] - 26:24, 58:22, 59:4, 60:13, 63:5 20:12, 20:19, 21:9, 22:21 Diego [1] - 48:12 59:22, 59:24, 61:16, 61:17 Dong's [2] - 19:14, 70:6 employer [9] - 10:13, 11:8, 11:9, 11:12, difference [6] - 22:14, 32:1, 32:2, 47:17, Donna [1] - 59:3 48:18, 67:15 11:14, 11:23, 12:24, 60:1 door [3] - 88:24, 89:4, 89:6 different [18] - 30:21, 30:22, 31:20, employer's [2] - 10:14, 11:11 dovetail [1] - 17:4 employment [1] - 71:17 32:12, 32:13, 32:17, 46:11, 64:21, 64:22, 65:4, 68:15, 68:20, 76:2, 78:12, dovetails [1] - 17:2 end [4] - 25:11, 46:12, 61:7, 87:4 down [2] - 80:17, 91:4 78:13, 80:6 enforce [1] - 59:22 differential [2] - 22:10, 22:11 Draft [1] - 7:16 engaging [1] - 25:13 dig [1] - 64:25 drafted [1] - 68:19 England [1] - 23:7 direct [8] - 46:19, 47:12, 47:18, 48:16, drag [1] - 25:4 English [1] - 23:10 50:10, 68:21, 80:25, 86:9 drawing [1] - 50:23 enjoy [1] - 94:7 directly [3] - 28:9, 46:17, 55:22 drift [1] - 94:1 enjoyed [1] - 92:12 disability [1] - 89:5 driveway [1] - 89:5 ensure [1] - 74:10 **Disability** [1] - 64:2 dropped [1] - 52:12 enter [1] - 56:5 disabled [1] - 89:12 Duane [1] - 6:4 entered [1] - 52:16 disagree [1] - 46:13 due [2] - 19:6, 62:1 entertain [2] - 35:3, 35:8 disclose [3] - 58:18, 59:12, 63:2 Dumitrescu [2] - 1:16, 3:14 entire [3] - 24:2, 24:15, 93:23 disclosed [9] - 26:20, 54:10, 60:11, during [9] - 6:11, 6:17, 9:17, 84:4, entirely [1] - 43:6 60:20, 60:24, 61:13, 61:14, 76:8, 79:5 84:14, 84:15, 84:18, 87:1, 94:10 entities [1] - 26:4 disclosure [1] - 67:2 duties [2] - 56:24, 73:4 entitled [2] - 93:3, 95:10 discovery [27] - 13:12, 14:5, 24:3, 24:8, duty [2] - 77:14, 77:15 **ENTITLED** [1] - 1:9 24:9, 24:13, 25:12, 54:9, 54:11, 54:21, entity [1] - 24:7 55:2, 55:8, 55:13, 56:9, 60:8, 60:22, Е entry [1] - 32:16 61:7, 61:14, 64:6, 64:8, 65:25, 67:2, equitable [1] - 42:12 77:12, 77:21, 78:9, 78:19 ERISA [3] - 11:25, 80:8, 81:4 e-mail [12] - 57:13, 57:25, 58:5, 58:11, discretion [2] - 68:17, 68:18 error [2] - 19:6, 19:8 63:5, 65:15, 66:14, 67:7, 69:24, 72:1, discretionary [3] - 56:3, 56:6, 68:21 errors [6] - 29:20, 32:3, 32:16, 33:15, 72:13 discussed [1] - 70:6 33:24, 34:6 e-mailed [1] - 17:21 discusses [1] - 69:24 Esquire [12] - 1:13, 1:13, 1:15, 1:15, e-mails [5] - 57:24, 60:4, 60:5, 61:2, disgorged [1] - 80:10 1:16, 1:16, 1:17, 1:17, 1:18, 1:18, 61:11 disgorgement [2] - 79:24, 81:11 1:19, 1:19 early [1] - 59:15 dismissal [1] - 39:4 essential [2] - 44:18, 70:20 easier [1] - 88:14 dispute [4] - 26:5, 41:24, 65:1, 66:15 essentially [45] - 6:22, 8:23, 8:25, 9:2, easily [2] - 90:24, 91:24 disputes [1] - 70:15 10:25, 12:3, 15:5, 16:8, 29:18, 29:21, Eassa [9] - 1:18, 4:2, 4:4, 88:21, 89:11, distinction [3] - 21:5, 31:22, 42:9 30:1, 33:17, 34:15, 34:17, 36:2, 38:2, 90:25, 91:8, 92:12, 94:8 distinguish [1] - 45:13 39:1, 39:9, 43:18, 45:20, 50:15, 51:2, EASSA [10] - 4:2, 4:5, 88:21, 89:20, **DISTRICT**[3] - 1:1, 1:1, 1:5 53:8, 56:17, 57:14, 67:10, 67:12, 69:4, 91:1, 91:6, 91:11, 91:19, 91:25, 94:12 District [3] - 3:11, 95:7 70:24, 71:4, 73:17, 75:2, 75:4, 75:7, Eassa's [1] - 86:11 **DIVISION** [1] - 1:2 79:12, 81:10, 81:12, 81:25, 82:19, East [1] - 82:14 82:22, 83:2, 83:4, 83:11, 90:12 divorce [1] - 37:21 EBSA's [1] - 12:17 Essentially [1] - 75:1 Docket [1] - 1:5 ECF [3] - 59:5, 59:9, 76:2 establish [1] - 10:8 docketed [1] - 86:10 effective [1] - 83:1 et [6] - 1:6, 2:10, 45:9, 46:6, 78:20 document [8] - 16:20, 22:17, 37:16, effort [1] - 74:14 64:10, 67:24, 68:6, 88:7, 88:8 event [1] - 64:3 efforts [1] - 35:11 eventually [1] - 11:7 documentation [1] - 22:18 eight [1] - 64:17

evidence [84] - 5:8, 6:24, 7:2, 7:21, 9:2, 16:25, 17:11, 17:23, 20:9, 29:20, 29:22, 30:11, 30:15, 33:15, 33:22, 34:5, 34:10, 34:23, 35:15, 35:21, 35:25, 36:3, 36:7, 36:8, 36:13, 36:21, 37:13, 37:23, 38:11, 38:25, 39:2, 39:21, 40:15, 42:4, 42:5, 42:17, 43:6, 43:8. 44:6. 44:14. 45:3. 45:6. 45:14. 45:19, 48:8, 51:4, 53:9, 56:16, 57:2, 57:5, 60:7, 63:15, 63:21, 63:23, 64:20, 66:24, 67:11, 68:3, 68:8, 68:11, 69:7, 70:4, 74:3, 74:11, 74:16, 74:19, 74:25, 75:10, 75:18, 76:21, 76:22, 77:3, 78:8, 79:8, 79:14, 79:17, 82:18, 82:23, 84:17, 85:18, 86:1, 86:4 evidentiary [2] - 65:25, 71:15 exact [1] - 28:16 exactly [5] - 7:18, 20:8, 73:7, 76:12, 83:24 examination [1] - 70:13 examine [9] - 19:2, 19:4, 20:10, 20:12, 20:14, 23:17, 24:21, 28:3, 28:16 examining [1] - 25:10 example [11] - 12:18, 13:10, 17:16, 20:8, 36:14, 42:7, 55:18, 55:23, 55:25, 64:10. 89:13 examples [3] - 7:20, 8:4, 12:1 exceeds [1] - 45:8 except [2] - 47:9, 61:15 exception [2] - 21:14, 22:19 exceptions [1] - 28:14 excess [5] - 45:20, 48:24, 49:3, 49:6, excessive [7] - 10:7, 10:10, 45:7, 46:19, 47:18, 48:16, 50:20 exchange [1] - 86:14 exclude [36] - 5:6, 5:8, 8:20, 9:1, 9:19, 10:1, 15:24, 16:9, 23:3, 23:14, 23:21, 27:11, 28:25, 29:20, 29:22, 33:14, 34:5, 38:25, 40:15, 41:14, 41:20, 45:14, 53:8, 57:12, 63:14, 66:24, 67:11, 69:7, 71:2, 71:4, 73:10, 73:18, 74:24, 75:18, 81:6, 82:23 excluded [12] - 14:1, 28:19, 30:16, 34:20, 42:3, 60:18, 63:5, 63:6, 64:20, 76:21, 88:7, 88:12 **excluding** [2] - 36:13, 79:8 exclusion [4] - 31:18, 39:2, 41:21, 73:21 excuse [6] - 43:3, 43:23, 43:25, 53:25, 59:17, 74:8 executing [1] - 55:9 **exemption** [1] - 55:16 exercised [1] - 56:3 exhaustive [2] - 2:17, 5:19 exhaustively [1] - 5:12 Exhibit [4] - 12:17, 65:14, 69:11, 88:4 exhibit [4] - 64:13, 69:13, 69:19, 87:24 exhibits [5] - 64:11, 64:13, 86:15, 90:15, 90.16

exist [2] - 84:22, 84:23

existed [1] - 83:12 exists [2] - 9:8, 58:15 expect [2] - 44:16, 74:3 expense [3] - 15:11, 50:2, 50:12 expenses [19] - 11:1, 11:16, 11:20, 12:20, 13:21, 13:22, 14:1, 14:3, 15:6, 15:9, 15:16, 45:24, 46:5, 48:25, 49:6, 50:1, 50:20, 80:25 Expenses [1] - 12:18 expert [37] - 10:2, 10:8, 10:9, 12:7, 15:13, 15:14, 23:21, 24:18, 24:24, 25:8, 25:23, 29:1, 34:24, 41:4, 41:14, 41:20, 41:22, 42:2, 42:6, 42:8, 43:3, 43:7, 43:19, 44:7, 44:9, 44:14, 44:22, 45:6, 45:19, 47:24, 49:12, 49:13, 54:23, 73:9, 77:5, 77:11 expert's [1] - 41:16 expertise [2] - 61:25, 73:8 experts [5] - 4:24, 24:23, 24:25, 25:6, 27.9 explanation [1] - 38:12 explore [1] - 58:19 express [2] - 65:4, 65:7 expressly [2] - 54:18, 76:12 extent [15] - 8:16, 15:12, 33:22, 37:16, 38:10, 41:19, 42:12, 42:17, 43:2, 61:15, 71:23, 73:3, 78:25, 83:17, 84.22 extraneous [5] - 35:22, 35:25, 37:14, 37:23. 38:11 extrapolated [2] - 30:19, 30:23 eyes [1] - 23:3

F

F.2d [1] - 17:17 facilities [1] - 89:10 facility [1] - 89:13 fact [27] - 8:13, 9:16, 14:13, 15:5, 22:10, 24:9, 26:2, 26:5, 30:1, 33:7, 33:19, 35:2, 38:9, 41:24, 42:2, 56:14, 65:7, 76:20, 83:25, 84:6, 85:6, 85:9, 87:3, 93:7, 93:15, 93:20 facts [9] - 18:4, 31:2, 54:12, 55:13, 56:8, 56:12, 56:25, 61:15, 81:23 failed [1] - 83:6 failing [1] - 45:23 failure [1] - 83:5 fair [3] - 54:25, 55:3, 62:23 fairness [2] - 54:22, 61:19 fall [1] - 22:18 familiar [3] - 18:3, 49:17, 62:19 far [11] - 21:13, 31:6, 35:10, 36:6, 69:3, 70:21, 71:13, 71:19, 89:17, 90:6, 92:20 fashion [1] - 70:20 fatal [1] - 53:2 **FBI** [1] - 91:15 FCE [87] - 2:13, 3:22, 11:13, 16:9, 16:14,

17:19, 17:21, 18:6, 18:10, 18:17, 18:20, 24:10, 24:22, 25:3, 25:12, 26:1, 29:15, 31:1, 31:3, 32:7, 33:7, 33:23, 36:25, 45:7, 46:20, 47:19, 48:14, 49:2, 49:20, 50:11, 50:19, 50:21, 51:7, 53:5, 53:7, 54:20, 55:8, 55:14, 55:22, 56:1, 57:12, 57:16, 58:1, 58:21, 60:9, 60:11, 63:14, 63:19, 64:1, 64:15, 65:5, 66:15, 68:1, 68:13, 68:16, 69:21, 69:22, 69:23, 70:8, 71:2, 71:4, 71:6, 71:9, 71:11, 71:16, 71:20, 73:16, 73:17, 74:7, 74:21, 74:23, 74:24, 75:4, 75:7, 75:17, 77:7, 77:12, 77:18, 77:20, 84:20, 85:11, 85:16, 85:23, 87:19, FCE's [14] - 18:4, 19:5, 24:7, 29:23, 33:3, 33:18, 33:21, 60:15, 67:16, 73:15, 77:4, 77:8, 83:11, 85:1 fear [1] - 60:14 feasibility [2] - 34:25, 35:9 feasible [1] - 35:10 February [4] - 24:8, 60:5, 60:8, 94:4 FEDERAL [1] - 95:18 federal [2] - 62:16, 64:5 fee [4] - 16:16, 18:12, 18:16, 18:21 fees [38] - 8:10, 9:11, 10:8, 10:10, 12:19, 17:25, 18:6, 18:18, 18:22, 26:6, 39:1, 39:3, 39:7, 39:10, 39:21, 40:10, 40:11, 40:16, 43:15, 45:7, 45:15, 45:17, 45:20, 46:5, 46:6, 46:19, 47:12, 47:14, 48:4, 48:6, 48:16, 48:24, 49:4, 50:4, 69:22, 69:25, 70:2, 85:1 felt [1] - 83:10 Ferretti [2] - 1:17, 3:25 few [6] - 2:6, 5:19, 52:10, 53:6, 62:1, 81:20 fiduciary [18] - 37:25, 53:10, 54:3, 54:12, 54:19, 54:20, 55:8, 55:11, 55:14, 55:25, 56:1, 56:3, 56:24, 57:5, 65:5, 65:10, 84:1 fiduciary's [1] - 77:15 fifth [4] - 89:8, 89:12, 90:2, 90:17 Fifth [1] - 17:16 figure [3] - 47:16, 48:17, 50:18 **filed** [21] - 2:13, 2:17, 5:3, 5:17, 5:18, 5:20, 6:2, 9:25, 16:7, 17:20, 18:8, 27:23, 29:5, 34:4, 34:8, 34:19, 44:4, 44:19, 67:21, 68:1, 86:8 finally [1] - 79:19 financial [2] - 16:10, 37:8

finder [1] - 38:8

finish [1] - 87:5

91:23, 91:24, 93:1

finished [1] - 66:11

findings [3] - 38:9, 93:15, 93:20

First [3] - 78:17, 78:20, 78:21

first [25] - 2:25, 5:3, 5:5, 6:8, 7:15,

13:10, 13:21, 14:7, 24:25, 25:25,

fine [15] - 4:25, 15:22, 39:24, 47:9,

52:14, 52:25, 65:19, 88:3, 89:1, 90:25,

health [1] - 86:11

hear [44] - 5:22, 5:24, 6:5, 6:7, 7:5, 10:3,

29:18, 47:11, 48:23, 53:15, 53:17, Gary [1] - 18:10 53:19, 58:3, 58:16, 66:24, 67:16, gather [1] - 6:11 69:13, 73:23, 77:14, 78:23, 81:16 general [3] - 14:2, 30:18, 63:20 five [8] - 51:14, 51:15, 51:17, 51:18, Gharanfoli [6] - 5:8, 6:10, 7:17, 8:6, 8:8, 51:19, 51:22, 70:25, 85:8 five-minute [3] - 51:15, 51:19, 51:22 Gharanfoli's [3] - 9:1, 9:6, 9:9 flagged [1] - 58:3 GIORDANO [2] - 1:23, 95:17 flesh [1] - 84:25 Giordano [2] - 52:4, 95:5 floor [4] - 89:8, 89:12, 89:15, 90:17 given [5] - 7:20, 22:3, 27:4, 28:2, 64:16 Floor [2] - 1:23, 89:25 glad [33] - 5:22, 5:23, 6:5, 6:7, 7:5, 10:2, FOCR [1] - 1:23 16:11, 23:18, 30:3, 32:23, 34:15, focus [1] - 75:13 39:12, 41:7, 42:21, 46:1, 46:7, 48:21, focused [2] - 39:9, 48:14 53:14, 55:4, 57:19, 59:20, 63:16, follow [2] - 19:12, 90:22 65:20, 66:9, 67:4, 71:9, 71:20, 75:18, following [1] - 50:16 79:19, 80:19, 83:19, 89:19, 92:10 glean [1] - 68:12 FOR [2] - 1:1, 1:9 foregoing [1] - 95:8 goal [1] - 93:4 gotcha [1] - 54:18 forget [1] - 78:20 Government [27] - 3:1, 5:4, 19:17, 20:1, form [2] - 43:6, 65:9 21:3, 23:15, 23:18, 32:23, 36:6, 40:7, format [1] - 95:11 40:8, 45:22, 46:2, 48:21, 57:15, 57:16, former [8] - 28:3, 59:22, 59:24, 60:1, 60:2, 61:6, 65:20, 66:9, 66:23, 67:22, 61:17, 64:1, 71:6, 71:11 76:25, 77:3, 87:9, 88:10, 90:11 forms [2] - 65:6, 65:8 Government's [5] - 12:7, 15:13, 42:22, forth [23] - 9:20, 9:24, 15:23, 16:1, 60:12, 93:3 22:22, 22:24, 28:24, 34:7, 35:19, Grace [6] - 16:9, 16:15, 17:19, 18:14, 38:13, 40:17, 41:13, 49:8, 56:8, 56:9, 22:21, 70:6 63:7, 65:9, 69:8, 70:22, 79:10, 84:20, grandeur [1] - 90:19 86:5, 90:17 grant [4] - 15:17, 76:23, 78:7, 79:1 fortunate [1] - 93:7 granted [30] - 19:5, 29:3, 35:1, 35:2, forward [1] - 93:1 35:16, 35:18, 38:2, 38:12, 38:21, foundation [4] - 17:15, 43:16, 71:24, 44:20, 44:25, 57:8, 62:13, 63:4, 63:7, four [9] - 5:3, 9:25, 20:23, 23:1, 28:20, 63:12, 69:8, 69:9, 70:21, 74:19, 74:21, 76:2, 79:8, 79:9, 81:7, 82:9, 82:10, 51:7, 51:9, 87:24 86:5, 86:10, 87:23 fourth [2] - 22:25, 23:1 granting [2] - 76:6, 81:21 Fourth [5] - 1:23, 62:4, 78:18, 78:22, great [8] - 21:7, 57:9, 74:14, 75:1, 79.7 frankly [6] - 20:16, 38:7, 57:10, 65:23, 91:19, 91:25, 92:24 grindstone [1] - 93:25 75:17, 82:5 Group [1] - 78:2 free [11] - 11:12, 19:3, 20:9, 37:19, group [1] - 4:7 37:22, 38:5, 71:13, 73:5, 85:11, 85:25 grudge [1] - 63:9 **Friday** [6] - 2:12, 2:15, 86:8, 86:13, guarantee [1] - 93:9 86:15, 87:1 guess [4] - 11:19, 83:14, 84:17, 93:6 Fringe [1] - 78:1 Guidance [1] - 12:17 fringe [3] - 10:15, 10:22, 11:9 front [2] - 46:22, 89:4 full [1] - 24:10 Н fully [1] - 72:25 fully-qualified [1] - 72:25 half [6] - 54:5, 71:18, 76:15, 80:14, **function** [1] - 15:15 80:15, 81:16 functions [3] - 11:5, 11:6, 12:24 hand [1] - 22:2 fundamentally [2] - 46:13, 62:24 handicapped [1] - 89:3 funds [1] - 11:7

G

handled [1] - 31:12

handrails [1] - 89:16

hard [3] - 13:2, 71:10, 92:7

hang [1] - 51:17

head [1] - 42:10

Health [1] - 45:8

heal [1] - 94:9

gap [1] - 50:18 garbage [3] - 32:14, 32:15

furthermore [2] - 15:12, 79:3

16:11, 20:9, 21:1, 23:18, 23:19, 30:3, 32:23, 34:15, 34:16, 39:12, 40:1, 41:7, 41:8, 42:21, 46:1, 46:8, 48:7, 48:21, 52:6, 53:14, 55:4, 57:19, 57:20, 59:20, 62:6, 63:16, 65:20, 66:9, 67:5, 71:9, 71:20, 73:23, 75:19, 75:20, 79:19, 80:19, 83:19, 83:20 hearing [5] - 5:2, 27:14, 27:15, 38:17, 38.19 **HEARING** [1] - 1:10 hearsay [5] - 6:15, 21:16, 24:23, 24:25, 74:5 held [4] - 48:8, 84:15, 86:17, 95:10 hello [2] - 3:16, 46:14 help [1] - 64:7 hereby [1] - 95:7 hidden [1] - 54:5 hide [1] - 59:18 high [2] - 72:8, 91:9 higher [1] - 47:13 himself [1] - 7:15 HIPAA [2] - 58:23, 59:13 hire [2] - 11:12, 11:13 hit [3] - 52:21, 52:24 Holcomb [4] - 79:16, 80:12, 81:10, 81.19 hold [12] - 4:8, 9:21, 12:4, 16:4, 18:1, 31:7, 34:12, 40:20, 40:24, 43:22, 85:4, 86.23 holding [2] - 21:21, 61:20 holiday [2] - 94:6, 94:7 Honor [127] - 2:8, 3:2, 3:8, 3:9, 3:12, 3:16, 3:19, 3:21, 3:24, 4:2, 4:5, 4:11, 4:15, 4:19, 4:21, 6:6, 6:9, 7:9, 7:14, 7:24, 8:11, 10:5, 13:8, 13:17, 13:23, 14:19, 16:2, 16:12, 17:18, 18:3, 19:2, 19:10, 19:11, 19:21, 20:3, 20:14, 21:23, 23:8, 23:20, 25:19, 25:21, 27:19, 30:7, 30:10, 31:7, 32:6, 32:8, 32:25, 36:12, 38:20, 39:20, 40:3, 41:9, 42:23, 46:9, 47:3, 47:10, 47:17, 47:21, 47:22, 48:22, 51:21, 51:24, 52:11, 53:16, 53:20, 54:15, 54:22, 55:6, 57:21, 58:9, 58:25, 59:5, 59:6, 59:8, 59:13, 59:21, 61:5, 61:22, 63:18, 63:20, 64:19, 66:5, 66:11, 66:22, 67:6, 67:14, 71:22, 72:20, 74:2, 75:22, 76:1, 76:17, 76:21, 76:23, 78:4, 78:6, 79:20, 80:13, 80:21, 83:21, 87:12, 87:14, 87:17, 87:20, 87:21, 88:7, 88:15, 88:21, 89:20, 89:21, 89:23, 89:24, 90:2, 91:1, 91:2, 91:11, 91:25, 92:2, 92:4, 94:12, 94:17, 94:18, 94:19 honor [1] - 58:22 Honor's [2] - 59:16, 84:1

HONORABLE [1] - 1:10

hope [3] - 4:4, 14:22, 94:8

hooked [1] - 51:25

horseshoe [1] - 89:5 hour [3] - 11:10, 11:23, 13:11 hours [4] - 14:22, 66:7, 82:12 Huber [2] - 8:5, 9:5 Huber's [2] - 8:5, 9:8 hundred [1] - 64:16 Huss [1] - 48:12 ı idea [3] - 26:13, 26:20, 62:13 identified [6] - 24:6, 54:21, 55:1, 55:2, identify [6] - 2:21, 2:24, 30:5, 76:12, 77:13, 77:15 identity [3] - 60:23, 61:2, 61:9 illustrated [1] - 55:17 illustrative [1] - 74:18 impact [1] - 86:21 impeach [1] - 34:23 impeaching [1] - 38:5 impeachment [4] - 36:8, 36:23, 74:7, 74:8 implicated [1] - 56:12 implications [1] - 8:18 imply [1] - 84:4 important [5] - 20:2, 22:12, 55:23, 75:21, 82:3 imposed [1] - 10:13 impressions [1] - 6:17 improper [2] - 72:3, 79:3 IN [1] - 1:1 inability [1] - 91:3 inadmissible [4] - 6:15, 28:17, 28:18, 57:13 inappropriate [1] - 83:4 Inc [7] - 3:11, 49:11, 64:2, 75:1, 75:13, 79:15 include [3] - 45:23, 73:4, 81:14 included [1] - 47:13 includes [3] - 12:18, 44:7, 49:2 including [2] - 45:6, 45:19 inconsistencies [1] - 8:12 incurred [1] - 43:14 indeed [2] - 9:11, 9:14 indicate [1] - 19:8 indicated [5] - 29:3, 63:6, 63:24, 73:13, 82:9 indicates [1] - 7:17 indicia [1] - 21:15 indirect [3] - 47:12, 47:14, 47:25 industry [1] - 59:25 informant [3] - 57:15, 60:9, 61:9 informants [4] - 57:16, 60:12, 61:1, 61:16 information [9] - 6:11, 54:9, 59:13, 60:21, 67:17, 67:21, 75:1, 75:5, 78:24 initial [2] - 31:11, 60:7

horse [1] - 65:22

initials [1] - 64:2 injunction [1] - 36:15 input [1] - 31:20 inquiries [1] - 10:21 inquiry [1] - 85:14 instance [4] - 11:23, 25:1, 36:22, 72:1 instead [1] - 24:13 Institute [1] - 69:12 insurance [1] - 55:19 intelligent [2] - 92:15, 92:20 intend [3] - 34:22, 56:18, 69:5 intent [2] - 26:8, 84:2 interact [1] - 72:4 interchangeably [1] - 5:5 interest [1] - 61:20 interested [2] - 37:24, 75:12 interesting [1] - 92:13 International [1] - 3:18 Internet [1] - 76:14 interpret [2] - 37:12, 68:10 interpreting [1] - 70:12 interrogatory [4] - 76:11, 76:19, 77:13, 78:11 interrupt [1] - 31:1 interview [2] - 9:4, 27:2 interviewed [2] - 26:3, 26:24 interviewing [1] - 25:2 interviews [2] - 9:7, 27:10 intimidated [1] - 59:4 introduce [6] - 13:11, 34:22, 54:4, 56:22, 57:5, 69:13 introduced [2] - 53:18, 55:3 introducing [1] - 42:3 investigation [7] - 6:12, 6:18, 6:23, 9:3, 26:7, 37:7, 38:7 investigations [9] - 35:22, 36:1, 36:4, 36:14, 37:14, 37:16, 37:24, 38:1, 38:12 investigator [3] - 5:8, 6:10, 8:22 $\textbf{investment} \ [\textbf{10}] \textbf{ - 54:14, 55:12, 55:18,}$ 55:20, 55:24, 56:1, 56:17, 56:21, 57:1 invoice [1] - 22:4 invoices [2] - 17:24, 50:3 involved [3] - 32:1, 64:5, 82:6 involving [1] - 64:5 Igbal [1] - 57:7 irrelevant [1] - 40:5 issue [30] - 15:5, 22:12, 24:2, 24:16, 31:17, 39:22, 46:4, 47:9, 49:4, 58:16, 58:17, 59:3, 66:13, 67:2, 67:7, 67:13, 68:6, 68:7, 70:20, 77:3, 77:12, 80:12, 81:9, 82:4, 83:18, 84:6, 85:13, 86:11, 91:6, 93:2 issued [3] - 77:13, 81:20, 86:8 issues [6] - 14:4, 24:7, 26:5, 58:19, 78:18, 92:14 itself [5] - 7:2, 27:8, 27:12, 60:7, 68:20

J January [14] - 2:15, 2:16, 24:9, 24:10, 60:23, 61:7, 75:8, 81:18, 86:13, 86:14, 86:15, 86:16, 87:6, 94:15 Jennings [1] - 17:17 **job** [1] - 92:10 Joe [1] - 3:25 joint [32] - 5:17, 29:12, 29:13, 29:17, 29:19, 33:14, 34:5, 34:8, 34:9, 35:14, 35:17, 35:21, 35:25, 37:13, 38:10, 38:22, 38:25, 40:14, 40:19, 41:2, 41:3, 41:10, 44:24, 45:1, 45:2, 45:3, 45:5, 45:9, 45:14, 51:3, 81:21 Joseph [1] - 1:17 judge [4] - 19:23, 20:7, 62:11, 69:1 Judge [4] - 48:14, 49:14, 49:15, 50:25 judged [1] - 85:21 judgment [6] - 18:5, 20:4, 20:5, 53:20, 55:15, 81:22 Judicial [1] - 95:11 K Karen [2] - 79:16, 81:10 Kathy [5] - 23:4, 23:14, 28:7, 29:1, 30:16 Katrina [7] - 1:13, 3:5, 6:9, 42:25, 74:1, 80:21, 84:12 keep [14] - 2:6, 18:20, 29:11, 37:3, 50:1, 51:25, 63:9, 75:13, 83:5, 84:4, 85:24, 90:16. 90:17. 93:25 keeping [4] - 11:10, 11:21, 59:10, 85:1 keeps [2] - 22:2 kept [1] - 85:9 key [2] - 21:4, 58:17 kind [5] - 35:11, 50:14, 63:22, 75:5, 85:24 knowing [1] - 43:13 knowingly [2] - 42:14, 42:16 knowledge [12] - 6:12, 24:7, 39:10, 40:9, 56:25, 61:15, 71:3, 71:6, 71:12, 73:11, 81:23, 82:12 known [2] - 28:11, 62:19 knows [1] - 64:3 **KOONIN** [50] - 2:8, 3:24, 6:6, 13:8, 13:17, 13:23, 13:25, 14:9, 14:11, 14:14, 16:2, 21:23, 21:25, 25:18, 25:21, 25:25, 30:7, 30:10, 31:7, 32:5, 38:20, 51:21, 51:24, 53:16, 54:2, 57:21, 61:5, 63:18, 65:17, 65:21, 66:5, 66:11, 66:18, 67:14, 71:22, 72:20, 72:23, 75:22, 76:1, 76:5, 78:4, 87:20, 87:23, 88:1, 88:5, 89:21, 89:23, 90:2, 90:4, 94:17

Koonin [13] - 1:17, 3:24, 13:8, 21:25,

25:18, 30:7, 53:16, 57:22, 63:18,

66:17, 67:24, 73:2, 89:24

Kravet [3] - 1:19, 4:22

L

labor [4] - 62:2, 62:6, 62:7, 62:21 Labor [9] - 1:4, 3:1, 3:3, 28:9, 29:5, 59:24, 67:20, 81:11, 87:9 Labor's [2] - 5:5, 28:25 lack [4] - 34:24, 35:9, 71:3, 73:11 laden [1] - 17:16 language [4] - 27:5, 65:4, 68:20, 68:21 **Lapin** [13] - 8:7, 57:13, 57:14, 58:4, 58:9, 58:14, 58:18, 58:20, 59:11, 60:13, 60:24, 61:9, 63:5

Lapin's [1] - 60:6 large [2] - 89:15, 90:8 larger [1] - 89:13

last [10] - 5:20, 5:21, 23:24, 45:9, 47:3, 76:14, 82:16, 86:8, 89:21, 89:23

late [4] - 8:6, 66:3, 75:5, 76:15 late-submitted [1] - 8:6

latest [1] - 70:4

laughing [1] - 92:23

Laughter [4] - 14:18, 44:3, 53:1, 92:22 law [20] - 12:12, 14:2, 14:3, 38:10, 54:7, 61:22, 61:24, 62:2, 62:6, 62:7, 62:15, 62:19, 62:21, 67:22, 74:14, 91:14, 91:16, 93:15, 93:20, 93:22

lawsuit [4] - 34:19, 37:7, 38:6, 68:1 lawsuits [9] - 35:22, 36:1, 36:4, 36:13, 37:14, 37:15, 37:23, 38:1, 38:11

lawyer [1] - 7:7

lawyers [7] - 3:18, 4:7, 62:7, 90:13, 90:19, 92:11, 92:21

lead [3] - 5:24, 6:1, 6:4 learned [2] - 77:17, 77:20

least [5] - 5:25, 6:21, 38:23, 74:12, 84.24

leave [1] - 54:4

Leckey [1] - 80:4

lecture [1] - 62:6

left [4] - 41:2, 52:7, 54:18, 79:11 legal [7] - 11:17, 11:20, 11:22, 11:24,

15:10, 44:15

length [3] - 66:6, 79:4, 81:8

letter [6] - 2:12, 18:17, 59:7, 59:12, 70:1

Letter [1] - 86:8 letters [1] - 58:22

level [2] - 31:9, 85:5

levels [2] - 32:13, 72:14

Levin [3] - 71:3, 71:23, 73:10

liable [3] - 83:1, 83:16, 84:15

liberal [2] - 53:22, 54:8

light [7] - 9:10, 82:5, 83:25, 86:10, 87:3,

90:5, 94:7 limine [46] - 2:17, 5:6, 8:19, 9:1, 9:18,

15:17. 15:24. 16:7. 16:8. 22:21. 23:3. 27:23, 28:25, 29:5, 29:20, 33:14, 35:14, 35:21, 38:11, 38:22, 38:25,

40:15, 41:11, 42:7, 53:7, 57:12, 63:14, 67:11, 69:6, 71:2, 73:10, 73:15, 73:16, 74:24, 75:18, 78:7, 79:13, 79:17, 82:8, 82:17, 83:25, 86:3, 86:7, 86:18, 87:23

limitations [2] - 44:6, 80:12

limited [6] - 41:14, 48:17, 48:19, 50:21, 75:16. 81:11

limiting [1] - 84:1

line [20] - 2:25, 3:23, 4:22, 8:12, 12:22, 30:10, 48:2, 51:11, 51:16, 51:18, 52:3, 52:8, 52:10, 52:12, 52:13, 64:15, 68:25, 78:15

lines [1] - 51:25

list [1] - 64:12

listed [2] - 8:21, 64:10

lists [3] - 7:16, 50:20

literally [2] - 5:20, 62:4

litigating [1] - 6:24

litigation [10] - 24:2, 26:1, 26:2, 26:10, 26:11, 54:17, 64:4, 64:6, 64:20, 65:25

Liu [16] - 1:13, 3:5, 6:9, 42:24, 42:25, 43:1, 43:18, 67:5, 74:1, 74:13, 74:14, 80:21, 84:9, 84:11, 84:12, 85:4

LIU [14] - 3:5, 3:8, 6:9, 40:3, 42:23, 42:25, 43:2, 74:1, 80:21, 84:10, 84:12, 87:11, 87:14, 94:19

live [5] - 16:18, 17:16, 40:6, 51:14, 52:24

loads [1] - 62:12

local [3] - 3:25, 4:13, 59:25

Lombard [1] - 1:24

look [3] - 12:15, 68:22, 71:24

looked [5] - 48:25, 54:13, 77:7, 78:1, 81:8

looking [4] - 28:21, 77:23, 82:19, 93:1

looks [2] - 47:10, 68:14

loss [1] - 44:17

losses [1] - 82:5

lost [1] - 49:12

loyally [1] - 45:23

lugging [1] - 90:17

lump [1] - 48:8

М

M&L [1] - 26:4

magic [1] - 56:10

mail [12] - 57:13, 57:25, 58:5, 58:11, 63:5, 65:15, 66:14, 67:7, 69:24, 72:1, 72:13

mailed [1] - 17:21

mails [5] - 57:24, 60:4, 60:5, 61:2, 61:11

main [1] - 89:6

maintain [1] - 83:6

major [1] - 21:16

Marc [9] - 1:17, 3:24, 13:8, 21:25, 30:7, 53:16, 57:22, 63:18, 89:24

March [1] - 24:4

Marilyn [6] - 4:10, 4:12, 52:9, 79:17,

82:17, 86:3

Mark [8] - 1:15, 3:13, 23:12, 23:23, 24:18, 25:1, 29:2, 41:10

market [3] - 59:25, 77:7, 77:25

Marshals [1] - 91:22

MARTIN[2] - 1:23, 95:17

Martin [1] - 95:5

MARYLAND[1] - 1:1

Maryland [3] - 1:7, 1:24, 95:7

massive[1] - 92:7

material [5] - 2:18, 5:11, 5:14, 5:20,

92:7

materials [1] - 78:16

math [5] - 19:12, 19:14, 20:17, 20:19

mathematical [1] - 19:6 mathematician [1] - 19:13

Mathias [2] - 51:1

matter [42] - 8:25, 9:11, 12:12, 14:3, 14:13, 15:5, 15:15, 21:5, 22:21, 23:12,

28:13, 31:23, 32:3, 33:7, 33:19, 33:20,

44:18, 45:18, 56:15, 56:17, 60:4,

66:13, 66:24, 67:1, 67:4, 67:10, 68:8, 69:10, 69:11, 74:4, 74:9, 79:2, 80:11,

81:9, 81:13, 81:17, 81:19, 83:14,

85:19, 91:18, 93:19, 95:10

MATTER [1] - 1:9

matters [4] - 70:16, 71:8, 71:12, 71:14 mean [16] - 12:12, 14:21, 17:1, 17:6, 21:12, 25:25, 27:6, 38:3, 40:5, 46:5,

57:8, 62:22, 71:15, 77:14, 85:16, 85.23

meaning [3] - 68:12, 68:23, 71:25

means [4] - 17:9, 43:14, 72:8, 72:14

measure [1] - 77:3

measurements [1] - 30:17

measures [6] - 34:18, 35:7, 35:16, 76:3, 76:17, 77:24

mechanical [1] - 1:21

meet [1] - 28:14

meeting [2] - 52:13, 88:6

members [1] - 32:10

memorandum [1] - 5:6

men's [1] - 89:12

mention [1] - 37:9

mentioned [5] - 17:18, 33:2, 33:5,

46:23, 90:2

mentions [1] - 48:1

Meredith [4] - 1:15, 3:13, 41:10, 42:20

MEREDITH [2] - 41:9, 41:13

Merit [1] - 95:5

merit [6] - 20:24, 22:20, 23:2, 27:23,

73:9

methodology [1] - 49:7

mic [1] - 51:14

Michael [2] - 6:4, 25:16

might [1] - 32:8

million [5] - 18:7, 46:21, 49:3, 50:10, 50:18

mind [1] - 63:10

mini [5] - 65:22, 67:13, 69:5, 70:15, 70:18 minor [2] - 66:19, 87:20 minute [18] - 5:10, 5:23, 9:21, 13:18, 13:19, 29:10, 29:11, 29:15, 31:1, 34:12, 40:20, 40:24, 45:4, 47:3, 51:13, 51:15, 51:19, 51:22 minutes [5] - 2:6, 51:14, 51:17, 51:19, 52:10 misconduct [1] - 8:11 misimpression [1] - 32:8 misrepresenting [2] - 9:14, 48:23 missed [3] - 4:16, 5:1, 40:25 missing [2] - 19:11, 19:15 mistaken [2] - 12:3, 45:10 mistakes [1] - 31:19 moment [2] - 54:18, 82:7 Monday [2] - 2:15, 86:12 money [7] - 12:22, 56:6, 79:25, 80:2, 80:7, 81:12, 82:6 monies [1] - 18:1 monitor [1] - 45:23 month [5] - 19:5, 23:24, 43:22, 54:5, 76:15 months [4] - 28:21, 61:8, 71:18 moot [2] - 68:7, 69:12 Morris [1] - 6:5 most [5] - 22:5, 65:5, 90:19, 92:20, 92:23 motion [135] - 5:5, 5:6, 5:15, 8:19, 9:1, 9:18, 10:1, 10:6, 12:16, 14:24, 15:1, 15:4, 15:17, 15:24, 16:6, 16:8, 17:21, 19:5, 20:4, 20:22, 21:2, 22:21, 23:1, 23:3, 27:23, 28:25, 29:12, 29:19, 33:14, 34:5, 34:8, 34:9, 35:1, 35:14, 35:17, 35:20, 35:21, 35:25, 37:13, 38:2, 38:10, 38:19, 38:21, 38:22, 38:23, 38:25, 40:14, 40:18, 41:3, 41:10, 41:13, 41:14, 42:7, 43:5, 44:19, 44:25, 45:1, 45:2, 45:3, 45:5, 45:9, 45:14, 45:17, 46:1, 46:17, 47:3, 49:11, 50:16, 51:3, 52:9, 53:5, 53:7, 53:8, 53:19, 56:15, 56:18, 56:23, 57:4, 57:11, 57:12, 59:4, 59:8, 60:15, 60:16, 62:12, 63:4, 63:10, 63:12, 63:13, 63:14, 63:22, 65:13, 67:10, 67:16, 69:6, 70:23, 70:24, 71:2, 73:10, 73:12, 73:14, 73:15, 73:16, 74:18, 74:22, 74:24, 75:18, 76:6, 76:8, 76:23, 78:7, 79:1, 79:2, 79:7, 79:12, 79:13, 79:17, 81:5, 81:7, 81:21, 82:8, 82:11, 82:16, 82:17, 86:2, 86:3, 86:4, 87:23 **MOTIONS**[1] - 1:10 motions [25] - 2:16, 2:20, 5:3, 9:25, 15:2, 16:7, 20:23, 23:1, 29:5, 29:13, 29:16, 29:17, 39:11, 40:19, 41:2, 41:3, 51:7, 51:10, 55:2, 71:1, 73:16, 79:11, 86:7, 86:18 motive [1] - 28:16

move [1] - 63:8

moved [4] - 36:2, 39:2, 71:4, 73:17 moving [7] - 16:8, 23:13, 23:21, 29:11, 29:22, 43:19, 72:13 MR [139] - 2:8, 3:2, 3:9, 3:12, 3:16, 3:19, 3:21, 3:24, 4:2, 4:5, 4:11, 4:19, 4:21, 6:6, 7:9, 7:11, 7:14, 7:24, 8:1, 8:4, 8:16, 10:5, 11:4, 11:21, 12:9, 13:8, 13:17, 13:23, 13:25, 14:9, 14:11, 14:14, 14:19, 14:25, 16:2, 16:12, 17:3, 17:7, 17:10, 17:13, 17:15, 19:1, 19:10, 19:21, 20:2, 20:12, 20:19, 21:18, 21:23, 21:25, 23:8, 23:20, 23:23, 24:1, 25:18, 25:21, 25:25, 29:7, 30:7, 30:10, 31:7, 32:5, 32:25, 33:11, 36:12, 38:20, 39:16, 39:18, 39:20, 41:9, 41:13, 46:9, 46:25, 47:2, 47:5, 47:16, 47:21, 48:22, 49:16, 49:18, 51:21, 51:24, 52:11, 53:16, 54:2, 55:6, 57:21, 59:21, 61:1, 61:5, 61:13, 61:22, 63:18, 65:17, 65:21, 66:5, 66:11, 66:18, 66:22, 67:6, 67:14, 67:15, 68:10, 69:17, 69:20, 71:22, 72:20, 72:23, 75:22, 76:1, 76:5, 77:2, 78:4, 79:20, 80:13, 80:17, 83:21, 87:12, 87:17, 87:20, 87:23, 88:1, 88:5, 88:11, 88:15, 88:21, 89:20, 89:21, 89:23, 90:2, 90:4, 91:1, 91:6, 91:11, 91:19, 91:25, 94:12, 94:17, 94:18 MS [22] - 3:5, 3:8, 4:15, 6:9, 40:3, 42:23, 42:25, 43:2, 52:19, 52:21, 74:1, 80:21, 84:10, 84:12, 87:11, 87:14, 92:2, 92:4, 92:6, 92:16, 92:18, 94:19 multiple [1] - 26:1 multiply [1] - 22:9 must [2] - 13:2, 23:7 mute [1] - 46:15

Ν

name [6] - 44:12, 50:23, 57:15, 60:6, 60:7. 61:3 names [1] - 61:23 narrow [1] - 62:2 Naugle [13] - 12:7, 12:9, 15:14, 15:18, 15:21, 44:11, 46:21, 47:6, 47:24, 48:1, 48:15, 49:21, 50:8 Naugle's [6] - 13:4, 46:18, 48:4, 48:10, 48:23, 48:24 necessarily [4] - 15:7, 17:4, 55:24, 79:4 necessary [3] - 18:18, 19:15, 41:22 need [17] - 5:12, 7:17, 8:22, 20:19, 21:1, 34:16, 49:8, 49:13, 55:12, 62:3, 66:20, 67:16, 73:12, 75:20, 75:24, 90:21, 91:20 needed [1] - 52:4 needs [2] - 21:19, 94:13 negate [1] - 81:2 negligence [2] - 34:21, 34:23 negligent [2] - 30:1, 33:21 negotiating [1] - 55:9

78:10, 93:10, 93:12 nevertheless [1] - 59:17 new [2] - 13:11, 53:10 newly [1] - 76:8 newly-disclosed [1] - 76:8 Newman [1] - 1:19 next [17] - 9:25, 10:3, 16:6, 29:12, 30:5, 34:8, 34:14, 35:20, 35:24, 38:22, 40:18, 43:21, 47:11, 57:11, 70:23, 70:24, 94:14 night [1] - 15:3 nine [2] - 28:21, 78:13 nitpicking [1] - 21:2 noble [1] - 74:14 nobody [2] - 25:25, 39:18 non [4] - 64:23, 64:24, 65:10, 74:5 non-fiduciary [1] - 65:10 non-hearsay [1] - 74:5 non-profit [2] - 64:23, 64:24 nondisclosure [1] - 58:23 none [3] - 5:2, 38:17, 38:19 normal [1] - 26:16 **NORTHERN**[1] - 1:2 nose [1] - 93:25 note [4] - 8:25, 9:4, 15:12, 20:24 noted [6] - 27:25, 77:14, 81:22, 86:8, 86:23, 86:25 notes [8] - 9:4, 9:7, 9:9, 9:13, 38:24, 41:1, 70:25, 71:1 nothing [8] - 11:6, 11:24, 21:2, 48:10, 59:7, 62:6, 62:15, 85:14 notice [3] - 23:16, 56:10, 93:22 noticed [2] - 28:9, 77:18 notified [2] - 62:9 noting [1] - 45:17 November [1] - 81:20 now-excluded [1] - 30:16 Number [35] - 2:11, 5:18, 8:20, 9:19, 10:4, 15:25, 22:23, 29:2, 33:16, 34:4, 34:6, 34:11, 34:14, 35:16, 36:1, 38:10, 38:23. 40:16. 40:20. 41:6. 44:24. 45:16, 51:5, 53:8, 63:7, 63:16, 69:9, 73:12, 74:24, 79:9, 82:9, 82:21, 82:22, 86:2, 88:4 number [23] - 10:17, 12:13, 22:25, 46:19, 46:20, 47:13, 47:19, 47:24, 48:1, 48:17, 48:24, 49:7, 49:8, 49:20, 50:10, 53:7, 63:14, 73:15, 73:17, 74:18, 74:23, 87:24 numbers [3] - 47:6, 50:8, 88:5 numerous [2] - 12:1, 12:11

never [7] - 13:12, 13:25, 54:10, 76:13,

0

o'clock [1] - 15:3 oath [2] - 37:20, 37:21 objected [2] - 53:20, 58:2 obligation [2] - 11:11, 83:18

obligations [2] - 10:15, 12:23 out-of-court [2] - 28:12, 74:3 81:17, 81:19 payroll [2] - 10:20, 11:5 observed [5] - 71:8, 71:14, 71:19, outside [2] - 33:11, 71:16 71:23, 72:12 overage [1] - 80:1 payrolls [3] - 10:19, 11:10, 11:21 observes [1] - 72:11 overall [2] - 50:17, 86:21 Pender [1] - 42:7 obtained [1] - 64:8 overbroad [1] - 73:22 pending [1] - 86:18 obviously [4] - 8:10, 73:19, 87:4, 92:19 overlapped [1] - 26:12 people [10] - 25:2, 25:4, 26:3, 32:2, occasion [1] - 53:3 overlaps [1] - 76:2 32:12, 33:2, 53:2, 82:14, 90:14, 91:14 occurred [1] - 7:3 own [6] - 31:21, 33:3, 44:7, 49:10, 62:14 per [2] - 9:3, 68:18 October [6] - 60:24, 61:10, 61:14, 62:8, perception [1] - 92:24 63:2, 76:15 Ρ performance [1] - 74:15 **OF** [4] - 1:1, 1:5, 2:1, 95:1 performed [2] - 16:14, 79:15 offer [2] - 63:24, 88:23 perhaps [1] - 32:13 p.m [2] - 52:2 peril [2] - 62:14 offered [2] - 28:13, 28:15 pace [1] - 94:7 period [4] - 62:11, 70:17, 73:6, 84:14 offering [10] - 8:13, 34:10, 35:15, 41:4, packages [1] - 64:22 44:9, 44:22, 45:3, 45:6, 51:4, 79:13 permit [3] - 15:22, 56:22, 57:4 page [2] - 76:14, 95:10 Officer [1] - 88:17 permitted [4] - 28:22, 35:18, 63:21, Page [2] - 46:16, 48:1 officers [1] - 91:22 74:16 paid [17] - 10:7, 11:2, 11:7, 11:15, OFFICIAL [2] - 95:1, 95:18 person [8] - 20:13, 27:1, 27:3, 27:4, 12:18, 45:7, 46:6, 46:20, 47:19, 49:1, 37:19, 37:21, 72:15, 92:15 **ON** [1] - 1:9 49:6, 50:1, 50:9, 50:11, 50:12, 50:19, on-the-record [1] - 86:17 personal [4] - 6:12, 71:3, 71:5, 73:11 50.20 once [3] - 31:14, 77:20, 91:14 personnel [1] - 91:22 paper [3] - 27:20, 32:11, 41:19 persons [2] - 33:4, 61:14 one [65] - 2:2, 4:8, 5:1, 6:20, 7:7, 8:18, Paper [34] - 2:12, 5:18, 8:20, 9:18, 10:3, 9:21, 12:4, 14:12, 14:21, 14:23, 15:1, pertain [1] - 37:2 15:25, 22:23, 29:2, 33:16, 34:4, 34:6, 16:4, 17:23, 18:4, 19:22, 20:2, 21:6, pertained [1] - 24:16 34:11, 34:14, 35:16, 36:1, 38:10, 23:2, 25:7, 26:5, 27:3, 29:18, 30:8, pertaining [1] - 16:15 38:23, 40:16, 40:19, 41:6, 44:24, 32:6, 33:7, 34:2, 34:12, 34:14, 35:22, phone [4] - 3:15, 46:15, 52:6, 59:5 45:16, 51:5, 53:8, 63:6, 63:16, 69:9, 35:24, 36:14, 40:20, 40:22, 40:24, phrase [1] - 5:4 73:12, 74:23, 79:9, 82:9, 82:20, 82:21, 40:25, 42:25, 43:22, 45:1, 47:11, picture [1] - 68:6 49:10, 52:6, 53:3, 53:7, 54:4, 57:24, pin [2] - 18:18, 42:10 papers [4] - 7:21, 27:22, 35:13, 41:13 58:17, 63:10, 64:11, 66:7, 66:19, 68:5, place [1] - 69:13 paperwork [2] - 31:19, 32:16 69:4, 69:15, 69:20, 74:22, 76:7, 82:11, placed [1] - 63:2 parent [1] - 68:5 86:23, 87:20, 89:15, 89:21, 89:23 Plaintiff [3] - 1:4, 1:12, 2:25 parking [3] - 88:24, 89:4, 89:18 one's [1] - 21:6 Plaintiffs' [1] - 90:9 part [7] - 11:4, 25:25, 31:15, 36:16, open [4] - 39:7, 51:14, 63:10, 86:6 Plan [42] - 10:7, 10:11, 10:19, 10:23, 55:23, 57:24, 76:8 operation [1] - 30:2 11:2, 12:9, 12:18, 12:20, 12:21, 12:23, participate [3] - 42:16, 59:5, 88:22 operations [1] - 33:22 12:24, 15:11, 29:21, 29:24, 33:6, participated [2] - 71:8, 71:14 operative [2] - 43:21, 53:11 37:10, 43:14, 44:17, 45:8, 45:24, participating [1] - 42:14 opine [1] - 15:19 48:25, 49:1, 49:6, 56:4, 56:5, 56:7, participation [1] - 43:13 opinion [16] - 23:12, 28:19, 29:2, 39:9, 60:10, 64:10, 66:25, 67:12, 68:9, particular [3] - 32:18, 46:1, 63:25 41:4, 41:17, 41:20, 42:8, 42:15, 43:4, 68:18, 69:8, 69:22, 69:25, 70:3, 79:14, particularly [4] - 27:8, 58:13, 82:14, 43:7, 49:15, 49:22, 50:25, 93:13, 94:2 80:2, 80:24, 82:5, 83:3 94:10 opinions [1] - 6:17 plan [7] - 30:21, 36:4, 67:19, 67:20, parties [9] - 25:7, 27:12, 48:3, 77:5, opponent [2] - 36:9, 74:6 67:25, 69:23, 73:5 82:20, 86:14, 90:6, 90:12, 94:3 opponents [2] - 26:4, 64:7 Plan's [2] - 10:10, 55:9 parts [4] - 25:22, 25:23, 27:7, 57:23 opportunity [10] - 5:15, 8:9, 24:21, 25:9, plan's [1] - 67:20 party [17] - 23:16, 24:15, 24:20, 28:2, 28:2, 39:14, 45:12, 46:3, 58:7, 58:19 plans [18] - 29:20, 29:23, 33:15, 33:18, 28:9, 28:15, 33:23, 36:9, 40:5, 50:7, oppose [1] - 81:5 36:25, 37:1, 37:2, 49:1, 63:15, 63:23, 55:23, 57:25, 68:10, 68:11, 74:6, opposed [2] - 21:6, 30:18 64:16, 64:21, 66:25, 67:11, 68:9, 69:6, 75:16, 90:13 opposite [1] - 49:18 69:7, 73:4 past [1] - 82:12 opposition [4] - 5:17, 22:1, 22:8, 47:8 players [1] - 77:25 Patrick [4] - 1:13, 3:2, 10:5, 16:12 oral [1] - 53:19 plead [1] - 54:3 pattern [1] - 9:13 oranges [1] - 47:8 pleaded [4] - 49:5, 53:17, 55:7, 56:12 Pause [14] - 2:4, 2:23, 4:9, 9:22, 11:18, order [8] - 2:12, 36:13, 37:6, 59:2, pleading [3] - 53:22, 54:8, 56:10 12:5, 16:5, 34:13, 35:23, 38:16, 40:21, 68:11, 84:16, 84:25, 90:5 pleadings [1] - 55:1 40:23, 43:24, 86:24 Order [10] - 7:16, 19:5, 75:6, 79:5, pled [1] - 53:13 pay [3] - 11:14, 12:20, 12:25 81:20, 86:7, 86:8, 86:9, 86:16, 86:17 plowing [1] - 53:5 paying [2] - 11:8, 11:9 ordered [1] - 61:23 **PM** [2] - 1:8 payment [4] - 31:15, 43:15, 80:23, 81:12 ordinary [1] - 59:8 point [30] - 6:20, 8:23, 9:4, 13:13, 19:10, payments [10] - 31:10, 31:11, 40:5, otherwise [2] - 23:6, 48:11 19:11, 20:2, 26:22, 32:16, 38:14, 48:8, 48:11, 79:14, 79:23, 79:24,

38:18, 40:11, 42:11, 43:10, 47:21, problem [13] - 13:13, 19:16, 19:18, 48:16, 50:16, 54:7, 54:16, 56:15, 19:19, 21:16, 50:1, 50:2, 71:24, 72:11, 66:18, 74:18, 76:12, 76:16, 79:22, 88:9, 88:10, 91:3 83:25, 87:8, 87:15, 87:20, 88:19 problems [3] - 30:12, 30:21, 33:24 pointed [1] - 58:13 procedures [4] - 31:4, 31:25, 34:11, points [2] - 66:19, 66:21 35:3 policy [1] - 55:19 proceed [1] - 5:2 portions [1] - 31:10 proceeding [1] - 43:21 position [11] - 9:12, 11:3, 12:8, 13:5, Proceedings [2] - 1:21, 94:21 36:10, 36:11, 42:8, 45:22, 63:3, 63:11, proceedings [1] - 95:9 PROCEEDINGS [1] - 2:1 positions [1] - 5:11 process [5] - 6:19, 31:11, 31:17, 76:22, possesses [1] - 83:3 possession [1] - 83:11 processed [4] - 31:15, 33:2, 33:5 possible [3] - 12:10, 88:24 processes [1] - 31:14 post [1] - 84:1 **Processing** [1] - 25:2 potentially [2] - 36:18, 48:9 processing [10] - 29:20, 29:23, 31:8, practices [2] - 84:3, 84:18 31:12, 32:3, 33:8, 33:15, 33:24, 34:6, precise [1] - 17:12 preclude [17] - 34:10, 35:14, 35:21, produced [10] - 1:21, 22:7, 22:9, 23:23, 35:25, 36:2, 37:8, 37:13, 38:11, 41:3, 58:2, 58:6, 60:4, 61:2, 61:11, 65:4 43:5, 43:19, 45:3, 45:5, 51:3, 79:17, product [3] - 65:14, 66:13, 67:3 82:18, 86:3 profit [8] - 42:8, 42:9, 64:23, 64:24, precluded [3] - 15:21, 34:18, 42:18 79:25, 80:2, 80:9, 80:23 precluding [3] - 15:7, 44:6, 45:19 profits [2] - 49:12, 82:1 program [2] - 22:6, 32:9 predicated [1] - 54:8 prejudice [2] - 75:6, 78:24 prohibited [5] - 54:13, 55:16, 55:19, prejudiced [1] - 57:17 81:3, 82:4 prejudicial [1] - 69:4 promise [1] - 94:1 premature [3] - 7:19, 8:23, 9:3 pronounce [2] - 23:5, 23:6 prepared [1] - 16:20 pronouncing [1] - 44:12 present [10] - 3:25, 4:13, 27:10, 27:18, pronunciation [1] - 23:10 37:19, 44:5, 44:14, 56:16, 84:17, 86:1 proper [3] - 14:7, 15:11, 84:4 presented [8] - 6:24, 15:16, 40:12, properly [1] - 60:18 46:13, 46:14, 46:16, 68:8 proponent [1] - 21:19 presenting [2] - 36:3, 48:5 proposal [1] - 77:4 presiding [1] - 69:1 proposed [2] - 93:14, 93:20 pressed [2] - 13:2, 71:11 protected [1] - 6:18 presumption [1] - 83:6 protective [1] - 59:2 protocols [1] - 33:9 pretrial [2] - 2:15, 86:13 Pretrial [4] - 7:16, 75:6, 79:5, 86:15 provide [7] - 21:19, 22:15, 36:15, 49:22, pretty [5] - 2:17, 26:22, 28:1, 83:23, 57:17, 76:20, 77:9 provided [6] - 17:19, 23:16, 24:8, 55:13, 91:23 prevail [1] - 19:20 75:2, 77:21 prevent [1] - 79:13 provider [1] - 77:8 previous [3] - 39:5, 42:15, 45:14 providers [13] - 36:25, 37:1, 37:3, 37:9, previously [4] - 58:19, 61:12, 86:22, 49:2, 49:3, 49:6, 50:7, 50:21, 55:10, 60:10, 77:13, 77:15 principle [3] - 14:2, 17:1, 61:19 provides [1] - 47:7 principles [2] - 27:25, 71:15 providing [3] - 49:12, 64:7, 78:23 printouts [1] - 76:14 provision [2] - 56:11, 67:18 private [1] - 64:22 provisions [1] - 68:17 privilege [11] - 6:19, 57:16, 60:3, 60:12, prudently [1] - 45:23 60:14, 60:19, 60:20, 61:1, 61:16, public [5] - 61:20, 64:23, 64:24, 67:25, 65:15, 67:3 68.2 privileged [5] - 64:12, 87:24, 88:7, **pull** [1] - 32:10 88:12, 88:13 pulling [1] - 22:2 probable [2] - 30:2, 30:12 purchase [1] - 55:18 probative [1] - 84:5 pure [1] - 54:15

purely [1] - 11:5 purported [1] - 18:7 purporting [1] - 69:21 purpose [1] - 69:18 purposes [3] - 36:8, 74:8, 76:2 pursuant [3] - 10:20, 60:11, 95:8 pursue [4] - 43:15, 60:17, 85:11, 85:23 put [12] - 11:7, 15:20, 30:20, 32:10, 32:11, 44:1, 68:11, 69:21, 71:10, 77:3, 78:7, 80:6 putative [2] - 10:2, 34:24 puts [1] - 47:8 putting [4] - 25:8, 36:20, 47:25, 68:2

Q

qualified [1] - 72:25
qualifies [1] - 22:16
qualify [1] - 73:9
quality [3] - 29:23, 32:13, 32:18
questions [3] - 37:22, 38:14, 38:18
quick [1] - 18:4
quickly [1] - 67:9
quip [2] - 62:22, 92:10
quit [1] - 33:12
quite [15] - 5:14, 5:19, 16:23, 20:16, 35:2, 38:7, 43:16, 52:23, 57:9, 72:23, 75:17, 82:5, 91:8, 92:9
quote/unquote [1] - 72:7

R

Raddock [8] - 10:2, 10:9, 10:17, 12:1,

12:13, 15:25, 37:8, 77:5 Raddock's [3] - 12:8, 15:18, 36:22 rail [1] - 89:13 raised [9] - 9:5, 13:12, 13:25, 14:4, 14:5, 14:6, 55:15, 60:19, 76:13 raising [1] - 15:6 ramp [1] - 89:5 rate [4] - 10:16, 11:9, 49:22, 49:23 rates [1] - 50:2 raucous [2] - 91:9, 91:17 RDB-15-3315 [2] - 1:5, 2:11 reaching [1] - 68:22 read [8] - 5:11, 14:21, 27:19, 27:22, 35:13, 61:24, 66:21 reading [1] - 14:22 ready [4] - 5:2, 52:5, 86:19, 93:17 real [2] - 80:8, 83:14 realize [2] - 14:22, 21:7 really [18] - 7:1, 37:15, 37:24, 39:11, 41:14, 44:17, 46:13, 56:20, 60:15, 65:8, 75:12, 75:19, 83:18, 87:2, 91:4, 91:14, 93:9 **Realtime** [1] - 95:6

reason [8] - 27:11, 40:14, 50:17, 65:2,

reargue [1] - 63:22

70:11, 76:16, 81:5, 94:13 Rehabilitation [3] - 64:2, 66:15, 69:12 REPORTER [2] - 95:1, 95:18 reasonable [3] - 17:9, 49:23, 70:17 reimburse [1] - 79:14 Reporter [2] - 95:5, 95:6 reporting [2] - 6:14, 16:10 reasonableness [9] - 39:1, 39:3, 39:7, reimbursement [5] - 79:25, 80:22, 81:2, 39:10, 39:21, 40:10, 40:15, 45:15, 81:9. 81:14 reports [10] - 9:14, 24:1, 24:4, 24:12, reimbursements [1] - 81:25 24:16, 27:6, 27:16, 27:19, 33:17, reasons [28] - 9:18, 9:20, 9:23, 15:23, rejected [1] - 59:1 91.15 16:1, 22:22, 22:23, 28:24, 29:3, 34:4, rejects [1] - 62:5 representative [1] - 67:20 34:7, 35:17, 35:18, 38:13, 40:17, relate [3] - 15:10, 40:10, 85:25 request [7] - 2:13, 41:24, 67:19, 67:21, 44:24, 51:2, 63:6, 63:7, 63:12, 69:8, related [7] - 37:7, 58:20, 64:15, 64:20, 77:4, 86:10 70:22, 73:13, 79:10, 82:9, 86:5, 86:22, 71:7, 79:8, 83:3 requested [1] - 82:22 require [2] - 64:25, 65:22 relates [6] - 45:13, 46:4, 56:16, 64:21, Rebecca [8] - 1:19, 4:13, 52:7, 52:12, 66:12, 81:19 required [3] - 44:13, 56:9, 67:22 92:16, 92:17, 92:18, 92:19 relating [20] - 11:17, 11:20, 29:22, requirement [3] - 10:13, 10:23, 11:23 rebut [3] - 34:24, 35:8, 77:10 requires [2] - 42:13, 85:14 33:18, 34:10, 35:15, 36:4, 45:4, 63:15, rebuttal [4] - 14:21, 36:19, 70:4, 77:24 63:23, 64:13, 65:13, 66:24, 67:11, residual [2] - 21:14, 22:19 recalculate [5] - 18:18, 69:22, 69:25, 69:7, 74:25, 75:10, 82:18, 82:23, 86:4 resolution [1] - 94:2 70:2, 70:9 relation [1] - 43:14 respect [40] - 2:20, 9:5, 12:7, 15:9, 17:5, received [4] - 18:2, 33:8, 77:22, 80:3 relationship [1] - 75:3 21:2, 21:11, 21:14, 23:14, 28:12, Recess [1] - 52:2 release [1] - 31:10 28:20, 29:15, 29:17, 31:23, 35:8, 35:9, recommended [1] - 56:4 releasing [1] - 31:9 36:3, 38:1, 39:8, 42:13, 44:16, 50:17, recommending [2] - 55:9, 56:5 relevance [2] - 69:2, 88:12 57:5, 61:18, 62:2, 62:3, 66:14, 67:1, recommends [1] - 55:18 relevant [28] - 6:23, 7:22, 8:10, 8:24, 67:2, 68:8, 69:4, 73:23, 79:4, 85:7, recompense [1] - 26:6 9:11, 29:24, 29:25, 30:21, 33:18, 85:15, 86:1, 86:2, 88:24, 89:9 record [35] - 2:7, 2:10, 2:22, 2:25, 8:11, respond [11] - 6:20, 13:7, 13:9, 25:18, 33:19, 33:25, 34:4, 36:18, 37:5, 39:4, 9:20, 9:24, 15:23, 16:1, 16:19, 17:5, 39:14, 43:11, 46:3, 66:23, 67:22, 39:8, 39:22, 40:12, 45:18, 46:7, 64:24, 19:6, 22:22, 22:24, 28:24, 29:3, 30:15, 65:3, 65:22, 71:18, 71:23, 82:25, 83:2, 73:12, 77:1 31:5, 34:7, 38:13, 40:17, 44:2, 48:11, 83:9 responded [4] - 34:22, 39:6, 53:12, 71:7 58:6, 63:6, 63:7, 67:25, 69:9, 69:21, reliability [1] - 21:15 responding [1] - 25:16 response [11] - 4:17, 5:25, 6:2, 6:21, 70:22, 73:13, 79:10, 82:10, 86:5, relied [1] - 26:25 86:17 relief [5] - 41:24, 42:12, 42:13, 42:17, 10:20, 41:8, 42:22, 44:13, 61:14, recorded [1] - 1:21 79:23 82:21, 83:8 recordkeeping [8] - 82:18, 82:24, relies [1] - 42:7 responses [8] - 13:13, 24:3, 24:8, 83:15, 84:3, 84:13, 84:18, 85:19, 86:4 religious [1] - 86:22 54:14, 54:15, 55:8, 55:13, 60:8 records [34] - 17:6, 18:1, 18:18, 18:19, rely [9] - 24:23, 24:24, 25:1, 26:25, 27:1, responsibility [2] - 54:19, 84:1 18:20, 21:20, 21:22, 22:1, 22:8, 33:4, 27:3, 27:9, 49:20, 54:24 responsible [1] - 85:4 50:4, 50:6, 50:7, 65:6, 67:19, 68:2, restate [1] - 5:13 relying [3] - 8:13, 25:3, 42:6 83:3, 83:5, 83:7, 83:9, 83:10, 83:18, remain [1] - 86:20 rests [1] - 55:14 84:4, 84:19, 84:21, 85:4, 85:5, 85:8, remaining [3] - 39:22, 82:16, 84:6 result [2] - 81:24, 83:6 85:10, 85:12, 85:17, 85:18, 85:24 resulting [2] - 16:16, 82:4 remains [1] - 57:2 redacted [1] - 60:6 remedial [10] - 34:11, 34:18, 35:3, 35:7, results [1] - 68:3 reduced [1] - 80:14 35:16, 76:3, 76:17, 77:2, 77:23, 79:2 retained [1] - 83:13 refer [1] - 12:16 retaliated [2] - 58:21, 59:22 remedy [1] - 81:11 reference [2] - 56:11, 79:1 remember [1] - 59:6 retaliation [2] - 59:23, 60:14 referenced [2] - 61:12, 63:25 remind [1] - 89:2 retired [2] - 83:9, 84:14 references [1] - 67:24 retirement [7] - 82:19, 82:24, 83:2, reminding [1] - 58:22 referring [1] - 65:15 remove [2] - 68:17, 68:20 83:15, 84:23, 85:15, 85:20 reflect [2] - 9:9, 85:9 return [1] - 80:2 rendered [1] - 80:1 regard [12] - 8:5, 21:21, 27:2, 27:8, revealed [1] - 75:5 replace [2] - 75:7, 77:8 30:17, 37:23, 48:6, 48:16, 58:23, review [4] - 7:1, 7:2, 34:1, 83:18 replacement [1] - 76:22 62:12, 79:23, 89:2 replacements [1] - 35:10 reviewed [2] - 29:18, 31:2 regarding [7] - 10:21, 39:2, 42:2, 42:8, replete [1] - 8:11 reviewing [1] - 81:8 42:17, 43:9, 59:2 rewarded [1] - 25:12 report [27] - 8:6, 8:8, 10:8, 10:9, 15:18, regardless [1] - 88:6 22:11, 22:12, 23:21, 24:22, 24:25, RFPs [1] - 75:15 regards [5] - 24:11, 24:22, 36:15, 56:1, 25:8, 25:23, 26:14, 27:8, 27:11, 28:20, RICHARD [1] - 1:10 67:20 28:23, 29:1, 41:22, 44:7, 44:11, 46:18, Richard [6] - 1:15, 3:13, 7:9, 39:16, Registered [1] - 95:5 48:2, 48:5, 48:10, 48:23, 49:8 46:10, 79:21 regularly [2] - 16:19, 27:9 reported [1] - 95:9 river [2] - 23:5, 23:7 regularly-conducted [1] - 16:19 reporter [5] - 30:5, 44:1, 51:12, 52:4, RMR [2] - 1:23, 95:17 regulation [1] - 55:17 82:15 Rob [2] - 4:2, 88:21 regulations [2] - 10:13, 95:11

Robert [1] - 1:18 rocket [1] - 19:13 role [1] - 6:11 roll [6] - 52:5, 86:19, 89:7, 89:14, 91:23 room [5] - 35:6, 89:12, 90:13, 90:15, 90:16 Roviaro [1] - 62:19 Rule [29] - 16:16, 16:18, 16:23, 16:24, 17:1, 17:5, 21:9, 21:10, 21:14, 21:19, 22:17, 24:19, 28:12, 30:1, 33:19, 34:20, 35:3, 35:5, 35:7, 35:11, 53:13, 53:22, 54:2, 54:8, 57:7, 69:4 rule [4] - 16:22, 53:22, 68:7, 74:15 ruled 191 - 42:15, 47:3, 54:23, 63:20. 64:19, 70:19, 82:25, 83:15, 88:11 Rules [1] - 69:2 rules [5] - 25:11, 25:12, 28:6, 31:18, 58:9 ruling [7] - 21:19, 39:5, 40:9, 59:16, 69:14, 82:1, 84:1

S

rulings [4] - 38:9, 70:12, 75:14, 81:15

run [3] - 22:6, 22:13, 25:11

Salerno [1] - 28:5 sales [1] - 72:4 sample [1] - 48:25 San [1] - 48:12 sandbagging [1] - 54:16 satisfactorily [1] - 32:21 satisfied [3] - 22:16, 22:17, 22:18 satisfies [1] - 55:11 save [1] - 75:11 SBGA [1] - 12:19 scenario [1] - 78:16 Scharlat [6] - 1:15, 3:13, 7:9, 39:16, 46:10, 79:21 SCHARLAT [25] - 3:12, 3:19, 7:9, 7:11, 7:14, 7:24, 8:1, 8:4, 8:16, 23:8, 39:16, 39:18, 39:20, 46:9, 46:25, 47:2, 47:5, 47:16, 47:21, 66:22, 79:20, 80:13, 80:17, 87:17, 94:18 schedule [2] - 86:7, 86:22 school [4] - 74:14, 91:9, 91:14, 91:16 Schrier [2] - 6:4, 25:16 scientist [1] - 19:13 Scott [4] - 1:18, 4:12, 52:11, 83:22 se [1] - 9:3 second [17] - 2:3, 4:8, 9:21, 12:4, 16:4, 17:21, 18:8, 34:12, 35:22, 40:20, 40:22, 40:24, 43:22, 53:6, 58:17, 86:23, 94:4 secondarily [1] - 42:11 secret [1] - 59:11 **Secretary** [137] - 1:4, 3:1, 3:3, 3:5, 5:4, 5:5, 5:23, 6:5, 6:7, 7:15, 8:13, 8:21, 9:25, 10:3, 10:7, 11:1, 11:19, 13:11,

13:21, 15:6, 16:8, 16:11, 17:20, 19:19,

20:23, 22:2, 22:4, 23:1, 23:2, 23:13, 23:15, 24:6, 25:9, 26:1, 26:2, 26:3, 26:8, 26:18, 26:21, 26:23, 27:3, 27:17, 27:24, 28:8, 28:25, 29:5, 29:25, 32:24, 34:10, 34:18, 34:22, 35:15, 36:2, 36:14, 36:24, 38:15, 39:6, 39:13, 40:1, 40:11, 41:4, 41:8, 41:16, 41:18, 43:8, 44:9, 44:13, 45:3, 45:6, 46:12, 46:20, 47:7, 47:10, 47:12, 47:18, 48:2, 48:7, 48:17, 50:10, 51:3, 53:12, 54:10, 54:24, 55:5, 55:7, 55:12, 56:9, 56:16, 56:22, 57:5, 57:10, 57:20, 58:2, 58:4, 58:14, 59:2, 59:14, 59:20, 60:18, 60:19, 63:1, 63:9, 63:23, 63:25, 64:3, 64:6, 65:2, 65:23, 65:24, 67:17, 70:16, 71:6, 73:21, 73:23, 75:8, 75:20, 76:12, 79:13, 79:22, 80:4, 80:20, 80:24, 81:11, 81:22, 82:21, 83:5, 83:11, 83:20, 84:2, 84:8, 84:15, 84:19, 84:23, 87:9. 88:1 secretary [1] - 73:11 Secretary's [27] - 5:15, 8:19, 9:18, 10:25, 11:3, 15:4, 15:13, 15:20, 15:23, 16:7, 22:20, 26:7, 32:6, 36:10, 36:11, 41:20, 42:1, 43:13, 44:7, 58:17, 63:11, 75:7, 76:8, 83:8, 84:13, 84:25, 85:7 secrets [2] - 58:24, 59:13 sector [3] - 64:23, 64:24 **Security** [3] - 5:7, 5:9, 9:2 security [6] - 91:2, 91:3, 91:7, 91:21, see [13] - 15:14, 19:7, 33:3, 47:3, 47:12, 56:25, 62:24, 65:3, 68:19, 84:17, 85:13, 87:6, 94:15 seek [3] - 41:20, 43:5, 79:23 seeking [6] - 27:15, 34:17, 42:12, 74:2, 81:12, 84:16 seeks [1] - 43:8 seem [1] - 69:14 sees [1] - 72:1 selective [1] - 9:13 self [2] - 21:7, 80:24 semantic [1] - 80:8 sense [1] - 74:10 sent [2] - 58:21, 77:17 separate [2] - 30:14, 30:15 separately [1] - 57:24 series [1] - 2:16 seriously [1] - 60:3 serve [1] - 84:5 served [3] - 24:3, 41:17, 54:11 Service [6] - 10:11, 10:12, 10:20, 10:21, 10:23. 11:22 service[11] - 36:25, 37:1, 37:3, 37:9, 49:2, 49:3, 49:6, 50:20, 55:10, 60:10, 77:8 serviced [1] - 69:23 Services [4] - 74:25, 75:10, 75:13, 79:9

services [4] - 36:25, 77:8, 77:10, 80:1

set [22] - 3:18, 9:20, 9:23, 15:23, 16:1,

22:22, 22:23, 28:24, 34:7, 35:19, 38:13, 40:17, 41:13, 49:8, 56:8, 56:9, 63:7, 65:9, 69:8, 70:22, 79:10, 86:5 Settlor [1] - 12:17 settlor [8] - 11:1, 11:5, 12:24, 13:22, 14:1, 14:3, 15:6, 15:15 seven [2] - 73:16, 74:23 several [1] - 63:25 shall [5] - 28:19, 74:19, 74:20, 82:9, 86.16 sharing [1] - 67:17 shoes [1] - 91:4 short [1] - 83:22 **show** [4] - 18:7, 34:21, 35:9, 48:11 **showing** [3] - 33:23, 34:23, 50:4 shown [1] - 22:12 Siamack [3] - 5:8, 6:10, 8:20 side [12] - 5:10, 5:14, 7:6, 12:22, 14:23, 19:20, 20:1, 62:25, 75:17, 78:24, 94:3 sides [1] - 15:22 signed [1] - 81:23 Significa [14] - 74:25, 75:2, 75:7, 75:10, 75:12, 76:5, 76:9, 76:13, 77:16, 77:17, 78:8, 78:12, 78:25, 79:9 signing [1] - 60:19 simple [10] - 14:13, 15:5, 20:21, 20:22, 27:24, 33:19, 35:1, 35:13, 56:14, 79.22 simply [6] - 16:21, 35:2, 80:2, 81:2, 84:5. 85:20 simultaneously [1] - 64:5 sit [1] - 90:14 sitting [1] - 87:3 six [7] - 61:20, 62:9, 63:3, 73:15, 73:17, 74:19, 90:8 sizes [1] - 64:22 skill [1] - 74:17 sleight [1] - 22:2 sneeze [2] - 43:22, 43:25 software [2] - 22:7, 31:10 solely [1] - 58:12 solicitation [1] - 75:15 solicited [2] - 6:16, 60:9 someone [9] - 11:12, 19:2, 23:6, 24:11, 37:22, 38:3, 72:3, 85:7, 85:16 somewhat [1] - 73:22 somewhere [3] - 50:24, 78:16, 78:21 **sorry** [16] - 2:5, 7:22, 7:24, 18:11, 34:11, 42:24, 43:1, 43:25, 45:4, 52:19, 52:21, 66:5, 74:8, 92:11, 92:14, 94:9 sort [5] - 6:20, 47:9, 76:9, 82:2, 94:14 sought [2] - 59:2, 82:6 sounds [1] - 6:22 space [2] - 90:10, 90:11 speaking [3] - 20:11, 30:5, 92:14 special [1] - 4:23 specific [4] - 12:13, 22:3, 54:3, 76:19 specifically [10] - 9:6, 10:14, 16:20, 31:23, 44:10, 50:19, 54:3, 59:3, 60:24,

20:3, 76:14

together [4] - 30:20, 47:8, 66:16, 66:17

toilet [1] - 89:13

111

76:11 submitting [1] - 18:14 telephone [4] - 2:6, 2:9, 51:18, 86:17 specificity [1] - 18:15 **TELEPHONIC** [1] - 1:10 subparagraph [1] - 56:11 speculation [1] - 72:14 subparagraphs [2] - 55:11, 56:2 ten [1] - 61:8 **speculative**[1] - 19:20 subpoena [5] - 77:18, 77:19, 77:21, tend [1] - 29:15 spend [1] - 56:6 78:11 terms [42] - 15:8, 15:11, 15:16, 20:7, spent [3] - 2:18, 14:21, 62:23 subpoenaed [4] - 24:2, 36:24, 50:6, 22:19, 27:25, 28:1, 29:12, 32:1, 32:2, spirit [1] - 25:11 50.7 33:24, 34:3, 35:12, 37:23, 38:8, 50:15, subsequent [5] - 34:11, 34:18, 35:15, **spoliation** [1] - 85:13 53:5, 56:21, 56:24, 61:9, 67:10, 68:12, spot [1] - 89:18 77:2, 77:23 68:15, 68:18, 68:23, 69:1, 70:12, spreadsheet [2] - 17:21, 72:13 substance [1] - 81:3 70:13, 70:15, 71:15, 71:16, 71:18, substantive [1] - 20:6 73:7, 75:15, 79:1, 81:9, 81:17, 85:3, square [1] - 91:21 85:5, 85:11, 85:21, 91:16 SSL [1] - 26:4 sufficiency [1] - 6:22 terrible [1] - 90:20 staff [2] - 89:6, 90:22 sufficient [2] - 22:17, 65:9 sufficiently [1] - 57:6 territory [1] - 14:16 stage [1] - 6:25 test [1] - 28:11 suggestion [1] - 83:17 stand [1] - 51:17 testified [4] - 10:17, 18:10, 18:11, 72:4 sum [2] - 48:8, 81:12 standard [3] - 54:8, 56:10, 59:7 testifies [3] - 71:25, 72:2, 72:7 stands [1] - 49:18 **summaries** [1] - 9:6 testify [5] - 6:13, 15:22, 60:9, 71:13, start [3] - 2:14, 91:14, 93:17 summarize [1] - 5:11 73:5 summarized [1] - 83:22 started [2] - 51:16, 91:7 testifying [2] - 25:5, 72:12 starting [2] - 86:21, 87:4 summary [20] - 16:17, 16:18, 16:24, testimony [56] - 5:7, 6:16, 7:21, 8:5, 17:9, 17:15, 17:22, 17:23, 17:24, 18:4, starts [1] - 30:6 8:24, 9:1, 9:5, 9:10, 9:19, 10:1, 12:8, 18:5, 20:4, 20:5, 21:10, 22:17, 22:21, state [2] - 10:14, 64:4 53:19, 55:15, 81:21 13:4, 15:13, 15:25, 16:18, 17:16, 20:5, **statement** [1] - 28:13 20:6, 20:8, 23:4, 24:19, 25:8, 26:25, summed [1] - 39:20 statements [7] - 9:15, 25:5, 36:9, 37:9, 27:4, 27:10, 27:12, 28:1, 28:3, 29:1, supplemental [5] - 23:21, 24:22, 28:19, 74:4, 74:6, 74:11 29:22, 30:16, 33:3, 36:22, 37:18, States [3] - 62:16, 95:6, 95:12 28:20, 29:1 37:19, 37:20, 38:3, 38:4, 41:4, 41:14, supplemented [1] - 77:21 **STATES**[1] - 1:1 42:2, 42:6, 43:19, 44:9, 44:22, 45:6, support [10] - 5:6, 8:19, 10:1, 15:24, stating [2] - 18:5, 18:17 45:19, 57:12, 63:4, 71:3, 71:25, 73:10, 41:4, 44:9, 44:23, 45:7, 45:19, 53:9 **statistical** [1] - 26:15 82:23, 83:12 supported [1] - 30:22 status [1] - 65:10 Texas [1] - 52:14 supporting [3] - 12:15, 22:15, 44:16 statutes [1] - 59:23 THAMES [1] - 23:4 supportive [1] - 30:11 **stay** [1] - 51:18 Thames [12] - 23:5, 23:6, 23:9, 23:11. supports [1] - 54:7 stenographically [1] - 95:9 23:12, 23:14, 27:13, 28:7, 28:16, 29:1, supposedly [2] - 58:20, 59:10 stenographically-reported [1] - 95:9 30:16 Supreme [1] - 28:4 stenography [1] - 1:21 Thames' [1] - 54:23 step [2] - 2:19 surplusage [1] - 58:7 themselves [4] - 2:21, 2:24, 11:14, 17:8 surprise [1] - 26:18 still [16] - 39:7, 40:6, 40:12, 45:17, 46:6, theories [2] - 54:3, 54:12 surprised [1] - 26:19 47:23, 51:6, 52:8, 52:10, 52:12, 52:14, theory [16] - 13:11, 13:25, 41:15, 53:10, switch [5] - 58:7, 58:15, 78:4, 78:5, 52:15, 52:18, 74:11, 84:22, 89:13 53:17, 54:3, 54:4, 54:10, 54:19, 55:14, 78.14 stipulate [1] - 36:20 57:6, 59:3, 59:11, 73:24, 76:8, 76:13 sworn [2] - 26:25, 27:4 stop [1] - 87:1 therein [1] - 28:14 system [5] - 31:3, 31:8, 31:24, 33:25, stops [2] - 7:11, 39:18 they've [4] - 13:25, 64:10, 76:13, 78:11 70.8 store [1] - 90:15 thinking [2] - 72:15, 89:11 systematic [1] - 33:23 story [1] - 18:20 thinks [2] - 72:3, 72:7 straight [1] - 18:20 third [7] - 16:6, 33:23, 50:7, 57:25, Т Strandberg [10] - 1:19, 4:13, 52:7, 63:13, 70:19, 75:16 52:16, 52:18, 92:16, 92:17, 92:18,third-party [3] - 33:23, 50:7, 75:16 92:19, 92:24 Table [5] - 46:18, 49:21, 49:24, 50:1, three [12] - 5:1, 20:23, 51:7, 55:11, 56:2, **STRANDBERG** [8] - 4:15, 52:19, 52:21, 50.9 58:6, 63:14, 71:18, 90:10, 90:12, 92:2, 92:4, 92:6, 92:16, 92:18 table [4] - 49:21, 50:12, 90:8, 90:10 93:10, 93:19 Street [1] - 1:24 tainted [1] - 38:8 throughout [1] - 56:9 strictly [1] - 72:12 targeted [3] - 30:18, 30:22, 46:18 thrust [2] - 11:3, 39:11 stuck [1] - 47:5 TAS [6] - 22:7, 22:9, 31:12, 31:15, Thursday [1] - 86:16 stuff [2] - 11:10, 14:22 31:20, 32:8 tied [1] - 67:1 **submissions** [1] - 82:20 team [18] - 30:13, 30:14, 30:22, 31:13, timing [1] - 54:25 submit [2] - 10:9, 43:4 31:14, 31:21, 31:23, 32:1, 32:10, TMS [2] - 69:24, 69:25 submits [1] - 10:8 32:12, 32:17, 32:18, 33:2, 33:5, 72:4 today [1] - 2:13 submitted [6] - 8:6, 18:5, 18:12, 19:7, teasing [1] - 74:16

technology [3] - 31:4, 31:25, 33:25

tolling [1] - 81:24 U W took [3] - 24:14, 34:19, 80:5 top [2] - 8:18, 14:23 U.S [2] - 1:23, 17:17 Wachovia [1] - 48:11 total [4] - 49:2, 70:25, 78:14 U.S.C [1] - 95:8 wage [2] - 11:10, 11:22 totally [2] - 32:17, 64:21 unanalyzed [1] - 48:8 wait [9] - 9:21, 13:18, 34:12, 40:20, tough [1] - 70:16 unavailable [1] - 24:19 40:22, 40:24, 45:4, 65:21, 87:6 track [1] - 85:1 uncontested [2] - 26:23, 30:13 waited [1] - 24:13 trade [2] - 58:23, 59:13 under [37] - 10:23, 16:21, 16:23, 17:5, waiting [1] - 2:6 training [3] - 26:16, 33:8, 72:24 18:16, 21:9, 21:10, 21:14, 21:19, walking [1] - 18:8 Training [3] - 64:2, 66:15, 69:11 22:19, 24:18, 28:11, 28:12, 28:14, wants [5] - 5:24, 39:15, 48:3, 48:7, transaction [7] - 55:16, 55:19, 55:21, 29:25, 32:8, 33:19, 34:20, 37:20, 83:11 80:23, 81:3, 82:4 37:21, 42:13, 48:2, 49:13, 53:22, Ward [20] - 4:10, 4:12, 18:19, 36:7, transactions [2] - 54:13, 56:2 55:10, 56:2, 56:10, 57:16, 62:19, 36:15, 37:25, 52:7, 52:9, 82:17, 82:22, transcript [4] - 1:21, 37:8, 95:9, 95:10 62:21, 69:2, 70:8, 74:4, 79:24, 80:8, 83:19, 84:7, 84:20, 85:1, 85:14, 85:17, transfer [1] - 79:25 81:4 86:1 TRDI [10] - 64:1, 64:5, 64:9, 64:11, undercharged [1] - 18:7 Ward's [7] - 79:17, 82:18, 84:3, 84:13, 67:18, 67:25, 68:13, 68:19, 68:21, underlying [10] - 17:17, 17:20, 17:22, 84:17, 84:23, 86:3 69:22 17:23, 21:11, 21:20, 21:21, 22:1, 25:5, warn [1] - 93:16 TRDI's [1] - 64:13 60.21 waste [1] - 20:17 Trial [3] - 65:14, 69:11, 88:3 understood [2] - 43:5, 89:24 ways [1] - 45:13 trial [38] - 2:14, 7:19, 8:22, 9:10, 9:17, underwriter [2] - 72:21, 73:4 Weatherford [4] - 1:18, 4:12, 52:11, 14:6, 15:17, 16:20, 19:23, 20:6, 20:9, unethical [1] - 58:2 20:15, 43:22, 50:14, 54:5, 56:19, unfair [6] - 25:9, 25:10, 54:16, 54:24, **WEATHERFORD** [3] - 4:11, 52:11, 56:20, 56:23, 61:13, 62:7, 62:11, 62:24, 78:10 83:21 62:15, 64:11, 64:13, 65:1, 65:23, 69:1, UNITED [1] - 1:1 weave [1] - 80:11 78:19, 85:19, 86:12, 86:15, 87:2, United [3] - 62:16, 95:6, 95:12 weeds [1] - 62:21 88:22, 93:11, 93:12, 94:1 unjust [1] - 82:1 week [6] - 2:14, 86:12, 86:21, 87:4, trials [5] - 67:13, 69:5, 70:15, 70:18, unless [3] - 7:11, 23:6, 28:2 94:4, 94:14 93:12 unreasonable [2] - 48:10, 48:13 weeks [8] - 5:21, 14:6, 28:20, 61:20, tried [7] - 18:18, 54:4, 62:1, 70:17, unsurprisingly [1] - 65:5 62:10, 63:3, 81:21, 93:10 74:17, 93:2, 93:4 untenable [1] - 63:11 weight [12] - 18:23, 19:17, 21:4, 21:6, Trilogy [5] - 24:1, 24:3, 24:6, 24:11, 21:7, 21:8, 33:20, 34:3, 43:10, 56:19, untrue [1] - 22:14 26:14 **up** [17] - 35:5, 39:20, 47:25, 48:1, 48:3, 57:9, 72:17 Trucker [1] - 48:12 51:17, 51:25, 62:8, 64:25, 72:3, 78:19, Welfare [1] - 45:8 true [7] - 8:14, 23:10, 62:16, 62:17, 79:18, 85:10, 88:23, 89:8, 90:22 West [1] - 1:24 62:19, 78:11, 95:8 updates [1] - 65:6 whatsoever [1] - 22:20 trust [11] - 10:16, 11:6, 11:7, 11:15, USERRA[1] - 12:19 wherein [1] - 55:18 11:25, 31:3, 31:7, 31:24, 33:24, 80:6 whole [2] - 56:19, 59:10 trustee [6] - 69:23, 69:24, 70:8, 80:5, utility [1] - 75:16 wiggle [1] - 35:6 84:5. 85:2 V withheld [2] - 57:15, 61:10 trusteeship [1] - 84:18 withhold [2] - 60:6, 61:23 truth [3] - 28:13, 74:4, 74:9 witness [11] - 7:17, 8:22, 9:7, 24:19, try [7] - 15:1, 19:13, 70:17, 78:21, 93:7, vanilla [1] - 59:12 24:21, 25:10, 28:3, 37:18, 59:11, 93:17, 94:7 variables [2] - 19:11, 19:15 61:13, 90:15 trying [24] - 13:11, 15:8, 16:14, 16:17, vendor [5] - 48:4, 49:9, 49:13 witnesses [1] - 84:24 17:25, 20:17, 29:9, 35:8, 35:9, 37:25, vendor-by-vendor [2] - 49:9, 49:13 wonderful [1] - 94:6 62:7, 63:3, 66:3, 66:4, 66:8, 68:20, verify [1] - 90:23 word [1] - 55:12 74:15, 75:13, 81:13, 82:2, 85:4, 85:25, version [1] - 58:5 90:23 words [4] - 18:24, 30:18, 54:14, 56:10 versions [1] - 58:14 works [1] - 70:1 turned [1] - 77:19 versus [2] - 2:10, 12:17 worry [2] - 66:20, 91:20 turnover [1] - 64:17 view [10] - 9:8, 34:17, 38:14, 38:18, worthy [1] - 74:14 two [30] - 5:1, 5:21, 5:23, 15:2, 16:14, 56:23, 57:2, 57:3, 87:8, 87:16, 88:19 18:2, 25:21, 25:23, 26:22, 27:7, 30:20, woven [2] - 66:16, 66:17 violation [2] - 42:14, 42:16 33:11, 40:19, 41:2, 49:15, 57:23, written [3] - 5:13, 5:14, 6:21 violations [1] - 7:2 $60{:}21,\,66{:}7,\,66{:}16,\,68{:}12,\,69{:}5,\,69{:}21,$ Vogel [1] - 4:22 72:14, 77:6, 78:1, 79:11, 82:12, 90:13, Υ 93:10, 93:19 Twombly [1] - 57:7 yard [1] - 12:22 type [2] - 24:24, 28:3 Year [1] - 47:11 typically [2] - 24:24, 25:6

year [8] - 24:9, 24:10, 50:25, 59:17, 60:25, 61:8, 71:17, 94:10
years [21] - 18:2, 41:5, 41:15, 42:4, 43:9, 43:19, 44:10, 44:21, 44:23, 46:23, 49:4, 49:15, 60:21, 64:16, 64:17, 78:14, 85:8, 91:9, 91:16, 91:17, 93:12

Z

Zapata [1] - 59:3

§

§[2] - 55:17, 95:8